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SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS,
WARD, SUMNER, AND COOLEY

This dissertation was conducted under the direction of the Reverend Paul Hanly Furfey, Ph.D., as Major Professor, and was approved by the Reverend Bernard G. Mulvaney, C.S.V., Ph.D., Celestine J. Nuesse, Ph.D., and Alphonse Clemens, Ph.D., as readers.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY

SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS,
WARD, SUMNER, AND COOLEY

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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PREFACE

SINCE "society" and "social change" are key concepts in social thinking and planning, especially in the contemporary world of rapid social change,¹ it seems necessary to analyze and evaluate the assumptions underlying the ideas of society which the pioneer American sociologists have introduced into systematic theory and compare these with the Thomistic position in Catholic social philosophy.

St. Thomas has been selected as representative of the basic assumptions and social theory found in most Catholic works in sociology, while Lester F. Ward, William G. Sumner, and Charles H. Cooley are taken as pioneers in introducing into American sociology basic assumptions and trends of thinking still current in non-Catholic works. An attempt will be made to present the similarities and differences existing between the dualism of St. Thomas, the materialistic monism of Ward and Sumner, and the spiritualistic monism of Cooley. Since "our conceptual language tends to fix our perceptions, and derivatively, our thought and behavior,"² it is very important to be able to analyze and evaluate the conflicting theories about "society" and "social change."

As a convenient organizing device, the concept of "society" will be analyzed according to the four causes used in a broad sense. The material cause is that from which a thing is made; hence, it will refer to the members of society. The formal cause is that which makes a thing what it is, the organization of society. The efficient cause or agent is that which brings society into existence; and the final cause refers to the purpose of society. The concept of "social change" will be analyzed according to its definition, factors of social change, and directed social change.

Each of the first four chapters will contain a brief biographical

¹ Svend Reimer, "Social Planning and Social Organization," *American Journal of Sociology*, LII (May, 1947), 508.

² Robert K. Merton, "Sociological Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, L (May, 1945), 466.

sketch of the writer, his theory about society and social change, and an evaluation of his theory. The fifth chapter will present a comparative and critical analysis of the four theories.

Similar comparative studies are: Henry Ignatius Smith, O.P., *Classification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology* (1915);³ Charles Hunt Page, *Class and American Sociology: From Ward to Ross* (1940);⁴ Sister Roberta Snell, *The Nature of Man in St. Thomas Compared with the Nature of Man in American Sociology* (1942);⁵ and William T. O'Connor, *Naturalism and the Pioneers of American Sociology* (1942).⁶

Father Smith compares the subjective classification of desires in St. Thomas and Ward, and the objective classification in St. Thomas and Albion Small. Page presents the theories of class, class structure, class conflict, and social control or social reform of Ward, Sumner, Small, Giddings, Cooley, and Ross. Sister Roberta Snell analyzes the Thomistic concept of the nature of man and compares it with American sociologists from Ward to Sorokin. Father O'Connor treats of naturalism in the sociological theories of Ward, Giddings, Small, and Sumner. This study will attempt to supplement this series by presenting a comparative analysis of the concepts of "society" and "social change" according to St. Thomas, Ward, Sumner, and Cooley.

To the Reverend Paul Hanly Furfey, Head of the Department of Sociology, the writer wishes to express her sincere gratitude for his patient supervision of this work. To the Reverend Bernard G. Mulvaney, C.S.V., Dr. C. J. Nuesse, and Dr. Alphonse Clemens, for their careful reading of the manuscript and valuable suggestions; to the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O.P., for reading

³ Henry Ignatius Smith, O.P., *Classification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1915).

⁴ Charles Hunt Page, *Class and American Sociology: From Ward to Ross* (New York: The Dial Press, 1940).

⁵ Sister Roberta Snell, *The Nature of Man in St. Thomas Compared with the Nature of Man in American Sociology* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942).

⁶ Reverend William T. O'Connor, *Naturalism and the Pioneers of American Sociology* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942).

the chapter on St. Thomas; and to all who contributed to the completion of this work, she also expresses grateful acknowledgment.

To my Religious Superiors I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the opportunity of graduate study at The Catholic University, and to the Sisters of my Congregation for their encouragement and assistance.

SISTER MARY EDWARD, C.S.J.

August, 1947.

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CHAPTER I

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, greatest theologian and philosopher of the Middle Ages, was born in 1224 or 1225 in Rocca Sicca, Italy, the son of a count and countess. At the age of five he entered the Monastery of Monte Cassino. In 1239 he went to Naples to begin his study of liberal arts, where he probably became acquainted with the writings of Aristotle. Entering the Dominican Order in Naples, in 1244, St. Thomas studied at Paris from 1245 to 1248, and in Cologne from 1248 to 1252 under St. Albert the Great, who exerted a powerful influence on his intellectual development. He received the bachelor's and master's degrees in Paris between 1252 and 1259 and taught at the University of Paris from 1256 to 1259. From 1261 to 1264 St. Thomas was papal theologian at the court of Urban IV. During most of the decade 1260-1270 St. Thomas taught theology in his native Italy. In 1268 he was recalled to the University of Paris as professor of theology. The four years from 1268 to 1272 mark the highest scientific achievement in his career. On March 7, 1274, he died while on a journey to the Council of Lyons.¹

The aim of St. Thomas' life of study and teaching was to penetrate the domain of the supersensory and supernatural truths, to search for the causes, relations, forces, and laws of the natural and supernatural world. St. Thomas' mind was characterized by independent speculation that sought logical and metaphysical foundations, by a "positive historical method of scrutiny and research, and by a deeply religious and mystical bent."² Thomas not only

¹ Martin Grabmann, *Thomas Aquinas: His Personality and Thought*, trans. Virgil Michel, O.S.B. (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928), pp. 1-17; Hans Meyer, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Frederic Eckhoff (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1944), pp. 549-550; Paul H. Furfey, *A History of Social Thought* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942), pp. 174-175.

² Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

2 *Society, Social Change in St. Thomas, Ward, Sumner, Cooley*

displayed independent power of investigation and great energy as a logician and metaphysician, but also put to good use the scientific results of earlier thinkers.

The range of sources St. Thomas used is astounding. He drew from Aristotle, Plato, Porphyry, Boethius; the Scriptures; the Church Fathers, such as Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, John Chrysostom; earlier Scholastics such as Anselm of Canterbury, Hugh of St. Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, Abelard, and Peter Lombard; the ancient classics of Horace, Ovid, Cicero, Seneca, Livy, and others; Arabian philosophers such as Averroes and Avicenna; and Jewish philosophers.³

Some of the sources of his social thought can be noted in the following examples. According to Aristotle,⁴ man's natural needs and his power of speech point to community life, and his sense of morality, of good and evil, right and wrong, presuppose an ordered community within which he is able to perform his life's tasks.⁵ The Stoics handed down to Cicero and ultimately to Christianity the idea of man's social nature and the concept of the organic state as developed by Aristotle and Plato. These ideas harmonized with the teachings of the New Testament, especially St. Paul's organic concept of corporate community. Aristotle, the New Testament, and especially St. Augustine were among the great authorities and guides for St. Thomas. Thomism has been called the synthesis of Aristotle and St. Augustine, for these two were the pillars of his system.

Although St. Thomas was primarily a theologian and philosopher, he selected from his predecessors certain principles of social philosophy and developed them so that they may serve as basic assumptions in the study of society and social change today. He did not write a systematic treatise but his complete system may be culled from his various writings. Those that will be used most frequently in the discussion of this treatment of society and social change are the *Summa Theologica*, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, *De Regimine Principum* (translated as *On the Governance of Rulers*),

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-57.

⁴ *In Libros Politicorum*, Lib. I, lect. 2; III, lect. 9; *In Libros Ethicorum*, Lib. I, lect. 6, 13.

⁵ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 418.

Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem (in English translation, *An Apology for Religious Orders*), and the Commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The basic assumptions of the Thomistic treatment of society and social change are: first, God is the Prime Reality, the First and Last Reason of all things. He is unchangeable and yet the source of all change. He is the Necessary Being upon whom all contingent beings depend for their existence and action, yet there is no identity between God and created things. Second, each finite being, such as a person, is a unit complete in itself and separate from all others. The universe is more than an organism. It is a systematic whole composed of finite beings, each of which is a complete unit. Each is a part of the whole universe, yet receives its wholeness not from the universe but from its own nature. The universe and change in the universe are guided by law according to His Infinite Intelligence.⁶

According to Thomistic metaphysics, also, everything exists for a purpose. This purpose is found in the very nature of the being, since each being has within itself an appetite or inclination to seek the end proper to its nature. This end is the "good" of the being.⁷ In beings lacking intelligence, this appetite for the natural good is blind and is sought by necessity. In intelligent beings, this appetite—the will—is conscious, and therefore man "desires" what is good for him since "desire" is a movement toward a good which is not present.⁸ Since things act according to their nature, persons direct themselves consciously because they are intelligent. Unconscious natures are directed by God, their ultimate source. According to his nature, man, like other creatures, must seek the good.⁹ This movement toward his natural goal has its first principle in God, the First Mover. Man is the only creature in the universe whose nature impels him to seek God, the Absolute Good.

⁶ Cf. Brother E. Stanislaus Duzy, *Philosophy of Social Change* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), pp. 116–118.

⁷ *In Ethic.*, I, 1a.

⁸ *In Libros Sententiarum*, Lib. I, d. 45, a. 1, ad 1m.

⁹ *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 6, a. 4, ad 2; I, q. 2, a. 1; I, q. 26, a. 2c.

4 *Society, Social Change in St. Thomas, Ward, Sumner, Cooley*

Because this is the natural goal of man, God has given to man his intellect to grasp the notion of the Good, and his will to move toward that Good.

DEFINITION OF SOCIETY

St. Thomas defines society as "a union of men for the purpose of effecting some one thing in common," or more simply, "a union of men acting for a common purpose." *Cum societas nihil aliud esse videatur quam adunatio hominum ad unum aliquid communiter agendum*.¹⁰ Since unity can be achieved either through unity of being or unity of act, what kind of a unity is society? It can hardly be a unity of being in which the parts are fused into one substance because St. Thomas remarks that society without individuals in an abstraction.¹¹ The recognition of a union of men who are separate individuals precludes the possibility of union of being; for man as a person is an individual, subsistent, incommunicable substance.¹² This is important in view of the tendency among some sociologists and social thinkers to hypostatize society as having a substance and reality apart from the individual men who are its component elements. Society then tends to be an abstraction or mental fiction rather than a being founded in concrete reality.

Society is not a unity of being but of act. The members of society, separate individuals, are united in common action to accomplish a common purpose. As examples, St. Thomas mentions an army organized for the purpose of fighting; an educational society, for teaching and learning. Out of common action a system of coordination and subordination, a set of relationships, arises among the members. These are directed to the achievement of the common purpose of the group. From this it would seem that the social fact is the system of relationships among the members of the group in action since *ad agendum* implies action. These relationships are dynamic rather than static since society is a unity

¹⁰ *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, c. 8.

¹¹ *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 16, ad 16.

¹² James Hoban, *The Thomistic Concept of Person and Some of its Social Implications* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University Press, 1939), p. 55; *Summa Theol.* I, q. 29, a. 1.

of act. It is the unity of collective action for a common good that makes the action social in contrast to an action directed by an individual for an individual goal or interest. Thus society is the ordered human activity of men toward a common objective or good. It is this striving of men for a common purpose that integrates the group, and it is this common purpose that primarily differentiates one group from another.

St. Thomas, following Aristotle, classifies groups according to their common purpose and common action.¹³ For example, a friendship group may be those who grew up together; those engaged in commercial transactions; or those engaged in some business. A distinction is made between public and private societies as follows: a public society is a union of men whose common purpose is the common good, e.g., citizens in a city or kingdom; while a private society is composed of a few persons for some private end, for example, a business partnership. Public and private societies may be subdivided into temporal and perpetual. A political society formed by citizens who choose to live in a particular city forever would be an example of a perpetual, public society. A perpetual private society would be a husband and wife, or master and slave, because of the durable bond between the members. When a group of men engage in a temporary business, for example, a fair, they form a temporary public society. If two friends manage the same inn, this would be a private temporary society. St. Thomas states specifically that these various classes of association are to be judged by different standards according to their purposes. This seems to imply a study of group relations in terms of common action, of common purpose, and what the purpose means to the agents involved. In classifying groups according to purpose the factor of the changing of group purpose in the course of time must be considered in a dynamic society for "the purpose of human living implies progressive action."¹⁴

In discussing the relationship between a private and public society St. Thomas states that "a private society is a part of a public society, as a house is part of a city. The fact that a man

¹³ *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, c. 8.

¹⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2; *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 7, ad 11.

forms part of a family causes him to form part of a city, which is composed of many families.”¹⁵ A man may belong to a public, perpetual association and at the same time be a member of a public or private temporary society, for example, a man may be a member of a family and be associated with others in education or in civil affairs.¹⁶ According to this definition society is characterized as a group or groups of men in dynamic relationship to each other in terms of the purpose selected by the members of the group. Society considered in general, or as a particular group, is a system of dynamic relationships purposively organized.

Since the essential elements of society are grouping of men, common action, and common purpose, these will be further analyzed according to the conceptual framework of the four causes. Applying this schema to the Thomistic concept of society, the material cause is men; the formal cause is social unity or unity of order; the efficient cause is, proximately, man's intellect and will and authority, and ultimately, God and the natural moral law; and the final cause is the common good.¹⁷ These four causes are related thus:

The final and formal causes are more properly called the causes of the *being* or of the perfected form of society; the material and efficient are more properly termed the causes of *becoming* or of the imperfect form of society.¹⁸

MATERIAL CAUSE OR MEMBERSHIP

In a general sense, man is the material cause of society. Specifically, it is those aspects of man's nature that furnish the material for social relationships, social institutions, and social organization.

According to St. Thomas, man is naturally social because of his needs, both spiritual and physical, his natural equipment to meet these needs, and his insufficiency to provide for all his needs.¹⁹

¹⁵ *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, c. 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Josepho Gredt, O.S.B., *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, II (7th ed.; Friburgi Brisgoviae, 1937), p. 411.

¹⁸ James Hagan, "Aristotelian Political Philosophy and the Corporate Society," *The New Scholasticism*, XV (April, 1941), 122.

¹⁹ *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Lib. III, c. 85; 113; 117; 128; 129; 131; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 96, a. 4; I-II, q. 61, a. 5; q. 94, a. 2; q. 95, a. 4; II-II,

This includes all of man's needs, his "altruistic and exalted as well as egoistic and animal."²⁰ In order to satisfy his appetites and develop his complete personality, man needs God, other men, and things.

For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, . . . human assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is not sufficient by himself to provide for his own life.²¹

God, the source of man's spiritual nature, is his final end and destiny. Through the development of his spiritual capacities, intellect and will, and his physical powers of locomotion, nutrition, growth and reproduction, man perfects his nature and attains God, his final end. Man can exist without others, but for his complete development he needs the help of others.

It is natural for man to be a social and political animal, to live in a group, even more so than all other animals, as the very needs of his nature indicate. For all other animals nature has prepared food, hair as a covering, teeth, horns, claws as means of defense, or at least speed in flight. Man, on the other hand, was created without any natural provision for these things. But instead of them all he was endowed with reason, by the use of which he could procure all these things for himself by the work of his hands. But one man alone is not able to procure them all for himself; for one man could not sufficiently provide for life, unassisted. It is, therefore, natural that man should live in company with his fellows.²²

The interdependence of man is also supported by the fact of the gift of speech, "a prerogative proper to man."²³ By the use of

q. 109, a. 3, ad 1; q. 114, a. 2, ad 1; q. 129, a. 6, ad 1; III, *Supplement*, q. 41, a. 1; *De Regimine Principum*, Lib. I, c. 1; c. 14; *In Ethic.*, I, lect. 1 et 2.

²⁰ Ignatius Smith, O.P., "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," *The New Scholasticism*, XIX (October, 1945), 306.

²¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 129, a. 6, ad 1.

²² *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1; *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, c. 21; cf. Wilhelm Schwer, *Catholic Social Theory*, trans. B. Landheer (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1940), p. 101.

²³ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1.

this faculty man is able to communicate his ideas to others. The presence of this faculty seems to be correlated with the need, for "man communicates with his kind more completely than any other animal known to be gregarious, such as the crane, the ant, and the bee."²⁴ Speech is a necessary condition for social life so that men can cooperate with each other in forming groups and also that "one who has conceived the truth in his mind, may be able to impart it to another: so that men may thus assist one another in the knowledge of truth, even as in other necessities of life."²⁵

Animals can discern what is useful and injurious by an inborn instinct or skill. Man, on the other hand, can obtain the knowledge of what is essential for his life by reasoning from universal principles, but he needs the help of others in order to obtain all the knowledge necessary because he cannot acquire it alone. Men, therefore, need to live in groups so that they can assist each other by exchange of ideas since each may be occupied in similar or different fields, "one, for example, in medicine, one in this and another in that."²⁶ In discussing intellectual development St. Thomas remarks that "it is especially in study that society is of use; for among many students some will know and understand that of which others are ignorant."²⁷ Again in the *Summa Theologica* he says that association with others is useful because one instructs the others "in that which he has to contemplate."²⁸ Learning is advanced through mutual cooperation.

In regard to moral development St. Thomas maintains that although man has a natural aptitude for virtue, he needs training in order to perfect his virtue and that necessitates training by another.²⁹ Speaking of the kind of training he says that "men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion; but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled."³⁰ Association with

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Contra Gent.*, III, c. 147; *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1; cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 420.

²⁶ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1.

²⁷ *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, c. 8.

²⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 188, a. 8.

²⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 95, a. 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

others, then, is necessary to attain moral perfection through developing personal and especially the social virtues of justice and charity by instruction, example, encouragement, and reproof.³¹ Friendship among good men also tends to preserve and promote virtue.³² Since all men have one common last end, attainment of happiness and union with God, they assist one another both in knowledge and affections "because one man helps another to know the truth; and one urges another to good, and withdraws him from evil."³³

In meeting his altruistic needs, e.g., sympathy, love, friendship, and patriotism, others are necessary as objects since man cannot practice in isolation the virtues of charity, honesty, or truthfulness.³⁴ "Society is necessary to *give* as well as to *get*."³⁵ As a proof that it is natural for all men to love one another St. Thomas cites as evidence "that a man, by a kind of natural instinct, comes to the assistance of anyone even unknown that is in need, for instance, by warning him should he have taken the wrong road, by helping him to rise should he have fallen, and so forth."³⁶

Since a virtuous life is the end of social life and the means of bringing man to his final end, God, association with others is necessary for a complete development of man's moral and intellectual nature and also in providing a sufficiency of goods so that man can have time to develop his higher nature.³⁷ Man unites with others not just to preserve his life but to perfect it.

It is so natural for man to live in society that St. Thomas, recalling Aristotle, asserts that those who do not live in society are either beasts or saints.

A man may lead a solitary life for two motives. One is because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on account of his uncouthness of mind; and

³¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, a. 188, a. 8.

³² *De Reg. Principum*, I, c. 10.

³³ *Contra Gent.* III, c. 128.

³⁴ *De Reg. Principum*, I, c. 14; cf. Sister Mary Dolores Hayes, *Various Group Mind Theories Viewed in the Light of Thomistic Principles* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942), p. 127.

³⁵ Smith, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," p. 309.

³⁶ *Contra Gent.*, III, c. 117.

³⁷ *De Regimine Principum*, I, 15; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 83, a. 6.

this is beast-like. The other is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things ; and this is super-human.³⁸

In emphasizing the importance of society for man, St. Thomas says it would have existed even in the state of original justice.³⁹

In conclusion, "it appears that man whether considered on the part of the body, or on the part of the sensitive nature, or on the part of his rational nature needs to live in society."⁴⁰ From youth to old age man needs others.⁴¹

Some Catholic writers such as Jacques Maritain, Gustav Gundlach, S.J., Romano Guardini, and Franz Mueller state that man is social primarily by virtue of his perfection as a person, i.e., intercommunication in the order of knowledge and love, and secondarily because of his needs.⁴² Hans Meyer, summarizing the teaching of St. Thomas on this point, remarks that human nature is related to time and space and exists differently in individuals because of their physical and spiritual limitations. The soul, however, makes these individuals men and sharers in the same species ; consequently, "their social nature is based on the peculiar limitations of the individual and specific factors of the human composite."⁴³

In contemporary sociology and social thinking the terms "sociality" and "sociability" are often used interchangeably. To St. Thomas each has a specific meaning.⁴⁴ "Sociality" (*socialis*) refers to the driving urge within man's nature to seek the companionship of others and to unite with them in creating a society to help him satisfy his appetites and fulfill his purpose in life. Both men and animals are instinctively social but they differ in that animal sociability is blind, unreasoning, and involuntary

³⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 188, a. 8, ad 5.

³⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 96, a. 4.

⁴⁰ *De Regimine Principum*, IV, c. 3.

⁴¹ *In Ethic.*, VIII, lect. 1.

⁴² Cf. Franz Mueller, "Person and Society According to St. Thomas," in Theodore Brauer and Others, *Thomistic Principles in a Catholic School* (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1943), p. 214.

⁴³ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 421 ; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 1 ; also, Louis Janssens, *Personne et Societe: Theories Actuelles et Essai Doctrinal* (Gembloux, Belgium: Louvain University Dissertation, 1939), pp. 216-218.

⁴⁴ Smith, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," pp. 315-321.

while human sociality may become reasoned and deliberate.⁴⁵ Man is social because of his nature. His degree of sociability depends upon his choice or opportunity. "Sociability" (*sociabilis*) means the capacity to live in a group in a pleasant, harmonious, and peaceful way. The sociality of man is manifested by his co-operation with others for any purpose. The sociability of man is revealed in the pleasant manner in which he lives and cooperates with others in promoting the common good. Man is always social because of his nature. He may or may not be sociable depending upon his acquisition of the intellectual and moral habits necessary for a good and virtuous social life.⁴⁶

Man as a social person should be viewed in the light of all his needs, spiritual and physical, and the social relationships and social organizations growing out of the effort to meet these needs. Attention should also be given to the distinction between "sociality" and "sociability."

FORMAL CAUSE OR ORGANIZATION

The formal cause of society, either society in general or a particular society or group, is social unity, which is a unity of order. "In creatures, one form does not exist in several *supposita* except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude."⁴⁷ The two essential elements of a collective term are "plurality of the *supposita* and a unity of some kind of order."⁴⁸ "Suppositum" means an individual substance that is wholly self-contained and complete. It may be animate or inanimate, rational or irrational; consequently, it may be applied to animals, plants, or man. In regard to "plurality of *supposita*" St. Thomas states that "it is of the very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units."⁴⁹ In the case of society the units are individual men.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁴⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 58, a. 2; I-II, q. 63, a. 4; Paul H. Furfey, *Fire on the Earth* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), pp. 49-59; Paul H. Furfey, *Three Theories of Society* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), pp. 192-206.

⁴⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 39, a. 3.

⁴⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 31, a. 1, ad 2.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 30, a. 3.

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"Many men are one people."⁵⁰ However, a group of men as such are not a society unless there is unity of order, for "people is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order."⁵¹

Before discussing unity of order a short explanation of the various types of unity seems proper. Metaphysical unity is that of simple beings that cannot be divided, as God, angels, and the human soul. Physical unity is that of composite beings whose parts are separable but united into a whole, as in man and plants. Moral unity is unity among persons according to some moral bond, as in the family and state. Artificial, or mechanical unity, results from an outside agent as in a clock. Accidental unity is an aggregation resulting from proximity, as a heap of stones, a mob, or a crowd of shoppers. In metaphysical and physical unity, the unity is intrinsic to the nature of the things, while in moral, artificial, and accidental unity it is due to an extrinsic cause. Society is a moral unity among persons and differs from a mere aggregation of men because of the unity of order.⁵²

Unity of order may be of two kinds:

First of all, by mere coordination: thus many houses make a town, and many soldiers make an army. Secondly, by coordination and composition: thus a house is made of many conjoined parts, coordinated and bound together. The two ways, however, do not suffice to form one nature out of several. Accordingly, things that are formed by coordination or composition are not natural things; and their unity is not unity of nature.⁵³

Unity of order, then, is not a unity of nature or a substantial unity but an accidental unity in the sense that the individuals in society differ in their substance but are united in one aspect. In speaking of this St. Thomas says that "A whole is twofold. In one sense it is homogenous, composed of like parts; in another

⁵⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 17, a. 4; I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2.

⁵¹ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 31, a. 1, ad 2.

⁵² Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 130; John F. Cox, *A Thomistic Analysis of the Social Order* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1943), pp. 45-46; cf. Charles Coppins, S.J., *Logic and Mental Philosophy*, II (New York: Schwartz, Kirwin, & Fauss, 1891), 22.

⁵³ *Contra Gent.*, IV, c. 35.

sense it is heterogenous, composed of dissimilar parts . . . Now, multitude is such a kind of whole.”⁵⁴ Or, in *I Ethic.*, he says that “unity formed by the whole which is the state or the family, is a unity of order not a simple unity.”⁵⁵ In this respect, as is pointed out by Franz Mueller, St. Thomas differs with the organismic sociologists who claim that society is a substantial unity.⁵⁶ St. Thomas uses the organic analogy in comparing the community with its members to the human body and its parts, yet he stresses the fact that he is speaking metaphorically and “in metaphorical speech we must not expect a likeness in all respects; for thus there would be not likeness but identity.”⁵⁷

Unity of order implies the arrangement of equals and unequals according to some plan⁵⁸ and also a relationship between terms which can be ordered.⁵⁹ Wherever there is plurality and difference order results from subordination and superordination. Order is “not a substance but a relation,”⁶⁰ and a relation is “the order between one creature and another.”⁶¹ Therefore, society as a unity of order means a unity of relations between the persons making up the society. Since the relation adheres to the subject or term, the person, it is an accidental relationship in that it is an added not a necessary perfection of the two or more persons among whom it exists. “An accident is a thing whose nature is to be in another.”⁶² However, since persons are real, the relations are real; consequently, the unity of order in society is a real though accidental relationship among the members of society. Society does not change man substantially but confers on him membership which relates him to other men;⁶³ and this membership is necessary for his complete development as a person.

⁵⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2.

⁵⁵ *In Ethic.*, I, lect. 1.

⁵⁶ Mueller, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

⁵⁷ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2.

⁵⁸ *In Sent.*, I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.

⁵⁹ *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 9; cf. Cox, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-51.

⁶⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 116, a. 2, ad 3; *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 9.

⁶¹ *De Potentia*, q. 7, a. 9, ad 7.

⁶² *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, IX, a. 5, ad 2.

⁶³ E. Welty, O.P., *Gemeinschaft and Einzelmensch* (Salzburg-Leipzig: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1935), p. 183; Hoban, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

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Society, then, consists in a system of relationships of subordination and coordination which arises out of common action for a common purpose or value. The immediate basis for the social relation is common action.⁶⁴ The form of the society and the hierarchy of relationships is determined by the end or purpose of the society. Coordination or the inner unity of order is the form of society which is caused and determined by the common good selected by the members of society to be the common purpose of the group. In order to have a well-ordered society St. Thomas prescribes as the necessary conditions:

First, that things be ordained to their due end, which is the principle of the whole order in matters of action. Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken from the end.⁶⁵

Society is a dynamic rather than a passive entity, since the existence of a specific society depends upon the agents who initiate and collaborate in its origin and development.⁶⁶ The arrangement of people in society according to their importance and contribution is not an automatic, evolutionary selection of "survival of the fittest," but rather a deliberate or instinctive ordering in view of a common good selected by rational creatures endowed with an intellect and will. Thus "Common, united, and orderly activity in view of a common purpose seem to be the formal elements of society."⁶⁷

To be more specific, St. Thomas says that "it is plain that many things are needful to the human community, such as meat, drink, clothing, dwelling and the like, which cannot be provided by one man."⁶⁸ He suggests, therefore, a division of labor in the

⁶⁴ Cf. Sister Mary Joan of Arc Wolfe, *The Problem of Solidarism in St. Thomas* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1938), p. 83; Hoban, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-59.

⁶⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 102, a. 1.

⁶⁶ *Contra Impugnantes*, c. 3.

⁶⁷ Smith, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," p. 313.

⁶⁸ *Contra Gent.*, III, c. 85; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 129, a. 6, ad 1; *In Ethic.*, I, lect. 1.

social body comparable to that in the physical body. Accordingly, he would have "some cultivate the land, some have charge of animals, some build houses and so forth."⁶⁹ He also considers in his social planning the goods of the soul as well as the body, and provides "for some to be busy about spiritual things for the betterment of others" and thus be exempt from the care of temporal things in order to devote themselves to their spiritual ministrations. He sees "this division of divers duties" . . . "as made by divine providence."⁷⁰ Through this division of labor individual differences are recognized and allowed expression.

The differences existing among men, and enabling them to devote themselves to different occupations, are to be attributed primarily to Divine Providence, and secondarily to natural causes, whereby certain men are disposed to the performance of certain functions in preference to others.⁷¹

At the same time individual and community needs are being met through cooperative endeavor for

one individual would not suffice for the different works of reproduction, of invention, of architecture, of agriculture, or for the other functions which must be exercised for the continuance of the human race. To supply the needs common to all mankind one individual must assist another: just as in the body, one limb is subserved by another.⁷²

Membership in society affects only that part of the life of an individual person which pertains to the common good, since in a unity of order "each of the parts of the whole can have activities which are not of the whole."⁷³ This recognition of the dual rôle of man's personality as an individual and as a member of society is a very important safeguard against extreme individualism and collectivism. His social obligations pertain only to the external

⁶⁹ *Contra Gent.*, III, c. 134, 136.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 134.

⁷¹ *Contra Impugnantes*, c. 31; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 113, a. 2, ad 3.

⁷² *Contra Gent.*, c. 136; *Contra Impugnantes*, c. 31.

⁷³ *In Ethic.*, I, lect. 1.

actions which affect the common good. As an individual person he is free to develop his personality and attain eternal happiness.⁷⁴ In speaking of man's dual rôle as a person and a member of society St. Thomas states:

Any individual man can be considered in a twofold manner: first, in so far as he is an individual person, and secondly, in so far as he is part of some group or a member of some community, and in each manner any act can appertain to him. An act which he himself performs by his own will appertains to him in so far as he is an individual person; but in so far as he is part of a group another's act can appertain to him, an act which he does not perform himself nor by his own will, but which is performed by the whole group, or by a member of a group, or by a leader of the group. . . . For such a group of men is regarded as one man, in such a way that different men are placed in different positions like the members of one natural body.⁷⁵

A group is two or more persons working together for a common purpose. Out of the common action for a common purpose arise relations which, when they become relatively stable, may be designated as institutions. Both originate in human needs and desires but institutions refer more to patterns of actions.

Human relations resulting from common activity and common purpose that tend to become permanent are institutions. An institution may be an association, a custom, or relationship, consciously approved by society and organized and maintained through prescribed rules and agencies. Institutions center around human needs and desires for these give rise to relations, and institutions organize these relations into certain patterns of action. By so doing institutions facilitate human action for they furnish a definite form and sanction to human activity. Since institutions are patterns of activity they are dynamic, and may be changed by

⁷⁴Sister M. Consilia O'Brien, *Christian Social Principles* (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1941), p. 164; Sister Roberta Snell, *The Nature of Man in St. Thomas Aquinas Compared with the Nature of Man in American Sociology* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942), pp. 20-21.

⁷⁵*De Malo*, IV, 1.

the men forming the relations to meet the changing conditions and purposes. These may be directed toward progress or retrogression depending upon the ideas or interests which serve as their nucleus.

The great variety of institutions is due to man's social nature with its many needs and desires. St. Thomas designates those institutions as natural which flow from man's nature, such as marriage, the family, the state, religion, and property, for these safeguard man's basic rights and needs.⁷⁶ These institutions derive their origin, purpose and sanction from the natural moral law, God's plan for man. Since these flow from man's nature, they may not be changed essentially but may change accidentally to meet different conditions.

Other institutions may be derived from culture or human convention which satisfy human needs and desires that are so changing in character that they do not warrant permanent or universal institutions to guard them. These may change both essentially and accidentally.

Among the necessary conditions for unity in society are the social virtues of justice and charity, for charity especially is the motive force for order, peace and harmony. These virtues are practiced not as a means of utility or expediency but rather because man is "naturally solicitous not only for himself but also for the good estate of the community, whereof he is a part, for instance, of the household, or city, or even the whole world."⁷⁷ Auxiliary virtues are honesty, truthfulness, and cheerfulness, for St. Thomas says that man owes to his fellowman "the manifestation of truth" and "the living agreeably" with him.⁷⁸

In conclusion, society is an accidental though real being resulting from unity of order. It is a living, organic whole but differs from a physical organism in that its parts are persons, each with his own values and rights.⁷⁹ It is a moral rather than a physical unity since it is a union of men directed by free will and intelligence, the specific characteristics of rational nature.

⁷⁶ Cf. Duzy, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-138.

⁷⁷ *On the Power of God*, q. 5, a. 6, ad 3.

⁷⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 114, a. 2, ad 1.

⁷⁹ *In Ethic.*, I, lect. 1; cf. Snell, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

EFFICIENT CAUSE OR AGENTS

The efficient cause of society is, proximately, man's rational powers of intellect and will, and, ultimately, God as the creator of man and his human nature. Since man is a social animal, he has a natural inclination toward society. However, this potentiality is actualized through his decision to cooperate with others to meet his needs, for man naturally and necessarily wills whatever conserves his being and society helps to conserve his being.

Man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which benefits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.⁸⁰

The driving power behind all individual and social action is legitimate personal development.⁸¹ Man's intellect and will demand that he develop into a psychological, social, and ethical person, for man like everything else exists not only to be but to act.⁸² It is through action that a man perfects his being, and it is only by his acts that he can become a true member of society.

According to St. Thomas the source of human activity is the soul. Since, however, the soul works through the body, human action flows from the composite,—the whole person.⁸³ The hierarchy of desires and needs and also the hierarchy of external goods, which are the object of these needs and desires, the nuclei for social institutions, are based on the distinction between the various activities of the soul. Man is so constituted that he can enjoy the good in many ways and degrees. Since there is a hierarchy among his activities, intellectual, animal, and vegetative, there is a corresponding hierarchy among the objects toward which these activities are directed.⁸⁴ St. Thomas classifies desires subjectively as sources of action and objectively as these desires are

⁸⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1; cf. q. 9, a. 1.

⁸¹ Smith, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," p. 293.

⁸² *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 73, a. 1; I-II, q. 55, a. 2, ad 1; *ibid.*, q. 18, a. 1, c.

⁸³ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; III, q. 20, a. 1, ad 2; a. 2.

⁸⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 6, a. 1; ad 2 m; q. 19, a. 1, 9; q. 59, a. 1; *Contra Gent.*, I, c. 72, ad 3m.

drawn into action by their objects, the goods of the body, the goods of the soul, and external goods.

Desires classified subjectively as sources of action are natural, sensible, and rational. Natural appetency is the inclination of a thing to an object pleasing to it.⁸⁵ The sensible appetite or desire operates automatically as soon as some good in the sense order is apprehended. The two powers of this appetite are the irascible, expressed by the emotions of hope, despair, courage, fear, and anger, and the concupiscible, such as love, desire, pleasure, hatred, aversion and sadness. Also on this order are the instincts relating to social activity as the inclination to knowledge, to imitation of others, and self and race preservation. The highest appetite in man is the rational or intellectual, the will. Its object is happiness. Metaphysically the will is necessarily determined to seek the good. In the physical order it has the power to choose among the particular goods presented by the intellect, for the will cannot choose unless the intellect presents the object to be chosen. It also has the function of bringing into proper order the lesser appetites, and thereby serves as the principle of order in human activity. Reason, then, is the guiding principle in human development. This is an important principle in Thomistic dynamic psychology. Although in principle the will is free, in fact it is limited by many factors, such as fear, anger, sex, habit, and the factors of heredity and environment.⁸⁶

Human action in its objective aspects refers to objects considered by man to be good and capable of perfecting him and giving pleasure. These may be classified as: goods of the body, such as food, sex, health, beauty, strength; goods of the mind, such as knowledge and virtue; and external goods, such as persons and things. External things for the body are food, drink, clothing, houses, money; and for the person—friends. External goods for the mind in regard to things are: honor, fame, glory, and power; for the person,—friends and God.⁸⁷

“Man is an intelligent agent, and it is clearly the part of an

⁸⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 1; q. 80, a. 1.

⁸⁶ Cf. Duzy, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-134.

⁸⁷ Henry Ignatius Smith, O.P., *Classification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology*, pp. 25-31.

intelligent agent to act in view of an end.”⁸⁸ Man’s intellect perceives the necessity of associating with others and presents the means to the will. The will, according to its nature, is determined to the good,⁸⁹ i.e., those things necessary for happiness, since man naturally desires happiness.⁹⁰ The will, as free, has the power of choice for “we are masters of our actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but *the means to the end*.”⁹¹ It is the will, as free, that is the proper cause of particular societies and by which individuals concur in the formation and preservation of particular societies, and also in the change of societies either in form or within the form to meet their changing needs and desires.

In any groups whatsoever, where one lives, each one through its part of concurrence is, according to its nature, efficient cause, be it either of the commencement or of the duration of social groups.⁹²

It is important to note that “knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so.”⁹³ Applying this to society in general, man naturally and necessarily seeks social participation because it is necessary for his perfection. In regard to particular societies he wills them freely either explicitly or implicitly; for example, he may choose implicitly to belong to the state, and explicitly to form a conjugal society or belong to a labor union. These various societies are expressions of the relations existing between men and are the result of man’s reason.⁹⁴

In lieu of gifts bestowed on other animals, man is endowed with reason, which teaches him to supply his

⁸⁸ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 41, a. 2; q. 82, a. 2.

⁹⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 1, ad 5; q. 82, a. 1, et 2; III, q. 18, a. 1, ad 3; I-II, q. 10, a. 1, ad 3.

⁹¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-I, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3.

⁹² R. P. Schwalm, O.P., *Leçons de Philosophie Sociale*, I (Paris: Blaud et Cie, 1910), 5.

⁹³ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 11, ad 1.

⁹⁴ Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

needs, and with hands wherewith he can carry out the dictates of reason.⁹⁵

The reason serves as the directive cause and the will as the effective cause of society. Thus man's free will guided by his intellect carries out the divine plan imprinted on his nature.

A coefficient factor with the intellect and will is authority with its laws and sanctions. Since men are inclined to be selfish and think only of satisfying their own needs, "the group would be broken up and scattered unless there were also someone to take care of what appertains to the common weal."⁹⁶ This is possible because the individual good and the common good are not always identical. "Things differ by what is proper to each: they are united by what they have in common."⁹⁷ . . . "Therefore, in every group there must be some governing power."⁹⁸ The amount of authority necessary in a group depends on the social intelligence of the group, i.e., the awareness of and cooperation for the common good. Since some are indolent and others disturb the peace it is necessary to have a ruler as the principle of unity in society.⁹⁹ Every man seeks his own good, the *bonum proprium*;¹⁰⁰ therefore, it is necessary for one to look after the common good,¹⁰¹ and bring about the "unity of society, which we call peace" and which is "procured through the efforts of the ruler."¹⁰² By laws and orders, punishments and rewards, the ruler is to restrain the wicked and encourage all to live virtuously.¹⁰³ Conversely, the more the members cooperate voluntarily with others for the common good, the less authority is needed.

In conclusion, the efficient cause of society is, proximately, man's intellect and will motivated by his needs and desires, and aided by authority with its laws and sanctions, both divine and

⁹⁵ *Contra Impugnantes*, c. 31; *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1.

⁹⁶ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1; c. 15.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, c. 1.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 12; c. 15; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 147, a. 3; cf. Smith, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," p. 294.

¹⁰⁰ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1.

¹⁰¹ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 96, a. 4.

¹⁰² *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 15.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

human, and ultimately, God, as the author of man's rational and social nature.

FINAL CAUSE OR PURPOSE

According to St. Thomas all actions are essentially teleological, i.e., performed in pursuit of some purpose. Therefore, he considers the final cause to be the most important because it influences all the other causes. The purpose or final cause limits or determines the material cause, specifies the formal cause, and moves the efficient cause to action and limits the action.¹⁰⁴ Society is also viewed teleologically.

Since society has a double efficient cause, proximately, the social nature of man, and ultimately, God, the Creator of that nature, it also has a double purpose.¹⁰⁵ Society exists in the individuals and must meet their needs; therefore, the immediate purpose of society is the objective or common good for which each group is established. Society also exists before and after the life of each individual, and therefore has a purpose beyond the life of each person. Although the proximate aim of the individual and society may be different, the ultimate aim of the individual and society is the same.¹⁰⁶ The ultimate aim of man is temporal happiness or felicity in this life,¹⁰⁷ and eternal happiness in union with God in the next. The ultimate goal of society is to help man to attain his temporal and eternal happiness by advancing the common good which is the perfection of human living in the natural order, and participation of the divine life in the supernatural order.¹⁰⁸ "It is not the ultimate end of an assembled multitude to live virtuously, but through virtuous living to attain to the possession of God."¹⁰⁹

In considering the common good it is necessary to make a distinction between the individual good and the common good, or the particular goods common to all the members of society that the individual man seeks, and the common good that is the good of

¹⁰⁴ *In Libros Metaphysicorum*, V, lect. 2; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

¹⁰⁵ *Schwer*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

¹⁰⁶ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 14.

¹⁰⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 118, a. 7.

¹⁰⁸ W. Ferree, *The Act of Social Justice* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1942), p. 206.

¹⁰⁹ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 14; c. 15.

society as such.¹¹⁰ Each man receives many benefits from society and he in return must contribute to society so as to add to the common good to be distributed to the consociated members.¹¹¹ "The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part."¹¹² However, the common good is not just the summation of the individual goods. The end of each individual is a personal good while the end of society is the common good. All individuals in society are the complete end of society; each individual is the incomplete end of society. There is a formal difference between the individual and common good.¹¹³ In speaking of society as politically organized St. Thomas states:

The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the *many* and the *few*, but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the *common* good differs from the aspect of the *individual* good, even as the aspect of *whole* differs from that of *part*.¹¹⁴

The common good of the state is its internal and external peace, its general material prosperity.¹¹⁵ St. Thomas, following Aristotle, considers that "all who are included in a community stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole."¹¹⁶ Just as each member of the physical body must contribute its share to the proper functioning of the whole body, so in society each man shares his talents with the others and through this cooperative sharing each one profits. Since the common good of society is the good of the whole and also of each of its parts, the members, each has a right to share in the fruits of the common good.¹¹⁷ The common

¹¹⁰ Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., "The Principle of Order in Politics," *The New Scholasticism*, XVI (January, 1942), 7.

¹¹¹ *De Charitate*, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2.

¹¹² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 9, ad 3.

¹¹³ Mueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-248.

¹¹⁴ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 7, ad 2.

¹¹⁵ Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹¹⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 5.

¹¹⁷ Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

good is the welfare of the group to which each has contributed according to his abilities and in which he shares according to his needs. Both the contribution to and the distribution of the common good are proportionate because of the natural inequalities and individual differences of men.

As Heinrich Pesch explains it:

Man seeks in the community the full and perfect development of his personality. For this purpose, society should offer him the necessary prerequisites, conditions, and means; this is the personal end of society. The maintenance, strengthening and perfection of the social milieu within which the free energy of all the citizens unfolds itself—this on the other hand is the social end of individual life.¹¹⁸

Because of this part-whole relationship the actions of the individuals affect not only the individual members but society as a whole either for weal or for woe.¹¹⁹

He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom . . . Secondly, because since man is a part of the home and state, he must consider what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole.¹²⁰

Parsons explains this by the principle of "mutuality of responsibility." To be in society means to be a giver and a receiver, an end and a means. "Society and the individual are mutually responsible to each other."¹²¹

St. Thomas frequently states that the common good of the many is more god-like than the good of the individual; that the common good surpasses the private good of the individual; and that the good of many is to be preferred to one's own good.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Heinrich Pesch, *Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie* (Freiburg in Breisgau; Pustet, 1905), p. 381; Cox, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63.

¹¹⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I–II, q. 21, a. 3, et ad 1, 2, 3.

¹²⁰ *Summa Theol.*, II–II, q. 47, a. 10; ad 2.

¹²¹ Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–7.

¹²² *In Ethic*; I, lect. 2; *Summa Theol.* I, q. 108, a. 6; II–II q. 31, a. 3, ad

The particular good is directed to the common good as its end: for the being of the part is on account of the whole; wherefore *the good of the nation is more god-like than the good of one man.*¹²³

The common good serves a higher purpose because it contributes to the good of the many in contrast to the individual good of the individual member.¹²⁴ This refers only to goods of the same order, e.g., temporal goods of one as opposed to temporal goods of many. The spiritual good of one would be superior to the temporary good of many since the spiritual good is of a higher order.

The common good takes precedence of the private good, *if it be of the same genus*; but it may be that the private good is better generically.¹²⁵

In regard to man's temporal welfare the common good is supreme; in respect to man's eternal welfare man is supreme for the "subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body, not the soul, which retains its liberty."¹²⁶ Man is, then, both a part and a whole. As a member of society he must seek the common good; as a self-determining being he seeks his own good.¹²⁷ As a social being he is immanent in society; as a spiritual being with a higher personal destiny, he transcends society.¹²⁸ The common good refers to man's social nature rather than to matters of conscience and the natural rights and duties which flow from his human personality, which has God as its origin and destiny.¹²⁹ The common good is not man's final end but only an intermediate end or means to his ultimate end, God.

2; *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 9; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 3, ad 3; II-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3; q. 39, a. 2, ad 2; q. 42, a. 2; q. 47, a. 10; a. 11, ad 3; q. 58, a. 12; q. 117, a. 6; *Contra Gent.* II, c. 42; c. 45; III, c. 146; *Quodlib.* I, a. 8.

¹²³ *Contra Gent.* III, c. 17.

¹²⁴ Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 440-445.

¹²⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 152, a. 4, ad 3; I-II, q. 61, a. 5. Italics supplied.

¹²⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 1.

¹²⁷ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 1.

¹²⁸ Hayes, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-149; Hoban, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

¹²⁹ O'Brien, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

In the words of Ignatius Smith, O. P.:

In a general way it may be said that the broad purpose of social living is the magnified purpose of individual living. This purpose would be the satisfaction in a human way of the desires or the capacities of human nature. This is that personal development called felicity in this life and happiness in the next.¹³⁰

After discussing the difference between the individual and common good and the relationship between the two, the common good of the group will be considered. Although the purpose of the individuals in the group may be very diverse,¹³¹ the group purpose is more simple.¹³² In any particular society, or in society at large, the group purpose is the preservation of the group and the distribution of the common good to the consociated members.¹³³ Each has its own particular common good. Man seeks not only to live, but to live a good life in society.

Men form groups for the purpose of living well together, a thing which the individual man living alone could not attain. But a good life is a virtuous life. Therefore, a virtuous life is the end for which men form groups.¹³⁴

Two things are necessary for man to live a good life: first, "to act in a virtuous manner," and second, to have "a sufficiency of those bodily goods whose use is necessary for an act of virtue."¹³⁵ St. Thomas presents as evidence for this the following facts. If men united just to live, animals and serfs would be considered part of the civil body. If acquiring wealth were the main purpose of society, only those who traded together would be members of society. But common experience shows that those are regarded as forming one society who are directed by the same laws and the same government to live well. Only those who help each other in living well form part of society.¹³⁶ It is

¹³⁰ Smith, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," p. 315.

¹³¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 6.

¹³² *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 16.

¹³³ Smith, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," p. 314.

¹³⁴ *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 14.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, c. 15.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, c. 14.

obvious here that St. Thomas is speaking of the purpose of the state or society politically organized. However, since man is related to the state only in the rôle of citizen, St. Thomas recognizes other particular societies or groups, each with a common good of its own, although he ranks the state as the highest in the natural order, because it contains the means to fulfill its end. In this he differs from Aristotle who regarded the state as the supreme form of society, the highest, most perfect, and self-sufficing community.¹³⁷

Since, however, in these societies there are many degrees and grades, the highest is the state which is sufficient of itself for human life. Wherefore this is the most perfect of all human societies.¹³⁸

Pope Pius XI in the encyclical on *Christian Education of Youth* and, more recently, Pope Pius XII in his allocution to the assembly of Cardinals, February 20, 1946, in accordance with Thomistic tradition discussed the three necessary societies, the family and state belonging to the natural order, and the Church to the supernatural order. The family is necessary for the procreation and education of children, and the state for the promotion of the common good.¹³⁹ The Church is necessary for the eternal salvation of man.¹⁴⁰ These are primary or basic societies. The family is further classified as an imperfect society in the sense that it does not have within itself all the means necessary for its complete development.¹⁴¹ The state and Church are perfect societies since they do have all the means necessary to attain their ends—the state in the natural order and the Church in the supernatural order.¹⁴²

In contrast to these primary societies there are secondary or derivative societies or groups which may be useful on account of the conditions of time or place but are not absolutely necessary,

¹³⁷ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

¹³⁸ *In Polit.*, Prologus.

¹³⁹ *In Polit.*, III, 5.

¹⁴⁰ *Contra Impugnantes*, c. 3.

¹⁴¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 65, a. 2, ad 2.

¹⁴² Pope Pius XI, *Christian Education of Youth* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1944), p. 40.

such as labor unions, employers' associations, choral, or sports groups. Since these owe their existence to the *finis operantis* of their members and not to a proper *finis operis* of their own, they are "artificial" or "interest" groups depending for their existence on man's free will.¹⁴³

St. Thomas holds that all human actions are essentially teleological and also that the hierarchy of "common goods" reflects the order of the universe in which the lower is subject to the higher. This is seen in society in the "coordinated hierarchy of purposes and the cooperative and graduated system of functions."¹⁴⁴ As an example of the "coordinated hierarchy of purposes" St. Thomas points out that "on the father of the family depends the order of the household; which is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered."¹⁴⁵ In *Quadragesimo Anno*, Pope Pius XI repeats the necessity of a "graded hierarchical order" between the "various subsidiary organizations" and that the state should help these groups to fulfill their functions and not to absorb them.¹⁴⁶ This "principle of subsidiarity" has been receiving an increasing amount of attention among Catholic writers recently. It is a very important principle in a world tending toward totalitarianism.

The "cooperative and graduated system of functions" may be seen in the following:

There is, indeed, to some extent sufficiency for life in one family of one household, namely insofar as pertains to the natural acts of nourishment and the begetting of offspring and other things of this kind; it exists, furthermore, in one village with regard to those things which belong to one trade; but exists in a city, which is a perfect community, with regard to all the necessities of life; but

¹⁴⁴ Smith, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Social Life," p. 297.

¹⁴⁵ Cox, *op. cit.*, p. 69; O'Brien, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-243.

¹⁴⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 105, a. 6.

¹⁴⁶ Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno* (New York: The Paulist Press, 1944), pp. 147-148.

still more in a province because of the need of fighting together and of mutual help against enemies.¹⁴⁷

Thus each group has a "common good" of its own and yet is part of a larger whole in an ascending scale of "common good."¹⁴⁸ As in the physical universe, so in society, the imperfect always progresses toward the perfect.¹⁴⁹ Any group in which a person participates is the "common good" at that level in the hierarchy from the lowest to the highest. Everyone, therefore, can contribute to and participate in the common good regardless of his capacity and status.¹⁵⁰ The common good in the natural order includes man's relations with other persons and things. Consequently, to work for the common good is to work for the perfection of the institutions of human life in every-day life.¹⁵¹

In recapitulation, St. Thomas' concept of man and society may be stated thus:

1. Society is a union of men acting together for a common purpose.
2. The material cause or the members of society are men. Man's social nature seeks to satisfy and develop in co-operation with others the inclinations, aptitudes, and needs of body and soul.
3. The formal cause is social unity or unity of order resulting from the free will and intelligence of men directed toward the pursuit of the common good.
4. The efficient cause or agent is proximately man's intellect and will motivated by his needs and desires and aided by authority with its laws and sanctions, both human and divine, and ultimately, God as the author of man's rational and social nature.
5. The final cause or purpose is the common good which is the perfection of human living in the natural order

¹⁴⁷ *De Regimine Principum*, I, 1; cf. Clare Riedl, "The Social Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Philosophy of Society*, ed. by Charles A. Hart (Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press, 1934), 13.

¹⁴⁸ Franz Mueller, "The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Christian Tradition," *The American Catholic Sociological Review*, IV (October, 1943), 146-149; Cox, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-124.

¹⁴⁹ *In Polit.*, I, 1.

¹⁵⁰ Ferree, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

and the participation of divine life in the supernatural order for each person.

SOCIAL CHANGE

Although St. Thomas does not treat of the problem of social change as such, the fundamental principles of social change are present. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, maintains that change or movement is a passage or development from an antecedent to a consequent state, or a reduction of potentiality to actuality.¹⁵² Social change is related to the many potentialities of man's social nature, and must be considered in the light of the Thomistic concept of being and change. Being is essentially dynamic, since it is constantly changing as the potentialities of being are reduced to actuality in the process of moving from a less perfect to a more perfect state. Although being is constantly changing, there is in it a permanence that serves as the foundation for change. Social reality is considered as a phase of being. Social change being confined to social reality deals with the actualization of the potentialities of man's social nature. Social change presupposes social action. Recalling St. Thomas' definition of society, the field of social change is in the activity of men seeking or possessing a common goal in meeting their needs and fulfilling their desires. The medium of social change is man, hence, social change deals with human relations either in their temporary form or in stable human relations which are institutions. Since institutions are stable human relations, and these are located in man, and man is always changing, no human institution can be static. Social change, then, takes place within social relations. The social process is the movement of human beings in a social group toward objectives determined by the potencies of human nature.

FACTORS IN SOCIAL CHANGE

The potentialities of man's development are within his human nature, but the factors bringing about his development are both within and outside of him.

In each power of the soul there is implanted by nature an

¹⁵² *In Physic.*, III, 1.

instinctive movement toward its proper object.¹⁵³ This is important because it is through the activities of the various powers and around their objects that social actions are initiated and may or may not be stabilized into social institutions. The various levels of life in man are the vegetative, including the powers of nutrition, growth, and reproduction; sensible, which man shares with the animals and consists in cognitive and conative functions on the sense level; and the rational, characteristic of man alone, which consists in the cognitive and conative functions on the human level. The natural appetency or driving force within each faculty to seek its proper object and the enjoyment derived from attaining the object are the source of movement within the individuals, and through them in society. Society, therefore, can not be static. It is always changing as men naturally seek to satisfy their desires and a desire is a movement toward a good which is not present.¹⁵⁴

Although man is a subsistent being and separate from others, yet he is dependent upon others, both persons and things. The social nature of men brings them together and a community arises through common activity for a common goal. In this situation the human nature of each person develops. Besides the factors of social environment, those of the physical environment also condition man's development.

Although heredity and environment are important factors in social change, yet the most important factor is man. Since his life consists in developing his human nature by actualizing his potentialities, reason, the highest part of his nature, is, in the natural order, the guiding principle in his development. The social process is purposive since man recognizes and wills the objects he seeks. Taking man as the focal point in social change, man's reason as the guiding principle, and society as made up of individuals, society also finds its law of development or change in human reason. Since man is a creature, he is a contingent being. God, the first principle of being, is the final explanation of man's perfection, and also God, as Pure Act, is the ultimate foundation

¹⁵³ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 1; I, q. 80, a. 1; *De Malo*, q. 3, a. 3; *De Veritate*, q. 25.

¹⁵⁴ *In I Sent.*, d. 45, a. 1, ad 1 m.

for social change, since God is the beginning and end of all being and of all change.¹⁵⁵

DIRECTED SOCIAL CHANGE

The social process is the interaction of institutions since institutions embody the dynamism of human activity. Man, as the source of social change, adapts the institutions to changing conditions. Since men unite for a common purpose, it is ideas that serve as the nuclei for institutions. Therefore, changes in institutions are dependent on changing ideas and purposes. An institution, then, may or may not be conducive to progress or happiness depending upon the interest or purpose it serves. Or it may have served its purpose in the beginning, and eventually has become so formalized that it fails to meet changing conditions, and hence, fails in its purpose.

Since all men act for an end,¹⁵⁶ and the ultimate end of man is happiness, social change to be progressive must move toward that end. The ultimate end of man and society, happiness, is the criterion of social progress. In Thomistic thought, objectively, happiness means the possession of the Absolute Good, God. Hence, social values do not originate in society but in man's nature, created and destined by God to enjoy Absolute Good. All lesser goods or goals are ranked according to this ultimate goal, and thus is established the hierarchy of ends in Thomistic philosophy.¹⁵⁷ The goal of all social progress, then, is man's last end, the perfect happiness of possessing the Absolute Good, God.¹⁵⁸ Although men desire happiness, they may mistakenly choose as their final goal wealth, honors, fame, glory, power, or pleasure.¹⁵⁹ Since St. Thomas sets as a criterion for social change and social progress man's last end, he introduces a supernatural factor which makes his evaluation of social change different from that of a rational social philosophy which finds the goals within the social process.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Duzy, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

¹⁵⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 6.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 8.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

CONTRIBUTIONS

Although St. Thomas did not devise a sociological method since he was not a formal sociologist, yet his method contains some valuable suggestions that may be used by sociologists. St. Thomas' method was to start with the materials of previous study, use the conclusions already attained, add proof to proof, and observation to observation, until the solution was evident. Real knowledge was separated from the apparent, the certain from the probable, and definite conclusions from hypotheses.¹⁶⁰ All the pros and cons of a problem were stated. In his research he combined observation and speculation, analysis and synthesis. His was the middle course between a positivistic empiricism which overemphasizes the factual at the expense of the ideal truth, and an exaggerated idealism which overemphasizes the ideal and neglects the factual. His ideas were checked by the facts of experience. In the observation and knowledge of the natural sciences, he was inferior to his teacher, St. Albert the Great, and Roger Bacon. But his ethical, social, and political studies were based on a noteworthy collection of observed data.¹⁶¹ Simon Deploige has commented on the surprisingly rich observations of Thomas on ethical and sociological questions.¹⁶² In his search for truth Thomas corrected and supplemented his views when new knowledge proved them to be erroneous. His system of thought was not static or absolute, but allowed for development whenever new truths were discovered.

The great advantage which Thomistic social philosophy has over contemporary sociology in analyzing society and social change is its teleology derived from God's plan as manifested in the natural moral law and Divine positive law. This establishes a definite hierarchy of needs and desires which serve as a guide in social planning and control. It meets the great need of the modern world which is looking for a guide to sound and sane social living. Since civilization results from the subordination of the lower to

¹⁶⁰ Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁶² Simon Deploige, *Le Conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie* (2d ed.; Louvain, 1914), trans. Rev. Charles C. Miltner, C.S.C. (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1938), pp. 272 ff.

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the higher, one of the greatest contributions of Thomistic social thought to contemporary society is the distinction between what is the higher and lower in needs and desires, and how these are related to God's plan for man and the universe.

In contrast to the Scholastic position of St. Thomas concerning society and social change will be presented that of three pioneers in American sociology: Lester Frank Ward, William Graham Sumner, and Charles Horton Cooley.

CHAPTER II

LESTER FRANK WARD

LESTER FRANK WARD, who ranks with Comte and Spencer as one of the founders of sociology, was the author of the first comprehensive sociological treatise in the United States. Ward accepted Spencer's version of universal evolution as a method, yet his system of sociology was different since it was dualistic in the sense that Ward distinguished between physical or animal purposeless evolution and mental, human evolution modified by purposive action.¹ His sociology attacked the monistic assumptions of social Darwinism and natural law laissez-faire individualism. He replaced passive determinism with a social theory adaptable to social reform and was a firm believer in planned rather than automatic social change.

Lester F. Ward was born in Joliet, Illinois, in 1841, the son of a mechanic and a clergyman's daughter. His youth was filled with hardship and poverty, yet he spent his spare time studying biology, physiology, French, German, and Latin. After two years of service in the Civil War, during which he was wounded in 1865, Ward entered the government service as a clerk in the Treasury Department. During this time he spent the evenings studying and within five years took diplomas in arts, law, and medicine. During part of this time also he edited a skeptical journal called *The Iconoclast*. Later he continued his scientific study in botany and paleobotany. In 1883 Ward became chief paleobotanist in the United States Geological Survey. Not until the turn of the century was Ward recognized as an outstanding figure in sociology. From 1900–1903 he was president of the *Institut International de Sociologie* and in 1906–1907 he was elected first president of the American Sociological Society. In 1906 Ward was appointed to a

¹ Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860–1915* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944), p. 52; B. J. Stern, "Ward-Ross Correspondence," *American Sociological Review*, III (1938), 362–401; XI (1946), 593–605; 734–748.

chair in sociology at Brown University, which he held until his death in 1913.²

In 1883 appeared Ward's first book, *Dynamic Sociology*, in two volumes, which he had been working on for fourteen years. This was followed by *The Psychic Factors of Civilization* (1893), *Outlines of Sociology* (1898), *Pure Sociology* (1903), and *Applied Sociology* (1906). *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, in six volumes, was published posthumously in 1918. *Dynamic Sociology* embodied practically all the main ideas of Ward's system of sociology. However, in his later works there was a modification of his ideas and more emphasis was placed on psychic factors. *Psychic Factors* and *Applied Sociology* place great emphasis on the achievement of genius and the place of the psychic in a "sociocracy" characterized by "telesis."³ *Applied Sociology* argued for universal public education as a preparation for solving the social problem and as a basis of social progress.

Ward continued the Comtean, Spencerian tradition of a synthetic philosophy although he added to it the psychic factor in civilization. He was continually looking for basic laws and principles in a monistic, synthesized, co-ordinated explanation of cosmic phenomena. He was not interested in sociology as a special science but as a synthetic social philosophy.⁴ In his earlier years Ward was a materialistic monist, while in his later years he emphasized more the role of intelligent activity in social evolution, although he always maintained that mind is an attribute or property of matter. Ward distinguished between "telic" phenomena or those directed by human will and purpose and "genetic" phenomena resulting from blind forces. The former he regarded as "artificial" and the latter as "natural." He contended that man's task is to direct, not to imitate, the laws of nature.

Ward also had a keen interest in astronomy, biology, anthropology, psychology, economics, political science, and education.

² J. Q. Dealey, "Lester Frank Ward," *American Masters of Social Science*, ed. H. W. Odum (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927), pp. 62-64; Samuel Chugerman, *Lester F. Ward, The American Aristotle* (Durham, N. Carolina: Duke University Press, 1939), pp. 22-47.

³ Dealey, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

During the decade 1871-1881, when Ward was convinced that education was the great panacea, he began reading philosophy, religion, and science. Among the authors that attracted him most were Francis Bacon, Kant, Draper, Agassiz, Lyell, Haeckel, Comte, and Spencer.⁵ In Washington, he had a large circle of intellectual and scientific friends who helped him broaden his point of view. His careful training in science and scientific method helped him to criticize and appreciate new points of view. The theory of sympodial development and the monistic application of this to social phenomena are evidences of his originality.

Ward was a great pioneer and in his later years was often called the "Nestor" of American sociologists. According to Small "this colossus of generalization held a place of splendid uniqueness for decades."⁶ His system of cosmic philosophy with its sociological corollaries as expressed in *Dynamic Sociology* and his later works influenced many of the younger men of the time who took Ward's system as their point of departure in their monographs and books.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Ward's social theory is an integral part of his monistic cosmic philosophy. "Nature and all her phenomena are conceived as the parts of one whole or unit, and bound together by an absolutely unbroken chain." This is his "fundamental postulate," both for "man individually" and "society collectively." The "initial premises" or "*sine qua non*" of all science, art, and action is the "invariability of nature's laws" and the "absolute dependence of all phenomena."⁷ By "monism" Ward means "a unitary principle running through all nature."⁸ Ward, similarly to Comte and Spencer, assumed that the laws of the universe at large are also applicable to human societies. Matter is the only reality, and it alone has independent existence. By universal chemism, a process of compounding and recompounding through

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁶ A. W. Small, *Origins of Sociology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 341-342.

⁷ *Dynamic Sociology* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1883), I, 65, 66.

⁸ *Pure Sociology* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1903), p. 172.

the principle of "synergy," matter eternally evolves and organizes itself through energy.⁹ Matter, force, and energy are the three fundamental elements which exist. The properties of matter are life, feeling, and mind. "An initial motion inhering in the primary form of matter is therefore the sole source of all causation and the true 'first cause.'" ¹⁰ Basic to the cosmos is energy, the *nisus* of nature, which manifests itself in structures functioning according to their own nature but in harmony with one common principle, monistic, materialistic, yet spiritual in its highest manifestations.¹¹ Because of universal polarity every force meets with resistance, thus generating energy. Universal conflict is necessary for evolution, and the result of this cosmic struggle is organization in the form of physical, biological, psychological, and social phenomena.¹² Since these "synthetic creations of nature" have evolved, each from the one preceding, they are filiated. The scientific philosopher, then, should show by study and research this filiated evolution, such as the differential of protoplasm from chemical compounds, and the rise of social groups from the undifferentiated horde of men. The stars and the mind of man are but differentiations of world energy with a common origin but different structures and function. Man is "part of all that is, the microcosm of the macrocosm, and is himself part of eternity."¹³ Ward was both monistic and synthetic. In his earlier writings his monism is materialistic; in his later works he emphasizes more the psychic factors.

DEFINITION OF SOCIETY

In *Dynamic Sociology* (1883) Ward states that "Society, in its literal or primary sense, is simply an association of individuals."¹⁴ Also he maintains that since the essential or necessary condition of society is populousness, "Society is simply the gregarious condition of the human race, endued with their natural passions and

⁹ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 231.

¹⁰ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 9.

¹¹ Dealey, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

¹² *Pure Sociology*, pp. 172-173.

¹³ Dealey, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

¹⁴ I, 460.

affections.”¹⁵ It seems to be the necessary result of the accumulation of individuals. In discussing association, Ward says that “Association is an act, and *an* association is a product of the act of associating. It is a relation among individuals . . . A relation is not a concrete object. It is an abstract conception. Nothing but the individual is concrete.”¹⁶ To Ward, “The only reality is matter,” and anything which is not matter is “some relation between discrete parts of matter.”¹⁷ Only matter and its relations can be conceived to exist.¹⁸ In this sense, then, individuals which are composed of matter are real or concrete, and the relations between or among individuals are abstractions for “relations are nothing in themselves” but are properties of matter.¹⁹ In stating that society is a relation among individuals, and relation is an abstraction, Ward seems to reject a hypostatized view of society. Instead of considering society as a substance or thing in itself apart from individuals, he considers it to be an “accidental” reality. Interaction seems to be the necessary characteristic of the “social” for Ward speaks of “the class of phenomena to which association gives rise” as being “denominated social.”²⁰

Following Comte’s division of social phenomena into statics and dynamics, Ward affirms that:

Social statics is found to constitute the domain of social construction, and to explain the origin of all social structures and human institutions. It underlies the social order. Social dynamics, on the other hand, is the domain of social transformation, and explains all change in social structures and human institutions. It is the science of social progress.²¹

This division will be referred to in the discussion that follows.

¹⁵ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 219.

¹⁶ “Contemporary Sociology,” *American Journal of Sociology* (1901–1902), 492–493.

¹⁷ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 231.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 222.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 227.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 450.

²¹ *Glimpses of the Cosmos* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1918), VI, 264; Rupert B. Vance, “Toward Social Dynamics,” *American Sociological Review*, X (April, 1945), 124–125.

MATERIAL CAUSE OR MEMBERSHIP

Since "society is an association of individuals," the material cause or the members of society are men. Before Ward treated of society, he insisted that "the inquiry into the true nature of man is a necessary prelude to the treatment of the class of phenomena to which association gives rise."²² In regard to man's origin, Ward states that "it is fully explained on the simple assumption of the animal origin of man."²³ By the zigzag path of evolution through natural selection and mutation man evolved from the animal. Ward substantiates this by referring to Professors Huxley and Haeckel as authorities.²⁴ The attribute of "humanity" was not part of man's nature originally, but "humanity" and the "so-called virtues—honesty, benevolence, justice, etc.," are acquired in the process of civilization of man. His moral nature, springing from his rational faculties, may be traced to its origin in *sympathy* which at first was confined to his immediate companions and later extended to take in successively his clan, tribe, race, country and, to a limited degree, the whole human race.²⁵ These qualities may be considered derivative as distinguished from his original nature which he has in common with the animals, that is, his physical appetite of food and sex. When these natural appetites are deprived of gratification, they give rise to "desires, emotions, and passions," and it depends on the frequency and intensity of these, and the possibility of satisfying them that the probability or improbability of man's early gregarious or social habits depends.²⁶

Ward disagrees with Aristotle's and Comte's statement that "man is naturally a social being."²⁷ Although Ward says that "civilized man is undoubtedly a social being" yet this quality is the "result of a long and severe experience by which a great change has been produced in his constitution."²⁸ Ward is using the term "social" as the quality of "associating" or "sociability,"

²² *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 450.

²³ *Pure Sociology*, p. 196.

²⁴ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 414; L. F. Ward, *Haeckel's Genesis of Man* (Philadelphia: Edward Stern & Co., 1879), pp. 24-64.

²⁵ *Pure Sociology*, p. 187; *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 461.

²⁶ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 461-462.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 221.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 460; II, 221.

rather than in the Thomistic sense of the term "social." This is evident from the following passage:

He was from the beginning and has always remained an exceedingly quarrelsome and willful animal. . . . His whole career has been marked by belligerency, internecine strife, and universal rapacity. The slow growth of sympathy and the moral sentiments somewhat mitigated this, but less than is commonly supposed, and but for the beneficent power of the state, seen by all to be in their interest, society would have been impossible.²⁹

At first man associated for protection, but as his intellect developed and he saw the advantages of association, he broadened his basis of association. Out of the conflict between his desire to associate and his original nature developed a socialized individual who under the direction of his intellect overcame his original anti-social nature and habits. This social instinct was the result of conflict of desires.

Equating the term "social" with "associating" Ward maintains that the idea that man has an "innate social sentiment" which brought men together "is not only improbable *a priori*, but is disproved by the actual condition of the apes, from which family . . . man has undoubtedly descended." Whether men joined together in a group or not depended not on their "social" nature but rather on whether they had sufficient brain-development to perceive the advantages resulting from organization.³⁰

Tracing the stages of man's socialization, Ward affirms that in the first stage of the development of society men lived in small groups that were more or less solitary. In the second stage they were still uncongenial but joined a "forced association" because of their rapid multiplication and need of safety. Moral qualities and virtues did not exist yet, hence the intellect was the servant of selfish passions. After some time, man because of his superior intellect achieved control of the natural environment. The various small scattered groups united into tribes and nations. Conflict between communities followed which finally resulted in the union of many tribes either through compulsion or interest. The in-

²⁹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 556.

³⁰ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 451-452.

fluence of Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer is evident in the emphasis on the state as the natural outcome of race struggle. Ward maintained that this process is still going on. He calls the third stage the epoch of "social progress," and looked forward to the fourth stage in which all governments would be consolidated into one. The four stages of aggregation are: the solitary or autarchic; the constrained aggregate or anarchic; the national or politarchic; and the cosmopolitan or pantarchic.³¹

In order to support his contention that man and society have passed through these stages from the "non-social" to the "social," Ward presents the following data. The first stage lies on the borderline between the human and sub-human and is represented by the genus which Haeckel called *Pithecanthropus*, and is a hypothetical stage. Although Ward admits that the evidence for this stage is very scanty, yet its reality as an intermediate stage between animality and humanity rests on the same evidence as the general theory of the development of the race from a lower or sub-human level.³² Because this phylogenetic explanation seems plausible, Ward uses it and justifies its use by stating that it is the method used by scientific men in biology and geology.³³ The representatives of the second stage are the lower existing tribes such as the Fuegians, interior Australians, Wood-Veddás and Bushmen. The third stage includes the savage tribes, barbarians, semi-civilized races and nations. Ward concludes by saying that "If the first stage is a strictly theoretical one, the fourth is a purely ideal one."³⁴ Positing the theory of evolution, he selected tribes on different stages to illustrate rather than demonstrate his hypothesis.

The material cause of society is man. In the early stages of his development it seems, according to Ward, that man was naturally antisocial, but as his brain evolved and he saw the advantages of association, he became social in the sense of associating with other men. Out of this association, society developed.

³¹ *Ibid.*, I, 464-466.

³² *Ibid.*, I, 467.

³³ *Ibid.*, I, cf. 465n.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 467.

FORMAL CAUSE OR ORGANIZATION

Comparing society to an organism, Ward maintains that they are similar in that both are organized, but that they are different in that society is not concrete. The essence of society is not men, women, material environment or both. It is "association" in which the "individual members are imperfectly held together by a certain psychic force."³⁵

In noting that society is "an association of individuals," "a product of the act of associating," and that "Society always possesses an organization, and it is this organization that acts," Ward emphasizes the relationship between social unity and social action.³⁶ "Order is the product of organization" and organization increases the working efficiency of society.³⁷ To illustrate this, Ward compares the efficiency of an army and a mob.

Looking at the social order statically, Ward considers it an organism in the sense that it is made up of structures. It is "complete in proportion as those structures are integrated" and it is "high in proportion as those structures are differentiated and multiplied and still perfectly integrated, or reduced to a completely subordinated and coordinated system."³⁸

Looking at social structures or institutions from the dynamic point of view, Ward regards them as the result of a struggle among the social forces in which the "centrifugal and destructive character of each force" is neutralized and each contributes to the constructive work of society. Once these structures are created, they become reservoirs of power and the means through which the work of society is performed. All of these structures are interrelated and in the mild struggle among them, as each performs its function, general social organization results. "The final result is the social order, or society itself as an organized whole—a vast magazine of social energy stored for use by human institutions."³⁹ Structures are the means and function is the end.⁴⁰

³⁵ "Contemporary Sociology," *op. cit.*, p. 492.

³⁶ *Applied Sociology* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), p. 337.

³⁷ *Pure Sociology*, p. 184.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 184–185.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

The most general name for social structures is "human institutions." These social structures may or may not be material. They may be psychic. Human institutions are the means of controlling and utilizing social energy. The "primordial, homogenous, undifferentiated social plasma" out of which all institutions developed, Ward calls "*the group sentiment of safety*." Out of it has emerged "religion, law, morals (in its primitive and proper sense based on *mos*, or custom) and all ceremonial, ecclesiastical, juridical, and political institutions."⁴¹ Other human institutions, almost as primitive and essential, are language, art, and industry. These may have a different source. Institutions may be classified as "material" and "immaterial," "natural" and "artificial" or "primary" and "secondary." The "artificial" seem to be an outgrowth of the "natural" and the "secondary" a product of the "primary." For example, the institution of the family grows out of or depends upon the institution of marriage; the moral code is derived from the blood bond.⁴² Law is the "*sense of order*" in society, out of which developed the whole system of jurisprudence. The primary institutions are the "direct products of fundamental wants and demands of human nature" and intimately connected with the psychic and social energy while the secondary institutions are more artificial constructions. Ward suggests it might clarify the concepts if the term "institution" were limited to the primary and "social structure" to the secondary. For example, property is the institution which has given rise to the arts as a social structure.⁴³

The basic principle of organic and social structures is the same, that is, "synergy," although the forces are different. "Social structures are the products of social synergy, that is, of the interaction of different social forces, all of which, in and of themselves, are destructive, but whose combined effect, mutually checking, constraining, and equilibrating one another, is to produce structures."⁴⁴

Although Ward has little discussion of groups, he does mention

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 176, 183.

two kinds of aggregates, the partial or incomplete and the universal or complete. These differ in purpose, size, constitution, and composition. Examples of partial aggregates are: organizations, societies, corporations, sects, churches. The difference between partial and universal aggregates is that the universal always includes all the inhabitants of some definite territorial area. All the members of a partial aggregate are also members of one and only one universal aggregate.⁴⁵

Ward implies social unity and social action since society is the result of associating, but he is not very explicit about the integration of a group or groups.

EFFICIENT CAUSE OR AGENTS

In his earlier writings Ward considers society to be the product of spontaneous evolution rather than the result of human design.

It must be declared at the outset that human association, and hence society itself, is the product of the law of natural selection, or adaptation, and was brought about under the rigid influence of natural economy, which preserves only such things as prove to be advantageous.⁴⁶

Following Hobbes' idea that society arose to protect man, Ward believes that man at first was unsocial, but through egoism and natural selection he discovered the advantages of association and thus became social. In this Ward is repeating the errors of the seventeenth and eighteenth century social thought.⁴⁷ In regard to using the terms "natural selection" or "survival of the fittest," which are biological terms, Ward prefers to use "principle of advantage" as it is applied to social phenomena.

In his later writings, Ward shifts the emphasis from society as a spontaneous, natural development of evolution to society as an artificial institution resulting from human planning. Society is still a product of evolution but of directed evolution.

Human society . . . is purely a product of his (man's)

⁴⁵ *The Psychic Factors of Civilization* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1893), pp. 293-294.

⁴⁶ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 451.

⁴⁷ Chugerman, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

reason and arose by insensible degrees, *pari passu* with the development of his brain. In other words, I regard human association as the result of the perceived advantage which it yields, and as coming into existence only in proportion as that advantage was perceived by the only faculty capable of perceiving it, the intellect.⁴⁸

This is further substantiated in *Psychic Factors*: "Human society, therefore, which is the highest product of evolution, naturally depends upon mind which is the highest property of matter."⁴⁹ And in *Outlines of Sociology*, Ward states: "This brain development was the condition of the psychic element which made man a creator, the master instead of the slave of his environment, and which above all else distinguishes him from the rest of nature."⁵⁰

Ward agrees with Spencer that "society is an evolving aggregate,"⁵¹ although he disagrees with the type of evolution described by Spencer. Spencer believed in unilinear and Ward in sympodial evolution, that is, evolution in a zig-zag course like the growth of vines rather than in a straight line. Since society is the result of evolution it is subject to all the laws and processes of evolution.⁵²

Looking at society from the point of view of social statics, Ward contends:

Just as the highest chemical aggregates forming the chemical substance protoplasm are compounded and re-compounded in the formation of physiological and then of morphological units, and just as these are further re-compounded to form organic aggregates of the first, second, third, etc., orders, so are the highest of these organic aggregates, or men, compounded anew, on precisely the same principle to form society. And this is the last and highest step with which we are acquainted of this long, unbroken series of cosmical aggregations leading from the ultimate material atom up to the social aggregate.⁵³

⁴⁸ "Sociology and Anthropology," *American Journal of Sociology*, I (1896), 432.

⁴⁹ P. 3.

⁵⁰ *Outlines of Sociology* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1898), p. 128.

⁵¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 209.

⁵² *Ibid.*, I, 210.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, I, 451.

In *Pure Sociology* Ward explains that every new combination is not only a synthesis but a creation. The pre-existing materials remain but something new is added by this "creative synthesis."⁵⁴ This term was borrowed from Wundt. In the case of society, man with his intellect in addition to all the qualities of the lower products created the next highest product—society. The new quality of society is its capacity for achievement.⁵⁵

At every stage of evolution is found the universal principle of *synergy*, the systematic and *organic working together* of the antithetical forces of nature."⁵⁶ Conflict is universal, and is necessary for evolution to take place, but "synergy" is the conservative, creative, and constructive principle so that the social energy generated by conflict will be organized into structures on each level. "Synergy is the principle that explains all organization and creates all structures."⁵⁷ It is primarily and essentially a process of "equilibration" for it begins in "collision, conflict, antagonism, and opposition, but as no motion can be lost it is transformed, and we have the milder phases of antithesis, competition, and interaction, passing next into a *modus vivendi*, or compromise, and ending in collaboration and cooperation. It is the cosmological expression of the Hegelian trilogy."⁵⁸ This "social equilibration under the principle of social synergy" produces and conserves social structures and society itself.⁵⁹ In applying this to the evolution of society, Ward says that the human race began as an "undifferentiated group, the horde" which contained all the elements of developed society. Then the group was differentiated and later became integrated through synergy.⁶⁰

Later, in *Pure Sociology*, Ward follows Gumpowicz and Ratzenhofer in their conviction that society originated in race struggle which manifests the principle of synergy in the social world.

⁵⁴ *Pure Sociology*, p. 89.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 175–176.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 175; 184.

⁶⁰ *Glimpses*, VI, 263.

We at last have a true key to the solution of the question of the origin of society. . . . It is the only scientific explanation that has been offered of the facts and phenomena of human history. . . . If I succeed in contributing anything to the subject it will consist in pointing out this truth and showing that the struggle of races is simple and typical social synergy and that it is the particular way in which synergy as a cosmic principle operates in the social world.⁶¹

Society, then, is a natural creation evolving mechanically from races and individuals in conflict.

Looking at society from the point of view of social dynamics he writes :

The cause, not only of the primary fact of association itself, but of all other human activities, is *appetite* In short, desire, taken in its widest sense, both positive and negative, is the real force in the sentiment world. It is the dynamic agent in the animal world including the human sphere, and therefore constitutes the *social force*. It is essentially psychic.⁶²

Applying this principle to the human sphere, Ward contends that while there is no perceptible change in this principle, "the co-operative habits of the human animal resulting in what is known as society gives this principle increased importance."⁶³ This psychic force is the efficient cause of the phenomena of society.⁶⁴

Ward also maintains that the plural form "social forces" may be used just as the term "physical forces" is used, since they are only manifestations of the one social force which in turn is only a manifestation of the universal force.⁶⁵ It is the "social homologue of the universal *nisus* of nature, the primordial cosmic force (Urkraft) which produces all change."⁶⁶

⁶¹ *Pure Sociology*, pp. 203-204.

⁶² *Dynamic Sociology*, I, p. 468; *Psychic Factors*, p. 115; "The Social Forces," *American Journal of Sociology*, II (1896-1897), 85-86.

⁶³ *Psychic Factors*, p. 129.

⁶⁴ L. F. Ward, "Sociology at the Paris Exposition of 1900," *Report of the Commission of Education for 1899-1900* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 1582.

⁶⁵ "The Social Forces," *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁶⁶ *Pure Sociology*, p. 22.

In explaining the term social forces, Ward says :

The social forces are wants seeking satisfactions through efforts, and are thus social motives or motors inspiring activities which either create social structures through social synergy or modify the structures already created through innovation and conation. They reside in the individual but become social through interaction, cooperation, and cumulative effects. They are all primarily physical or physiological, even those classed as spiritual, for the organism is the only source from which they can emanate. They all have, therefore, their physical seat in the human body, and for most of them this is not difficult to locate.⁶⁷

In *Pure Sociology* Ward repeats that the collective desires of men in association are social forces. By using the term "desire" broadly he includes in it "all emotions, all passions, . . . all cravings, all yearnings, and longings, all hopes, anticipations, aspirations, and ambitions."⁶⁸ It is equivalent to the term "interest" used by Ratzenhofer.⁶⁹ In the *American Journal of Sociology* Ward maintains :

It is in the affective side of mind that forces of society are found to lie. Feeling is a force. It is the only psychic force, and is at the same time the fundamental social force. The particular form under which feeling manifests itself as a force is *desire*, and the social forces consist in human desires. They are true natural forces and obey all of the Newtonian laws of motion. They are either negative—desire to escape pain—or positive—desire to secure pleasure. . . . In either case they impel the individual to action. A convenient and highly expressive synonym for desire in its widest sense is *will*. . . . From an economic point of view we may identify it with *want*, and contemplate the combined wants of mankind as constituting the social forces.⁷⁰

Stressing the importance of these social forces, Ward says that

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 261.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 102–103.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, cf. p. 21n.

⁷⁰ "Mechanics of Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, II (1896–1897), 238.

if for any reason these dynamic agents—wants and passions of men—should be inoperative, society would instantly stop.⁷¹

In *Dynamic Sociology* Ward classifies the social forces as:⁷²

Essential Forces	Preservative Forces	{ Positive—Gustatory (seeking pleasure) Negative—Protective (avoiding pain)
	Reproductive Forces	{ Direct—The sexual and amative desires Indirect—Parental and consanguineal affections
Non-essential Forces	{ Aesthetic Forces	
	{ Emotional (Moral) Forces	
	{ Intellectual Forces	

The preservative and reproductive forces are classified as essential because they are necessary for the existence of man and society.⁷³ It is the duty of the preservative forces to preserve the vitality of the race while the reproductive forces sustain society by reproducing individuals. The former preserves the individual while the latter preserves the race.

The non-essential forces are divided into those of the senses of sight and hearing, the emotions, and the intellect. The first, or aesthetic, directs the advancement of society in the fine arts; the second, emotional or moral, controls the changes in customs, sentiments, and desires; the third, intellectual, regulates the thoughts and judgments of society.⁷⁴ Although Ward speaks of the moral and intellectual forces, he reduces them together with all the social forces to a physical basis for the "body is the source of them all, even of the mind itself."⁷⁵

In *Pure Sociology* there are a few changes in the terms:⁷⁶

Physical Forces (Function bodily)	Ontogenetic Forces	{ Positive, attractive (seeking pleasure) Negative, protective (avoiding pain)
	Phylogenetic Forces	{ Direct, sexual Indirect, consanguineal
Spiritual Forces (Function psychic)	{ Sociogenetic	
	{ Forces	
	{ Moral (seeking the safe and good) Esthetic (seeking the beautiful) Intellectual (seeking the useful and true)	

⁷¹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 463.

⁷² *I*, 472.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, I, 482; *Glimpses*, V, 9.

⁷⁴ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 666–667.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 666.

⁷⁶ *P*, 261.

Just as in the first classification, hunger and love hold the first place as being the chief mainsprings to action and the principal social forces.⁷⁷ The changes introduced in the second classification are according to the genetic point of view of society. Since ontogeny includes everything relating to a being during its whole life except its genetic relations to other beings, the term ontogenetic forces was substituted for preservative forces. It includes all the ideas of preservative forces besides the genetic and evolutionary relations of individuals. The term reproductive forces of the former classification was changed to phylogenetic forces which connote the influences pertaining to the continuation of the race.⁷⁸

The non-essential forces are now called the sociogenetic forces. In *Psychic Factors* these were termed "spiritual" forces, that is, psychic.⁷⁹ They were considered as "forces of race elevation" and as such the chief civilizing agencies. In *Pure Sociology* they are not only the chief civilizing but also the chief socializing agencies. "Socialization is the first step toward civilization, and all esthetic, moral, and intellectual influences are working for civilization chiefly through socialization."⁸⁰

Ward points out other relationships among the social forces. The physical forces common to both man and animal are regarded as original while the spiritual, characteristic of the human race alone, are derivative. The physical become social through the social effects resulting from activities while the spiritual are essentially social and tend to "race elevation and universal culture." The physical forces are negative in the sense that they are directed to the prevention of pain while the spiritual forces are positive since they are directed more to attaining pleasure than to avoid pain.⁸¹

Under the "paradoxes of the social forces" Ward states that the physical forces are altruistic while the spiritual are egoistic. Altruism is conceived of in terms of maintaining life and the race. The spiritual forces are egoistic because they pursue pleasure for

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 259-260.

⁷⁹ *Psychic Factors*, p. 123.

⁸⁰ *Pure Sociology*, p. 260.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

its own sake. The physical forces are characterized by necessity, while the spiritual represent utility in the sense of amount of satisfaction achieved. The physical forces have greater intensity and the spiritual greater duration. The former secure the ends of nature and are largely on the biological plane, while the latter secure the ends of man and therefore are sociological. The first are ontogenetic and phylogenetic while the second are socio-genetic.⁸²

In *Psychic Factors* Ward maintains that there are two theorems to be established :

1. The phenomena of subjective psychology, viz., the feelings taken collectively, properly called the soul of man, constitute the dynamic element of society, or the social forces.
2. The initial, original, or primary characteristic of objective psychology, viz., the intellect proper, or intuitive faculty, constitutes the directive element of society, and only means by which the social forces can be controlled.⁸³

Discussing this further in *Pure Sociology*, Ward says that the two great agents or agencies of society are the dynamic and directive. Since the social forces, the desires, are natural forces, blind impulses obeying mechanical laws, they must be directed by the intellect in order to have social progress.⁸⁴

In *Dynamic Sociology* he states: "This, then, is the essential prerequisite to all true social union, that there should be sufficient brain-development to enable the individuals interested to perceive, however dimly, the advantages of association."⁸⁵

The efficient cause of society is evolution. From the point of view of statics, the process of evolution is explained by the principle of "synergy" which Ward in his later writings identifies as race conflict. From the point of view of dynamics, the social force is appetites or desires.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 264-265.

⁸³ P. 5.

⁸⁴ *Pure Sociology*, pp. 462-463.

⁸⁵ I, 452.

FINAL CAUSE OR PURPOSE

In *Dynamic Sociology* Ward states that "the end of nature is the preservation and perpetuation of life; that of man is the satisfaction of desire."⁸⁶ Happiness here on earth is the great object of man's existence and the only object of his effort. "The disposition to seek happiness is already provided by instinct, and each individual necessarily seeks his own happiness without suggestion or direction from any source."⁸⁷ Happiness is defined as the "realization of all the positive forms of feeling, attended by a more or less complete absence of the negative forms, known as pain."⁸⁸ Or in other words happiness is the excess of pleasure over pain.⁸⁹ Happiness, however, is not restricted to the desires of eating, drinking, and reproducing, but includes also the "higher emotional pleasures afforded by the gratification of social, esthetic, moral, and intellectual tastes."⁹⁰ Ward seems to follow the ideas of Spencer and Spinoza that the "pleasurable is the good and the painful is the bad, and that the duty of life is to pursue the former and avoid the latter."⁹¹ In the beginning of organic life, feeling directed life. Pleasurable feelings induced actions promoting life while pain acted as a warning against injury and destruction. Feeling is pain and pleasure, the appetites and the passions all summed up in desire.

In *Psychic Factors* Ward presents a summary outline as follows:

1. The object of Nature is Function.
2. The object of Man is Happiness.
3. The object of Society is Action.⁹²

Action is considered in terms of the effort put forth to satisfy desires or to attain happiness.⁹³ It would seem from this that the

⁸⁶ I, 469.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 154-155.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 129.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 108.

⁹⁰ *Psychic Factors*, pp. 73-74.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

object of society is to help men satisfy their desires. This is clarified in *Dynamic Sociology*:

Can happiness, then, be directly sought? By the individual, yes. By society, no. The individual may seek it directly, but can best attain it by seeking it indirectly. The social organism must fail by seeking it directly; it may succeed by seeking it indirectly. . . . The happiness of society is nothing else than the happiness of its individual units.⁹⁴

The different methods to be used by the individual and society are described as follows:

The proximate ends to be sought by the *individual* must rest upon the *subjective* branch of mental manifestation—they must be related to the *feelings* and be *moral* in their character. But the proximate ends which *society* must seek, in order to act at all in the scheme of securing a fuller measure of human happiness must rest upon the *objective* branch of mental manifestation, must be related to the *understanding* and be *intellectual* in their character.⁹⁵

This human happiness can only be secured by the elevation and expansion of the reasoning powers of man. This is indirect but the only effective means of attaining the end. Maintaining that the "end of social as of individual being is to minister in the highest possible degree to the feelings," Ward contends that this can be accomplished only by a thorough cultivation of the intellect.⁹⁶

This is made more explicit in the following statement:

As the ultimate end which every feeling organism, every individual man, and society collectively, both morally should and physically must directly or indirectly pursue, is the increase of happiness, so the highest achievement of the *developed* intellect and social consciousness of man is the substitution for the unsuccessful or partially successful and costly directed efforts to attain

⁹⁴ II, 152.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 154.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 131.

that end, of a systematic, predetermined, and successful scheme for the organization of happiness. Such a successful scheme must have for its primary object the equal distribution of the extant knowledge of the world.⁹⁷

Ward claimed that most of the evils of society are due to a lack of wisdom of its members, hence it is necessary to extend education. In *Applied Sociology*, Ward defines education as the "universal distribution of extant knowledge."⁹⁸ It becomes the prime duty of society to make education universal if it is to improve itself. "When only a few possess it, it has little value. It may even become injurious. The inequalities engendered lead to all forms of exploitation and social misery."⁹⁹

Thinking in terms of reform and progress, Ward contends that :

Society, considered as an active agent, can have no other object than its own preservation and advancement. Its functions are reduced to two, the protective and ameliorative. . . . No individual ever limits his activities to the simple sphere of self-preservation. Every individual is always seeking besides to benefit himself in every possible way. Society should do the same, and, in fact, has always sought to do so in the measure of its power to understand itself. The extent to which it will do this will depend upon the collective intelligence. . . . That degree of social consciousness which enables society to perceive that it needs greater intelligence in order to further its own interests is the homologue of native capacity in the individual, and the problem of increasing social intelligence is reduced, as in the individual, to that of acquiring knowledge.¹⁰⁰

Ward pleaded for social improvement through both education and legislation. Since human beings are not free agents but are subject to social forces, the next stage in evolution beyond individualism is collectivism. Civilization or social progress is possible only by society acting as a unit. "Sociocracy" is collective, socialized action. At present only the few profit from the

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 541.

⁹⁸ P. 299.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 308.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 39.

achievements of the élite. These benefits need to be extended to all. The means is "sociocracy," a term Ward borrowed from Comte and used first in a paper read before the Anthropological Society of Washington.¹⁰¹ In *Outlines of Sociology* Ward defined "sociocracy" as "the general social art, the scientific control of the social forces by the collective mind of society for its advantage."¹⁰² It aims to put the moral, spiritual and intellectual life above the material and animal life. Under "sociocracy" or the planned control of society by society as a whole, "collective telesis" or purposeful social activity could be harmonized with individual self-interest by "attractive legislation." In his "sociocracy" favors would be distributed according to merit, and equalizing opportunities would distribute the advantages.¹⁰³ Government in the past was a necessary evil and its purpose was protection. Under "sociocracy" it would become an art by using attractive rather than repressive legislation, and placing it under the direction of social scientists who would direct social development toward desired ends. Ward's elaboration of this form of group activity and his emphasis on social control made him one of the most inspiring theorists in the development of social thought in America.¹⁰⁴ In recapitulation, the purpose of society is to increase the sum total of human happiness. The most effective means of achieving this are universal education and attractive legislation under "sociocracy."

In conclusion, Ward's ideas about the nature of society may be summarized as follows:

1. Society is an association of individuals.
2. The material cause or the members of society are men. Man is not social by nature but civilized man has become social because of the advantages accruing from social union.
3. The formal cause of society is association in which the

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Glimpses*, II, 334.

¹⁰² *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 292.

¹⁰³ *Applied Sociology*, ch. 13; *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 273 ff; 292-93; *Psychic Factors*, ch. 38.

¹⁰⁴ W. B. Bodenhafer, "The Comparative Rôle of the Group Concept in Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* and Contemporary Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVI (1920-1921), 300.

members are imperfectly held together by a certain psychic force.

4. The efficient cause is evolution. The principle of synergy in the form of race conflict explains the evolution of social structures, while the social forces are appetites or desires.
5. The final cause or purpose of society is to secure a fuller measure of happiness to each individual in society primarily through popular education and attractive legislation.

SOCIAL CHANGE

In accordance with Ward's basic assumptions that matter eternally evolves, and that organization takes place on each level of phenomena, through the process of conflict, social change is considered as that process in operation in social phenomena. Synergy is the universal principle which equilibrates the opposing social forces. Any disturbance in the balance of these opposing forces causes social change. Since society is an evolving aggregate, social change is always taking place. These changes at first were "genetic" or the result of blind evolutionary forces. As man's mind developed, and he became capable of controlling the social forces and directing them toward desired ends, social change became more "telic."

Ward follows Comte and Spencer in considering social evolution or change as a phase of the broader process of cosmic evolution, but he differs in regarding evolution as "sympodial."

FACTORS IN SOCIAL CHANGE

Man is the center of social change since it is his feelings that become the social forces when he interacts with others. The three dynamic factors in social change are: difference in potential, innovation, and conation. Difference in potential means synthesizing differences into a new creation such as the contacting and blending of different cultures. Innovation means actualizing potential geniuses by developing dormant capacities in a suitable environment or understanding the environment well enough to modify it to meet man's desires. Conation impels man to put forth efforts to satisfy his desires since the end of conation is the

satisfaction of desire. These basic principles relate to the individual but become social in the "act of associating."

DIRECTED SOCIAL CHANGE

Ward maintained that group feelings, like individual feelings, need guidance or control if they are to function safely and efficiently. Social control in its highest sense is social or collective "telesis." This means that the social ends to be attained are well-known and the means to achieve the ends are scientifically ascertained. Then the feelings are directed by the intellect toward the end according to the selected means. "Telesis" implies purpose combined with scientific knowledge. This idea of "telesis" applied to social change and progress is one of Ward's greatest contributions. It suggests that the group should carefully study its situation, its ends, and its means, and then concentrate on attaining the end. The social survey method illustrates this telic idea.

Ward envisioned a sociocratic society in which all the members would work consciously and intelligently for the constructive progress of the whole society rather than a segment of it. Perhaps his childhood experience as a member of the lower economic class encouraged his faith in the "latent intellectual capacities of the masses," and his desire to widen the opportunities for all to develop their native endowments.¹⁰⁵ His government experience aroused his interest in a planned social economy rather than the prevailing laissez-faire individualism of his time.

The means to be employed in replacing "genetic" with "telic" change are education and attractive legislation. A wider diffusion of the best knowledge extant would enable each individual to participate consciously and more intelligently in a "sociocracy," and attractive legislation would tend to cheerful compliance with law and eliminate much social friction.¹⁰⁶

Real progress depends on achievement which is the distinguishing characteristic of human beings. Achievement is the constructive expression of human energy and intelligence in material and non-material inventions. Ward stresses cultural achievement

¹⁰⁵ Hofstadter, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Dealey, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

which, though based on the material, is the socializing, spiritualizing factor giving man his greatest joy and happiness. Civilization depends upon the level of cultural achievement.

"Sociocracy" or "telic" society should scientifically study potential talents and the kind of social environment best suited for developing potential geniuses as well as the average man and furnish the opportunity for development through a suitable environment. In seeking to ascertain the important factors in a social environment which would be conducive to achievement, Ward concludes that leisure through economic achievement, and contact with a cultural environment, including education, are the most necessary.

The climax of Ward's sociological teaching is the emphasis on present human progress through "telesis." Progress is to be based on economic achievement and be "sociocratic" so that all may have leisure. With leisure, education becomes possible and thus the human capacity for achievement is enlarged both materially and spiritually.¹⁰⁷

CONTRIBUTIONS

Ward's conclusions or "scientific principles" were largely *a priori* philosophic deductions rather than inductions from empirical studies of concrete facts.¹⁰⁸ He considered his rôle as sociologist or social philosopher to master the best thought of his time and synthesize it into a coherent system supplemented by his own mental contributions. This he was equipped to do because of his broad grasp of several fields of science and his logical intellect and deep insight. He was interested in developing sociological knowledge by establishing general laws. The most fundamental is the law of "parsimony," that is, that men seek their greatest advantage. Since Ward considered sociology to be a body of generalizations derived from the other sciences rather than inductions from observed facts, his sociology becomes a branch of philosophy rather than a special or empirical science.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 91; Read Bain, "Trends in American Sociological Theory," *Trends in American Sociology*, eds. George A. Lundberg, Read Bain, and Nels Anderson (New York: Harper & Bros., 1929), p. 79.

Ward's monistic materialism and its "explanation from below"—that is an attempt to explain social phenomena by appealing to biological, chemical, and physical principles—resulted in an analogical conception of social phenomena which has been, and is to a certain extent still current in American sociological thinking.

Although Ward distinguished in the abstract between "genetic" and "telic" change and organization, yet because of his monism, "telic" behavior is a "genetic" product.¹⁰⁹ "Telic" behavior is that guided by intellect, and the intellect is a higher development of matter. Since it is a difference in degree rather than in kind, Ward's explanation does not show how a difference in kind of activity can flow from a cause different only in degree.

Because Ward was the first to stress the importance of psychic factors in society, he has been regarded as one of the founders of modern psychological sociology.¹¹⁰ He pointed out that the feeling aspect of the human mind is the dynamo or dynamic agent driving men into action, therefore, the psychology of feeling is very important for sociology.¹¹¹ This idea has been developed, on the one hand, by the Freudian psychoanalytic school in psychology, and on the other, by those emphasizing "interests," such as Sumner, W. I. Thomas, and Albion Small.

Modern empirical psychologists, however, contend that there is no such thing as feeling in general but specific feelings, ideas, and volitions.¹¹² In his classification of desires or social forces, Ward seems to confuse his logical classification with ontological reality.

In emphasizing desire as the sole driving force in human activity, Ward aligns himself with those holding particularistic or single factor explanations of social phenomena. His tendency to draw on psychology limited him to the psychology of the traditional hedonism of his day. Hence, his horizon was circumscribed by pleasure and pain, stimulus and response, and neglected the effects of cultural conditioning.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Hofstadter, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Dealey, *op. cit.*, p. 91; C. A. Ellwood, "Lester Frank Ward," *American Journal of Sociology*, XIX (July, 1913-May, 1914), 72.

¹¹¹ Cf. Dealey, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹¹² L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), p. 225.

Another product of Ward's monism, deductive method, and hedonism is his emphasis on material achievement. Judging from the experience of history in which the relationship between material achievement and hedonism and national degeneration is evident, this aspect of Ward's social philosophy is hardly conducive to the social progress he envisioned. However, his social philosophy with the emphasis on material achievement, the power of intelligent volition, and the value of education in controlling nature was well-suited to the spirit of the times in which he wrote and has exerted a profound influence on sociology. Even though recent research in biology, sociology, and psychology tend to discredit some of Ward's conclusions, he will always rank as one of the foremost American pioneers in sociology.¹¹³

Ward was the first to emphasize social meliorism and progress. By his emphasis on social planning, the limitations of laissez-faire, and his criticism of biological sociology, he helped to free American sociological thinking from nineteenth century influences, particularly, the kind of evolutionism rooted in English sociology. His great faith in education as a means of social reconstruction still has many adherents. Education for Ward meant primarily the transmission and diffusion of the means of realizing human purposes.

Ward's theories of social "telesis" and education have exerted an influence on his contemporaries and successors. They contain valuable suggestions for contemporary social reconstruction provided the materialistic basis is broadened to include the spiritual, and the goal of society and social change is also enlarged to meet all the needs of man, both material and spiritual, natural and supernatural.

Ward's concept of "social forces" was a prominent feature in early American sociology and is still found in some texts. Some of Ward's contributions to sociological terminology are: telesis, sociocracy, synergy, meliorism, achievement, and opportunity.¹¹⁴

It is difficult to estimate the importance of Ward. His work was a synthesis of Comte, Spencer, and Darwin interpreted

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 236; Chugerman, *op. cit.*, p. 204-210.

¹¹⁴ Ulysses G. Weatherley, "Lester Frank Ward," *American Journal of Sociology*, XIX (1913), 68.

according to his frontier egalitarianism. Comte's positivism and semi-mystical worship of humanity was transmuted by Ward into a kind of "materialistic idealism" in which man is only part of the cosmic evolution. The narrow individualism of Spencer was attacked by stressing the socializing power of education. By glorifying the capacity of the common man, Ward pointed out the fallacies of laissez-faire economics, and stressed the need of government regulation of private enterprise and the extension of governmental services. The pessimism of social Darwinism was transformed into an optimistic intellectualism. Ward had a profound faith in man's ability to solve his own social problems by his scientifically guided intelligence.¹¹⁵

Most of the outstanding American sociologists between 1890 and 1915 may be grouped either in the Ward or Sumner lineage. In contrast to Ward, Sumner represents a synthesis of the evolutionary ethnology of Lubbock, Tylor, and Morgan; laissez-faire economics; and social Darwinism. Although Ward probably did most to popularize sociology in the United States, Sumner seems to have been the only one who called a course "sociology" before the appearance of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883. Not until after 1883 did the term "sociology" appear consistently in university catalogs.¹¹⁶ Both Ward and Sumner are pioneers in introducing specific trends into American sociological thinking.

¹¹⁵ Bain, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER III

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, American economist and sociologist, was born in Paterson, New Jersey, October 30, 1840. As the son of an English immigrant family, he was taught to value highly independence, ambition, and common sense. After finishing his elementary and secondary education in the public schools of New Haven, and graduating from Yale, he went to Europe. During the winter of 1863-64 Sumner studied French and Hebrew in Geneva, Switzerland; in April he went to Göttingen to study ancient languages and history. At Oxford he studied Anglican theology until his election as tutor at Yale in 1866. The next year he was ordained deacon in the Protestant Episcopal Church of New Haven, and later became Rector of the Church of the Redeemer, Morristown, New Jersey, from 1870 to 1872. In June of 1872 Sumner was elected Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale where he remained until his death in 1910. The year before his death he was elected president of the American Sociological Society as successor to Ward.¹

Sumner was troubled by the social chaos of his time and wanted to bring some order into it by an "objective study of the characteristics of the social body and the laws governing it" so that there would be greater freedom and opportunity for mankind.² As a result he was continually seeking a scientific method through his reading and personal contacts.

His professors at Göttingen were credited with introducing him to "rigorous and pitiless methods of investigation and deduction. Their analysis was their strong point."³ At Oxford Sumner

¹ "Autobiographical Sketch of William Graham Sumner," *Earth-Hunger and Other Essays*, ed. A. G. Keller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913), pp. 3-4.

² H. E. Starr, *William Graham Sumner* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1925), pp. 392, 395-6.

³ R. Davie, "Sketch of William Graham Sumner," *Sumner Today* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. xiii.

and a group of fellow-students "agreed that social science must be an induction from history and that Buckle had started on the right track."⁴ The difficulty, however, was to collect and arrange the mass of historical material so that the inductions could be made. When he read Spencer's essays, collected later into the *Study of Sociology*, Sumner said that the "conception of society, of social forces, and of the science of society there offered was just the one I had been groping after but had not been able to reduce for myself."⁵ The method of assembling facts from anthropology and ethnology was also borrowed from Spencer.⁶

After Sumner became Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale, he said that he was "definitely converted to evolution by Professor Marsh's horses sometime about 1875 or 1876." About this time he reread Spencer's *Social Statistics* and *First Principles*, and all of Darwin, Huxley, Haeckel and other natural scientists.⁷ Sumner credited Spencer with having tested and corrected the principles of evolution by inductions from the other sciences and given them to sociology as a scientific method.

I can see no boundaries to the scope of the philosophy of evolution. That philosophy is sure to embrace all the interests of man on this earth. It will be one of its crowning triumphs to bring light and order into the social problems which are of universal bearing on all mankind. Mr. Spencer is breaking the path for us into this domain. We stand eager to follow him into it, and we look upon his work on sociology as a grand step in the history of science.⁸

According to Chugerman, Sumner accepted from Darwin natural selection and the struggle for existence as much as Spencer did for the method of social evolution.⁹ In fact Julius C. Peter in the

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

⁶ C. A. Ellwood, *A History of Social Philosophy* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939), p. 506.

⁷ Davie, *op. cit.*, p. xvi.

⁸ "The Science of Sociology," *The Forgotten Man and Other Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), pp. 404-405; Starr, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

⁹ Lester F. Ward, *The American Aristotle*, pp. 315-316.

foreword to *Sumner Today* remarks that "Sumner has been called the 'Darwin of the social sciences' for his resemblance to Darwin in singleness of mind, solid belief in the inductive method, his willingness to revise his opinions on the introduction of new evidence, and his selfless devotion to seeking after truth."¹⁰

From Harriet Martineau and Thomas Hooker, Sumner acquired some of his ideas about rights, and from Ludwig Gumplowicz much about group conflict. To Julius Lippert's *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit* he was indebted for many suggestions about the origin and evolution of social institutions which were incorporated into his *Folkways* (1906), and *Science of Society* (1927), published by Keller.¹¹

In praising his teacher and predecessor, Keller speaks of Sumner's wide knowledge gained from theology, philosophy, history, personal investigations, travelling, and contact with leaders in the business world. Spencer and Lippert, and perhaps Ratzenhofer, were considered the dominant influences in the works of Sumner.¹²

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

In discussing Sumner's concept of society and social change it is necessary to keep in mind his basic assumptions derived from materialistic monism and the Darwinian-Malthusian context of "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest" as applied to social phenomena by Spencer. The "strain of improvement and consistency" are also evident as they are in his discussion of folkways. The "strain of improvement" is regarded as better adaptation of means to ends in order to attain pleasure and avoid pain. This is a reflection of the hedonistic principle of Jeremy Bentham. The "strain of consistency" is directed toward lessening of friction and antagonism. Since society is thought of in terms of social evolution, Sumner considers the four factors in this evolution as: "man's relation to the earth; the solidarity of the race; the presence of mystery in human experience; and the ruling

¹⁰ Davie, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Starr, *op. cit.*, p. 393; Bernard Stern, "William Graham Sumner," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XIV, 1930, 463.

¹² Starr, *op. cit.*, p. 377; A. G. Keller, "William Graham Sumner," *The Yale Review*, XIX (1910-1911), 9; A. G. Keller, "William Graham Sumner," *American Journal of Sociology*, XV (1909-10), 832-835.

motives of human nature, hunger, love, vanity and fear.”¹³ These factors are in the “nature of things and persist unchanged from generation to generation.”¹⁴ As Page remarks, Sumner “extended the evolutionism of Spencer and Lippert to the whole social field.”¹⁵ Sumner sets as the task for science the investigation of the laws underlying social phenomena. He thought that men must react to social laws as to physical laws—“learn them, obey them, and conform to them.”¹⁶

DEFINITION OF SOCIETY

Since Sumner did not complete his system of sociology before his death, and also because he was more interested in the descriptive and ethnographic than the theoretical phase of sociology,¹⁷ there is no precise definition of society in *Folkways* or his *Essays*. However, in *The Science of Society*, published posthumously by his successor and disciple, A. G. Keller, the following definition is given: “A human society is a group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species.”¹⁸ In the preface to Volume One of this work Keller states that Sumner developed the salient features of the system and Keller considerably altered the system although always within the main outlines of it.¹⁹

¹³ Starr, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ C. H. Page, *Class and American Sociology: From Ward to Ross* (New York: The Dial Press, 1940), p. 76.

¹⁶ “Sketch of William Graham Sumner,” *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays* ed. A. G. Keller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1914), p. 11.

¹⁷ H. E. Barnes, “Two Representative Contributions of Sociology to Political Theory: The Doctrines of William Graham Sumner and Lester Ward,” *American Journal of Sociology*, XXV (1919-1920), 6.

¹⁸ W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), 6-7.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I, Preface, pp. xxiv-xxv. Keller remarks that “It is next to impossible to apportion the parts contributed by the two authors, except that chapter LVIII and sections 458, 459, 460, 461 and 463 are mainly in Sumner’s words.” Keller made explicit and emphasized the conception of evolution in the mores which was implicitly recognized in Sumner’s writings but explicitly denied by him.

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If the above definition is taken as representative of Sumner's thought, the indispensable elements in the definition are "group of human beings," and "cooperative effort" for "self-maintenance and self-perpetuation."²⁰

Organization, which connotes specialization plus cooperation, is not the sole qualification but organization for the "discharge of the two characteristic societal functions."²¹ This presumes different sexes and different ages.²² For that reason Sumner maintains that a club, political party, college, or army, do not qualify as a society, for society is a functional group organized for the biological and economic function of self-maintenance and race preservation.

This definition, then, sets no limit to the size of the group. Therefore, "the family, nation, or whole race of mankind" may be considered as a society.²³ The size of the group and the space occupied by it depends upon the food-supply, means of transportation and communication, and, above all, the conditions of the struggle for existence. Therefore the "whole human race constitutes, at least potentially, a society; for the life of mankind on earth is subject to conditions and forces . . . as wide of scope as the earth or the race."²⁴

It is also stated in *The Science of Society* that "The society-idea in its primary form is 'we' as distinguished from others. We who are here are one party; those over there are another."²⁵ Proximity is considered as the simplest condition leading to association but the conditions of the struggle for existence determine the size of each group, and the internal organization of each group.

A group or groups may have some relation to each other (kin, neighborhood, alliance, connubium and commercium) which draws them together and differentiates them from others. Thus a differentiation arises between

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 7.

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 8.

²² *Ibid.*, III, 2220.

²³ *Ibid.*, I, 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 420.

ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups.²⁶

This seems to presume a "social" category as the distinctive element of the "in-group" and the "out-group." However, Sumner is differentiating the two types of groups on the basis of competition for means of existence and survival rather than emphasizing the social aspect. For him the "social" is the competition of man and man in fulfilling the biological and economic functions of society. This seems to be a contradiction yet it is consistent with Sumner's basic assumptions of the man-land ratio and struggle for survival.

In discussing the relationship of the in-group and the out-group, Sumner says that the members of an "in-group" or a "we-group" are peaceful and amicable to each other but hostile and inimical to the "out-group." Peace and war are correlative in the interaction between and among groups. Thus, Sumner, like Gumpłowicz, assumes a double standard of behaviour,—one to the "in-group" and another to the "out-group."

The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. These exigencies also make government and law in the in-group, in order to prevent quarrels and enforce discipline. Thus war and peace have reacted on each other and developed each other, one within the group, the other in the intergroup relation. The closer the neighbors, the stronger they are, the intenser is the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and discipline of each. Sentiments are produced to correspond.²⁷

Although Sumner does not explicitly state it, he implies that not only "primitive" society but practically all human society or the human race is a "conglomerate of groups" following this

²⁶ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), p. 12; W. G. Sumner, *War and Other Essays*, ed. A. G. Keller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), p. 16.

²⁷ *Folkways*, p. 12.

"in-group" and "out-group" pattern of action. The folkways and mores which are adjustments to life-conditions are attributed to these specific groups within the larger society of the human race and not to society in general.²⁸

MATERIAL CAUSE OR MEMBERSHIP

Before discussing man as a member of a group, it might be well to summarize Sumner's concept of man as an individual. This seems to bear out the contention that Sumner's theory of social development is "in the main materialistic."²⁹ Man has come from the earth like other creatures and bears a direct relationship to it. In order to survive in the struggle for existence with nature he must make adjustments in the form of folkways and mores. "There is nothing surer than that men are earth-born and earth-nourished."³⁰ This is further supported by the passage:

Land is that upon which, and out of which, men live.
 . . . The ultimate elements offered for a scientific study
 of the evolution and life of human society are, then,
 Man and Land; given these, there arises at once the
 necessity of adjustment between them.³¹

The process of adjustment is evolution, "for the essence of evolution is the adjustment of life to life-conditions."³² In speaking of man's relation to nature, Sumner claims that before her he has "no more right to life than a rattlesnake; . . . his right to the pursuit of happiness is nothing but a license to maintain the struggle for existence, if he can find within himself the powers with which to do it."³³ Sumner may be classified with those who think that man descended from a branch of higher animal life, for he considered that even the psychic equipment of man can be traced to the primates who have an individual and social nature.³⁴

²⁸ Cf. Floyd House, *The Development of Sociology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936), p. 277.

²⁹ Cf. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 514.

³⁰ *The Science of Society*, I, 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*, I, 4.

³² *Ibid.*, I, 3.

³³ "The Boon of Nature," *Earth-Hunger and Other Essays*, p. 234.

³⁴ E. S. Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1922), p. 30.

Referring to the social nature of man, Sumner, like Ward, maintains that civilized man as we know him today is social but that originally man was unsocial and became "social under the rod of experience."³⁵ Primitive man did not deliberately choose to associate with his fellow-men. Rather it was a case of necessity or expediency. If he joined with others he survived; if not, he perished. "Men have to be driven to think in terms of society."³⁶ "Societal bonds" became a "species of insurance" in the struggle for existence.³⁷

Sumner objects to the conclusion that because man as we "ordinarily encounter him" is found in society that he is a "social animal," is "gregarious," or has a "herd-instinct." He says that such statements do not explain but rather restate that which is to be explained: "man is social because he is social."³⁸ It is evident that Sumner is confusing "social," that is, the natural tendency to live in society, with "sociability," or the manner of associating which is acquired.

We do not believe that man was outfitted with any innate quality of sociability implanted in his germ plasm, but that the tendency to associate is acquired rather than inherited, and that man's association with his kind is a product of societal rather than of organic evolution. Association is another of those long-standing usages which like "natural rights" are referred to "nature" because their origin is not known.³⁹

To illustrate that man's sociability is acquired Sumner refers to children and to primitives. Here he uses the term "social" as meaning "sociable" in the Thomistic sense, that is, living harmoniously with others. In regard to children he states:

If, without training, a child took naturally to being controlled and limited, as one must be in society, the assertions about social animals, social instincts, and the

³⁵ A. G. Keller, *Man's Rough Road* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., Yale University Press, 1932), p. 15.

³⁶ *The Science of Society*, I, 14.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 11.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

rest would be more plausible. As it is, all those qualities which are indispensable to membership in society have to be learned, like language, by each generation anew; no one is "to the manner born"; no one spontaneously limits his own freedom.⁴⁰

As for primitives he says that "a number of human beings about the earth live in a condition of marked atomism, and association decreases as we go back toward the "nature-man."⁴¹ In the light of recent anthropological studies this would be hard to prove, to say the least. Emphasizing that association developed in the process of evolution from the atomistic stage of early man to civilized man he says:

What the cases drawn from the life of primitive societies show is that the capacity to live in society is not there at the outset, but has to be won. It is not hereditary in the race but traditional in custom. Incontinently to assert its presence at the outset, or to assume that it is the result of rational choice and resolution, is to ignore the facts in favor of a chosen premise or selected thesis—which have been excusable in the uninformed past, but is so no longer. Association has at length, and with difficulty, become a characteristic habit of mankind because of its high survival-value in the evolution of civilization.⁴²

The above quotation raises the problem of whether the capacity to live in society is acquired or whether the potentiality for social life is latent and is developed according to existing conditions or necessities, and also whether Sumner selected his cases from the primitives to illustrate or demonstrate his "chosen premise" or "selected thesis."

Sumner also contends that the sociability or anti-sociability of man seems to be correlated with means of subsistence. In *Collected Essays* Sumner asserts: "It is fair to infer that mutual suspicions and fear were the rule among the scattered groups of early man, competing as they were for a precarious sustenance."⁴³

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 13.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, I, 11.

⁴² *Ibid.*, I, 13.

⁴³ *Collected Essays in Political and Social Science* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1885), p. 7.

This is further substantiated in *The Science of Society*:

Men who are in a desperate situation as regards self-maintenance . . . are atomistic and anti-social. Individual self-interest prompts action with them; and that interest is incapable of seeing its satisfaction under limitations imposed by the general interest. There was no Arcadian peace and simplicity in the elder ages. Men always quarreled, and if they did not fight it was because they were too broken, cowed down, or cowardly. It was only as time went on that peace was found to be a more expedient policy. Peace was a benefit to be striven for, it did not come as a natural boon. . . . Familiarity with violence is common to all animal life. Under civilization the individual gets away from it; but it cannot be said that societies have yet done so.⁴⁴

Man has become "social" or rather "sociable," then, not because he is social by nature but because of the benefits derived from association and because of its survival-value.

EFFICIENT CAUSE OR AGENTS

According to Sumner the necessary conditions for a potential society to come into existence are people and natural resources, or the man-land ratio as expressed by Malthus and later by Darwin. In this "struggle for existence" social forces originate. These social forces were considered by Sumner to be the same as biological forces yet acting on different fields, i.e., social phenomena, and under different conditions—the law of population and the law of diminishing returns of the land.⁴⁵ These two laws were regarded as the great underlying conditions of society.

Life in society is the life of a human society on this earth. Its elementary conditions are set by the nature of human beings and the nature of the earth. . . . As soon as any number of human beings are struggling to win from nature the material goods necessary to support life, and are carrying on this struggle side by side, certain social forces come into operation. The prime condition

⁴⁴ I, 18-19.

⁴⁵ "Sociology," *War and Other Essays*, p. 175.

in this society will lie in the ratio of its numbers to the supply of the materials within its reach.⁴⁶

Perhaps Sumner's thinking was influenced by the pioneer conditions in America when the direct relationship between the population and the land was closer than it is today in our urbanized and mechanized civilization.

Sumner maintains that it is because men have the same common need—existence—that they join in association as useful and expedient. In trying to ascertain the forces that lead to association he selects four basic impulses or motives,—hunger, love, vanity, and fear.

There are two of these whose identity is revealed in our definition of society; they are the natural impulses that stimulate to self-maintenance and self-perpetuation: hunger and sex-love. Human beings share them both with the rest of animal life. Besides these, there are two others, which are specifically human, and which demand the existence of a society as an arena for their exhibition, namely vanity and ghost-fear . . . Hunger, love, vanity, and fear have operated with great power on all peoples. We call them the socializing forces because, being the stimuli that drove men into society and held them there, they may be said to have socialized mankind. But for the action of these forces there could have been no society at all.⁴⁷

Hunger and love are called the "primordial appetites" because they are the primary causes of society among men as well as among animals.⁴⁸ They are physiological forces which tend to self-preservation and race-preservation.

The two motives and their outworkings cross back and forth and intertwine; that they severally and jointly impel to association is self-evident. Anyone can see that human beings must cooperate in self-maintenance and self-perpetuation.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 173–174.

⁴⁷ *The Science of Society*, I, 21.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 24.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 24–25.

Fear and vanity are considered to be derivative rather than primary as in the case of hunger and love. Neither can they be explained in physiological terms as the latter. "Fear, therefore, is socializing in the sense of holding society together rather than in that of producing the original association."⁵⁰ In *Folkways*, fear is identified with "fear of ghosts and spirits."⁵¹ As for vanity, since it calls for an audience, "it is evident that it supports rather than originates association."⁵² These four are conceived of as positive and definite in their nature, yet their complexity defies analysis if attempted quantitatively.⁵³

The driving forces within the individual which tend to socialize him or cause him to associate with others are basically hunger and sex. As these forces operate within the individual as a member of a group they are ambivalent in the sense that they may lead to peace and association or to war and dissociation. Usually at first they were war-forces that finally became adjusted into a peaceful association through violence.⁵⁴

The great common interest of persons or groups is the "struggle for existence" carried on under "life-conditions" and in connection with "competition of life." "Struggle for existence" refers to the interaction between man and nature in which man tries to obtain an existence. The factors of "life-conditions" as enumerated by Sumner are: "the variable elements of the environment, the supply of materials necessary to support life, the difficulty of exploiting them, the state of the arts, and the circumstances of physiography, climate, meteorology, etc., which favor life or the contrary."⁵⁵ "The competition of life" includes both the struggle between men and also men with the flora and fauna.

The competition of life is the rivalry, antagonism, and mutual displacement in which the individual is involved with other organisms by his efforts to carry on the struggle for existence for himself. It is, therefore, the

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 26.

⁵¹ P. 18.

⁵² *The Science of Society*, I, 25.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, III, 2165-2166.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 21.

⁵⁵ *Folkways*, p. 16.

competition of life which is the societal element, and which produces societal organization. The number present and in competition is another of the life conditions. At a time and place the life conditions are the same for a number of human beings who are present and the problems of life policy are the same. This is another reason why the attempts to satisfy interest become mass phenomena and result in folkways.⁵⁶

The folkways are means of meeting needs or group adjustments to life-conditions. When these take on the element of social welfare as the result of reflection, they become mores.⁵⁷

In *Earth Hunger* Sumner states:

We are led by scientific knowledge, or driven by instinct, to combine our efforts by cooperation so that we can make them more efficient—and "more efficient" means getting more subsistence out of an acre, so that we can support more people, or support the same number on a higher grade of comfort.⁵⁸

Since the process by which folkways are made is the "chief one to which elementary societal or group phenomena are due," the proximate efficient cause of society is "competition of life," which results ultimately from the drive to satisfy man's basic interests.⁵⁹

FORMAL CAUSE OR ORGANIZATION

In speaking of the organization of society Sumner conceives of it as "natural" in the sense of being "spontaneous, unconscious, and automatic" rather than "artificial" or "designedly disciplinary like an army or orchestra."⁶⁰ Historically it is an evolved product, the outgrowth of trial and error, the result of expediency and utility, the most satisfactory with the least pain. Whenever the elements in the life-situation change, that is the man-land ratio, the organization must adapt itself. However, this

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁵⁸ *Earth-Hunger and Other Essays*, p. 33.

⁵⁹ *Folkways*, p. 34.

⁶⁰ *The Science of Society*, I, 20.

adjustment is not "rationally conceived" but is done "without reflection or analysis."⁶¹ "Men begin with acts, not with thoughts."⁶² Harry E. Barnes says that this view of social development probably was derived either directly from Spencer or strengthened by Spencer's exposition of this doctrine particularly in his *Study of Sociology*.⁶³

In *Folkways* Sumner states that during the struggle for existence men react to each other in terms of rivalry, coercion, or cooperation. Out of this interaction develop relationships of superordination and subordination, both of individuals and of groups, to meet the interests of the group. Although this cooperative struggle is unconscious and unplanned, it results in a "structure" which is the "fabric of relations and prescribed positions with which societal functions are permanently connected."⁶⁴

The life of society consists in making folkways and applying them. . . . The relations of men to each other, when they are carrying on the struggle for existence near each other, consists in mutual reactions (antagonisms, rivalries, alliances, coercions, and cooperations), from which result societal concatenations and concretions, that is, more or less fixed positions of individuals and sub-groups towards each other, and more or less established sequences and methods of interaction between them, by which the interests of all members of the group are served. . . . The societal concatenations are due to the folkways in this way,—that the men, each struggling to carry on existence, unconsciously cooperate to build up associations, organization, customs, and institutions, which, after a time, appear full grown and actual, although no one intended, or planned, or understood them in advance.⁶⁵

When human beings in juxtaposition to each other are trying to satisfy their interests, they may either compete or cooperate. Sumner contends that similarity of interests socializes, but that in

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Folkways*, p. 2.

⁶³ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁶⁴ *Folkways*, p. 35.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

the majority of cases socialization arises from interests that are antagonistic. This "antagonistic cooperation" is defined as "the combination of two persons or groups to satisfy a great common interest while minor antagonisms of interest which exist between them are suppressed."⁶⁶ Emphasizing the importance of "antagonistic cooperation," he maintains that "it is the strongest and most pervasive form of organization throughout the whole societal structure."⁶⁷ Just as in Ward, "synergy" was the integrating factor, so in Sumner it is "antagonistic cooperation."

In attempting to classify Sumner on the basis of these statements, House is inclined to call him a sociological nominalist like Tarde and Giddings who conceive of society as primarily a collection of like-minded individuals rather than as groups of individuals organized for concerted actions. Yet since Sumner included the idea of interaction House finally concluded that Sumner had a "realist" conception of society but was more interested in the cultural aspects of society and the processes of cultural change than society as a whole.⁶⁸

Also in *Folkways* Sumner speaks of "combination" as the "essence of organization" and "organization" as "the great device for increased power by a number of unequal and dissimilar units brought into association for a common purpose."⁶⁹ Since this is true in both the organic and the superorganic domains, that is the animal and human level, it is not necessarily the result of rational choice. This may be seen in Sumner's idea of groups and of institutions.

According to Sumner, "an institution consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a structure."⁷⁰ The structure is a "framework" or "perhaps only a number of functionaries" cooperating in prescribed ways "at a certain conjunction."⁷¹ The function of the structure is to hold the concept and furnish the instruments or means of bringing it into actuality to serve the

⁶⁶ *Folkways*, p. 18.

⁶⁷ *The Science of Society*, III, 2237.

⁶⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 281-282.

⁶⁹ *Folkways*, p. 17.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

interests of men in society. Institutions may be either "crescive" or "enacted." "Crescive" institutions, such as property, marriage, and religion, which are the most primary institutions, began in folkways, became customs, and finally developed into mores. As the rules, prescribed acts, and apparatus become more specific, they become complete institutions consisting of a structure and a concept. "Enacted" institutions, such as banks and laws, are the result of rational invention and intention. All institutions grow out of the mores.⁷² Mores develop around salient interests into institutions. These may be classified as institutions of societal self-maintenance, such as industrial organization, property, and regulative organization—corresponding to the hunger-interest; societal self-perpetuation, including marriage and the family—corresponding to the love-interest; social self-gratification—social etiquette, dress, ornament, and forms of pleasure-seeking—corresponding to the gratification-interest; and religion, including animism, daimonism—corresponding to the fear-interest.⁷³ All of these interpenetrate as do the interests behind them.

Finally Sumner's concept of society may be summarized as follows:

Human society, then, by the diversity of its parts, their specialization, the distribution of functions, the mutual service and support of the parts, and their solidarity, is a true system or organization. It has a life different from that of the individual and not simply aggregated or multiplied from the life of individuals.⁷⁴

To illustrate this Sumner states that in the "unit-cluster of the family and in its extensions into larger associations" there is always division of labor among the sexes and some cooperation in an industrial organization. Because of the difference of capacities, tastes, and desires of the individual members, there will arise different functions in the work of the community. Mutual services, rights and duties appear. By supporting and supplementing each other in their attempted conquest of nature, the community as

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁷³ *The Science of Society*, I, 89-90.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 2220.

a whole achieves more than would result from the efforts of isolated individuals.⁷⁵ The elements of social unity, social action, and social order are present. However, the integrating factor seems to be "antagonistic cooperation" stimulated by utility and expediency in the process of adaptation. This is similar to Ward's "synergy" rather than common action for a common purpose rationally selected as in St. Thomas.

FINAL CAUSE OR PURPOSE

Sumner's idea of final cause is not teleological or theological for he considers the discussion of motives and purposes to be outside the realm of science because "motives and purposes are in the brain and heart of man."⁷⁶ Following Comte's idea, Sumner maintains that science is concerned with "consequences" that are in the "world of fact" and these are the result of "cause and effect" depending on "the nature of the forces at work." In explaining this he says that when man acts, he "sets forces in motion" and the "consequences" are the result of the "action of the forces under the existing conditions." They are not the result of rational choice but rather are "independent of any notion, will, wish, or intention in the mind of man or men." Science then investigates "consequences" which are the facts in the world of experience and "deduces inferences by sound processes."⁷⁷

This is further substantiated in an essay entitled "Sociological Fallacies" :

To ask what is the end of man, or society, or the earth, is to put a teleological or theological problem. Such a problem has been discussed in regard to man; if it has ever been discussed in regard to society, it is at least new. It is also idle. The scientific view of the matter is that a thing exists for reasons which lie in its antecedents and causes, not in its purposes or destiny. Human society exists because it is, and has come to be on earth because forces which were present must produce it. It is, therefore, utterly unscientific to regard man or society as a means to a further end.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ "Purposes and Consequences," *Earth-Hunger and Other Essays*, p. 67.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁷⁸ *Earth-Hunger and Other Essays*, p. 364.

However, in *The Science of Society*, as has been pointed out, society was defined as "a group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species."⁷⁹

According to this statement the purpose or function of society is self-maintenance and preservation of the species. This is elaborated in the following:

The basic object to which any existing form of life does and must consecrate its energies is to the continuance of its existence. "The first task of life is to live." That is naturally its first interest. A society presents the collective pursuit of self-maintenance as its enthralling interest and activity. To operate upon the terms of self-maintenance is to go to the root of the matter.⁸⁰

In harmony with Gumpowicz and Lippert, Sumner says that "it is not true that self-maintenance always overrides every other motive or interest of the group; nevertheless it is the prime motive and interest which prevails normally and in all but the exceptional cases and it gives shape to every thing else."⁸¹

In *Folkways* Sumner states: "In fact, the real process in great bodies of men is not one of deduction from any great principle of philosophy or ethics. It is one of minute efforts to live well under existing conditions, which efforts are repeated indefinitely by great numbers, getting strength from habit and from the fellowship of united action."⁸²

In *The Science of Society* it is maintained also that society is formed because of its expediency and utility. Besides the increase and economy of power, "there are manifold economies attending on specialization, as in division of labor, by which men save time, effort, and materials and yet get a better product. . . . The formation of society was thus a winning expedient in the art of living."⁸³

In *Folkways* when Sumner is speaking of the four great

⁷⁹ *The Science of Society*, I, 6-7.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 2238.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, III, 2239.

⁸² *Folkways*, p. 38.

⁸³ *The Science of Society*, I, 15.

motives of action—love, hunger, vanity and fear—and the interest underlying them he says that “life consists in satisfying interests, for ‘life,’ in a society, is a career of action and effort expended on both the material and social environment.”⁸⁴

In *The Science of Society* Sumner states that association is necessary for man in the struggle for existence. It is a matter of expediency rather than free choice.

In general, life in society is a species of insurance. Insurance is something which man has had to develop against the chances of life, although he could not realize its nature and function until long ages had passed. Its function is the reduction of the risk-element in life to a constant; the substitution of a small, recurring calculable loss for a possible ruinous and incalculable one. Living within a peace-group, a man enjoyed a security which he paid for by the limitation of his freedom, by services rendered, and by payments in goods; outside of his group, he was a prey to the mischances of life just as anyone is exposed to fire-hazards if his property is uninsured. It is clear that early man was bared, in the absence of an apparatus of protection, to ruinous calamities: starvation, cold, violence. He needed protection; association afforded it; and he was forced into association whether he willed or not.⁸⁵

In conclusion, the purpose of society or association is self-preservation and race-preservation, rather than the development of the abilities, potentialities, and talents of the individuals in society. It is an attempt to adjust to the life-situation with the least possible pain as the result of trial and error rather than to seek the common good through rational choice. For Sumner the key to the “good life” and “happiness” is economic gain, for capital not only maintains “civilization” but also “sustains the happiness of the individual.”⁸⁶

In recapitulation, Sumner’s ideas on society may be summarized as follows:

⁸⁴ *Folkways*, p. 18.

⁸⁵ *The Science of Society*, I, 20.

⁸⁶ “Power and Progress,” *The Challenge of Facts*, p. 147; “The Power and Benificence of Capital,” *Earth-Hunger and Other Essays*, p. 353.

1. A human society is a group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species.
2. The material cause is man. Originally man was not "social" by nature, but civilized man has become "social" because of the benefits derived from association.
3. The efficient cause is the socializing forces within the individual of hunger, love, vanity and fear, which drive man into association with others in the "competition of life." The necessary condition is the land-man ratio.
4. The formal cause is social order and social unity as the result of "antagonistic cooperation" motivated by expediency and utility rather than rational choice.
5. The final cause is self-maintenance and preservation of the species.

SOCIAL CHANGE

Sumner views society and the history of the whole human race in the light of a process of evolution which consists essentially in the "adjustment to life-conditions."⁸⁷ Hence social change as a process of evolution is a reality that is taken for granted. Accordingly, a scientific discussion of "societal crises and changes consists in showing their connection with changes in the life conditions, or the readjustment of the mores to changes in those conditions."⁸⁸

FACTORS IN SOCIAL CHANGE

Since "every societal effect is due to an adequate cause," and "no investigation can establish the exact causal relation in all cases, or even in many,"⁸⁹ the factors in social change are more conditional than causal. The "ultimate" elements or determining, dynamic factors in social change are "Man" and "Land," for the adjustment necessarily arises between these two.⁹⁰ When the elements of the situation change, society has to adapt itself anew.⁹¹ If there are few men to much land, the struggle is lighter; if the

⁸⁷ *The Science of Society*, I, 31.

⁸⁸ *Folkways*, p. 36.

⁸⁹ *The Science of Society*, III, 2165.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 4.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, I, 20.

opposite is true, the struggle is more destructive.⁹² Such is a "response to driving forces productive of discomfort."⁹³ The struggle for existence, or competition of life, with the "powerful urge of self-preservation behind it"⁹⁴ determines the type of adjustment to life conditions, and land is most important in determining the form of human society.⁹⁵ The land-man ratio, then, is the basic factor in social change. The struggle for existence contains the factors of competition and conflict. The crudest form is violence or war. Other forms are peaceful competition, such as industrial and political rivalries. Competition is a necessary means of better adjustment,⁹⁶ and is ever present between groups since life conditions never permit all men to satisfy their wants and needs. As the standard of living rises so that men get control over the basic struggle for existence, the struggle for self-gratification impelled by vanity, ambition, and other forces is one of the main forms of competition out of which comes selection.⁹⁷ The "decisive factors in societal evolution" are "societal expediency under existing circumstances of environment" and constraints imposed by "tradition."⁹⁸ Since the maintenance-mores form kind of a basic theme in society, the other mores, such as forms of property, marriage, religion—the superstructure—change when the maintenance-mores change. For example, if the economy changes from pastoral to agricultural, gradually the other mores change. Although the economic or self-maintaining does not always rule over the other motives, yet it is the primary motive which prevails normally and gives shape to everything else.⁹⁹ Both Sumner and Keller add a limited economic determinism to the idea of mechanical selection which makes the social process automatic. This is

⁹² *Ibid.*, I, 4.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, I, 19.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 4.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 3.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 36.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, III, 2159.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 2165.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 2239.

similar to Ogburn's idea of material culture as the chief causal agency in cultural change.¹⁰⁰

DIRECTED SOCIAL CHANGE

Since society is the result of trial and error, and the process is "natural" in the sense of being spontaneous, unconscious, and automatic,"¹⁰¹ it can hardly be rationally controlled. The means of control are the folkways and mores which have evolved to meet needs. The folkways and mores are "direct, habitual, unconscious, unpremeditated adjustments to life-conditions,"¹⁰² which result from growth rather than from human purpose or wit.¹⁰³ In the beginning pleasure and pain were the constraints which defined the lines on which efforts were to proceed. As the folkways and mores evolve, and man increases his skill and raises his standard of living, he can manipulate the man-land ratio. Human beings in all ages and all stages of civilization are primarily controlled by folkways handed down from their ancestors. These are similar to the ways of other animals. Only the topmost layers are subject to change and control, modified somewhat by human philosophy, ethics, and religion, or other acts of intelligent reflection. Custom regulates all of man's actions with a little margin of variation.¹⁰⁴ Although expedient ways of satisfying needs were found by trial and error, the primitive always had to reckon with the aleatory element of risk and loss, good or bad fortune, which could be controlled only by religious rites.¹⁰⁵ The process of making folkways, ways of satisfying needs, can be explained by cooperation and suggestion which are highly productive when operating in a crowd.¹⁰⁶ Therefore the life of society consists in making and applying folkways.¹⁰⁷ Selection of mores or folkways takes place also through conflict between groups. The successful group tends

¹⁰⁰ W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1922), pp. 268-280.

¹⁰¹ *The Science of Society*, I, 20.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, I, 35.

¹⁰³ *Folkways*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

to impose its folkways and mores on the others. Instead of being intelligent efforts to secure change as in elections or laws, they amount only to a blind striving to realize local or class interests.¹⁰⁸ "The combination in the mores of persistency and variability determines the extent to which it is possible to modify them by arbitrary action."¹⁰⁹ "The masses, as the great popular jury, . . . decides the fate of all proposed changes in the mores."¹¹⁰ The classes and the leading men, or the men of talent, are the innovators of change, but their success depends on the masses, the great middle group in the population.¹¹¹ Changes in accordance with the mores are easily made, but those opposed to the mores are made only with great effort, if at all.¹¹² The ruling cliques can use force; leading classes such as the aristocracy, can lead by example. "Such influences are unspoken, unconscious, unintentional."¹¹³ Methods fail if they do not affect ritual. Sumner states that the favorite methods in his time were legislation and preaching, but these failed because they did not affect ritual and aimed to make the change in a short time.¹¹⁴ "That is why the agitator, reformer, prophet, reorganizer of society, who has found out 'the truth' and wants to 'get a law passed' to realize it right away, is only a mischief-maker."¹¹⁵

In discussing the almost futile attempt to direct social change Sumner says:

If we puny men by our acts can do anything at all to strengthen them (i.e., changes) it will be by modifying the tendencies of some of the forces at work so that, after a sufficient time their action may be changed a little and slowly the lines of movement be modified. This effort, however, can at most be only slight, and it will take a long time. In the meantime spontaneous forces will

¹⁰⁸ A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1915), pp. 174, 181.

¹⁰⁹ *Folkways*, p. 87.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 45-51.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 94.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

be at work, compared with which our efforts are like those of a man trying to deflect a river; and these forces will have changed the whole problem before our interferences have time to make themselves felt. The great stream of time and earthly things will sweep on just the same in spite of us.¹¹⁶

Any changes in society will take place automatically, and eventually come to the same end without man's interference.¹¹⁷ In this, Sumner reflects the thinking of Spencer, Novicow and Gumplowicz, which is contrary to Ward's idea that man can become progressively more capable of controlling society by social planning.¹¹⁸

Since man and society are subject to law, man has little control over "natural" forces, and depends on the skill he develops in adjustment. He can affect the forces either before they come into operation, choose which he will set in motion, or near their inception modify them slightly.¹¹⁹ This can be done only by men working together. No major change can be the object of direct human effort. Change can be brought about only by "small, immediate efforts to adapt the means we control to the problems nearest before us, as the only sound method of readjustment."¹²⁰

In recapitulation, Sumner contends that social change is a form of the universal process of evolution. Its source is impersonal, automatic forces originating in individuals and working through the instruments of folkways, mores, and institutions. Its law is the natural law of evolution and its objective is to meet human needs. The factors are: man; land; competition; and conflict; the four basic interests of hunger, love, vanity and fear; social expediency; and tradition. Of these the economic motive as expressed in the maintenance-mores is the most basic. The possibility of directing social change is slight and must be in accordance with the mores and folkways. The classes are the innovators of

¹¹⁶ "The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over," *War and Other Essays*, p. 209.

¹¹⁷ *Folkways*, p. 113.

¹¹⁸ H. E. Barnes, H. Becker, and F. Becker, eds. *Contemporary Social Theory* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1940), pp. 3; 662.

¹¹⁹ *The Science of Society*, III, 2215.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 2216.

change but their success depends on the masses who are the bearers of the folkways.

CONTRIBUTIONS

Sumner, in contrast to Ward, has been considered a "crusader for a special social science," whose task is to investigate, plan, and promote human welfare.¹²¹ As an explorer rather than a technician, Sumner laid the foundation for more realistic and objective studies of human nature and society. Sumner in *Folkways* and W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant*, were interested in substantially the same phenomena, but Sumner was concerned with the objective, and Thomas and Znaniecki with the subjective aspects of culture. The *Folkways* is concerned with folkways and mores, while *The Polish Peasant* is a study of attitudes.¹²²

The Sumner-Keller theory of society and social change is anti-rationalistic.¹²³ When society is looked upon as a natural phenomenon, the product of natural forces acting mechanically according to a natural law, the law of evolution, the social process is interpreted as being automatic and there is little place for free exercise of the human will. It is a blind and automatic striving for existence rather than the result of rational reflection.

Sumner, following Spencer's laissez-faire attitude, contended that the mores could be little changed by religion, education, or any other control. The mores change of themselves but man's will has little to do with the change. Therefore, he opposed the idea of reform and planned reorganization of society for changes will take place without man's intervention.¹²⁴

The elimination or limitation of purposiveness in society and social change follows from the basic assumption that society is

¹²¹ L. L. Bernard and Jessie Bernard, *Origins of American Sociology* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1943), p. 4.

¹²² R. E. Park, "The Sociological Methods of William Graham Sumner and of William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *Methods in the Social Sciences*, ed. Stuart A. Rice (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 165.

¹²³ Cf. M. L. Sims, *The Problem of Social Change* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1939), p. 137.

¹²⁴ *Folkways*, pp. 95; 113.

governed by immutable laws, and social change is an automatic process. This naturalistic position led logically to a deterministic and antipurposive conclusion.¹²⁵ However, Sumner is not entirely an economic determinist because he recognizes that other forces are active and that ideas and the environment affect each other.¹²⁶

By showing that the folkways, mores, and institutions develop in social interaction, and that the social processes are not controlled by biology, but are under laws of their own, Sumner started an inductive and empirical trend which still continues in American sociology.¹²⁷ Although Sumner overemphasizes custom and tradition as the mainsprings of social action, yet he calls attention to the effect of these on collective action, and thus helps to initiate a trend in cultural sociology.

Sumner's chief interest was group-reaction in adjustment as these were expressed by the folkways and mores. In emphasizing the folkways and mores as methods of social control, Sumner contributed to the extension of Comte's idea of the important function of the broader social and extra-legal methods of social control which have also been developed by Ross, Cooley, and Giddings.¹²⁸

Although the concepts of "folkways" and "mores" were implicit in previous writers, Sumner's contribution consists in giving them a definite meaning and place in sociological analysis, by showing the significance of cultural factors.¹²⁹ As Cooley states, Sumner "merely enlarged, analyzed, and interpreted the familiar idea of custom."¹³⁰ In his analysis Sumner gives more attention to process than to social forms, the dynamic rather than static analysis. This derives from his interest in the evolution of society and his conception of evolution as adjustment.

Hartnett maintains that Sumner's theory of "folkways" enjoys

¹²⁵ Sims, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

¹²⁶ "Earth Hunger," in *Earth-Hunger and Other Essays*, pp. 34-35.

¹²⁷ R. E. L. Faris, "American Sociology," *Twentieth Century Sociology*, ed. by G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 544.

¹²⁸ H. E. Barnes and H. Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, I (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1938), p. 593.

¹²⁹ Barnes, Becker, and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

¹³⁰ Charles Horton Cooley, "Sumner and Methodology," *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1930), p. 326.

some validity if taken as a partial explanation of certain types of social behavior, since people do adopt unthinkingly many traditional forms of meeting needs. Yet Sumner includes acts as unconscious that may be purposive to a degree. However, in regard to the mores, it is not clear how the folkways as unconscious and irrational predetermine the conscious and rational, or how reason is derived from unreason. Another question raised is how there can be antagonistic mores in the same society or in the same individual, if folkways have an inner consistency, and the folkways determine the mores. Just as the theory of folkways has some validity, so the theory of mores throws some light on the strong psychological force in human behavior to conform to codes of conduct which have social approval, such as codes of etiquette and even to adopt the social code as the moral code. There is a failure, though, in this theory to recognize the difference between ways of satisfying needs such as food, shelter, and clothing, and ways of regulating moral conduct,¹³¹ or, in other words, to distinguish between folkways, mores, and morals.

However, Sumner employed his concepts as means of description and interpretation, and defined them in such a way as to be useful for other students. Among his most important concepts related to society and social change, to which he gave original and a more precise definition are: folkways and mores; social groups such as "we-group" or "in-group," and "other-group" or "out-group"; social classes; masses; sects; ethnocentrism; rôle of the masses and classes in forming customs; specific forms of mores, such as taboo, convention, etiquette, and social ritual; forms in which the mores change as fashions, poses, and fads; and the concept of institution.

Park states that using his concepts as methodological tools, Sumner helped to change sociology from a more descriptive to a more systematic and analytical science.¹³² Hartnett contends that Sumner employed no scientific methodology because his method represents the "fallacy of hasty generalization" and proof by

¹³¹ R. C. Hartnett, S.J., "An Appraisal of Sumner's Folkways," *The American Catholic Sociological Review*, III (December, 1942), 195-199; 201-203.

¹³² Park, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-162.

illustration rather than demonstration. Another defect of Sumner is that of using cultural traits out of their context of cultural configuration. This method has been superseded by the more scientific functionalist method of Goldenweiser, Wissler, Lynds, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Malinowski, and others who investigate culture-elements as parts of total cultural patterns.¹³³

The Darwinian theory of organic evolution in its application to society, popular in classical anthropology, and used by Sumner and Keller as basic in their sociology, has been discredited as a theory of social evolution by the painstaking studies of anthropologists, such as River's monograph on the *Todas*, Seligman's study of the Veddas, Thurnwald's description of the Banaro, and the work of Lowie, Boas, Father W. Schmidt, Father Koppers, and others.¹³⁴ It has been proved that the assumption of a universal law of evolution from the simple to the complex is not always true of social institutions. Parallelism in culture and social organization in different areas do not necessarily imply identical antecedents, or consequences. Sumner's assumption of the "marked atomism" of the "nature-man" is also unwarranted.

Sumner's concept of "institution" is valid in so far as it is regarded as a component part of the total structure of society considered as a plurality pattern. Also in that the specific social function of an institution determines its peculiar structure, it is a good starting point for sociological analysis. However, the concept is unacceptable if it postulates an entirely rational basis for institutions since modern social psychology has also demonstrated the non-rational or unconscious characteristics of institutions.¹³⁵ The distinction between "enacted" and "crescive" institutions differentiates between the relatively rational in the former as opposed to the less rational in the latter.

According to Hofstadter, Sumner provided his age with a synthesis of three great products of western capitalist culture: the Protestant ethic, the doctrine of classical economics, and Darwin's

¹³³ Hartnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-195.

¹³⁴ Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 756.

¹³⁵ Leopold Von Wiese-H. Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1932), p. 402.

natural selection.¹³⁶ Harry Elmer Barnes summarizes the dominant features of Sumner's sociological thought as: "an evolutionary view of social life and development, a slight predilection for the use of biological concepts, and a firm conviction of the preeminent value of ethnography as the 'data' and to a large extent the substance of sociology."¹³⁷

Since a more recent trend in sociological thinking is that socially acquired conditioning rather than inherited action patterns is a more significant factor in human behavior, and social patterning is more significant for scientific social research, Charles Horton Cooley will be presented as representing one aspect of this new trend. According to Ellwood, Cooley's *Social Organization* (1909) marks the beginning of the modern period in American sociology.

¹³⁶ *Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860-1915*, p. 37.

¹³⁷ H. E. Barnes, "Two Representative Contributions of Sociology to Political Theory," *op. cit.*, p. 6.

CHAPTER IV

CHARLES HORTON COOLEY

CHARLES HORTON COOLEY was born in Ann Arbor, Michigan, August 17, 1864. His father, a distinguished jurist and professor of law at the University of Michigan, was the leading constitutional lawyer of his time, and also chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission for four years.¹ Charles was intelligent but his childhood illness, speech impediment, and frail physique caused him to be sensitive and timid. His inability to compete physically with others made him feel inferior and retreat into a dream world.² This was reflected, to a certain extent, in his sociology. Cooley entered the University of Michigan in 1880, but on account of ill-health, did not finish until 1887. Here he studied language, history, philosophy, and mechanical engineering. After a year of graduate work in engineering at the University, Cooley spent two years in Washington, D. C., doing statistical work in the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Census Bureau. During this time he wrote "The Social Significance of Street Railways" in which he attempted to interpret transportation "in terms of an organic social whole."³ Thus began an interest, which continued throughout his life, in communication and transportation as related to an organic view of society, and the social processes of conflict, survival, and adaptation.

After six months abroad, Cooley returned to the University of Michigan in 1892 as part-time instructor in political economy, and as a candidate for a doctorate in political economy with a minor in sociology. This he received in 1894. His dissertation topic was "The Theory of Transportation."⁴ From 1894 until shortly

¹ E. C. Jandy, *Charles Horton Cooley: His Life and His Social Theory* (New York, The Dryden Press, 1942), pp. 11-13.

² C. H. Cooley, *Journals*, X (1895), 2-3; cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

³ C. H. Cooley, "Development of Sociology at Michigan," *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, p. 7.

⁴ Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

before his death on May 8, 1928, Cooley taught economics and sociology at the University of Michigan. In 1917 he was elected president of the American Sociological Society which he helped to found in 1905. In his teaching Cooley was concerned more with raising questions than with giving answers, presenting points of view and suggesting leads.⁵

Although about 1890 Cooley was becoming interested in sociology, still he was influenced more by Emerson, Goethe, and Darwin. Goethe, Emerson, and Thoreau whom Cooley greatly admired belonged to the transcendental idealistic school of nineteenth century philosophy which maintained that nature was an integrated organic whole and man a phase of it. This organic view appealed to Cooley as is evident from his own statement:

An omnipresent and constraining element in my character is a need for symmetry and wholeness in what I do and think . . . I must feel that all I do contributes to a whole. The feeling of disunity is a cause of constant restlessness and discontent.⁶

Darwin, on the other hand, furnished for Cooley as for Sumner "the most satisfactory idea of the general process of nature and the way to study it."⁷ Emerson's influence is also reflected in Cooley's style and his ethical and philosophical idealism, especially in *Human Nature and the Social Order* and, to a certain extent, in *Life and the Student* although the latter is more influenced by Thoreau.⁸ Cooley has been called both the Darwin and the Emerson of sociology.

In seeking for a system to serve as a framework for his ideas, Cooley at first was interested in Spencer's "general conception of the progressive organization of life," although he rejected Spencer's "specific views on society."⁹ Comte had little influence on Cooley's thinking. Later Cooley was attracted by Schaeffle's

⁵ W. H. Hamilton, "Cooley, Charles Horton," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IV (1930), 356; W. H. Hamilton, "Charles Horton Cooley," *Social Forces*, VIII (1929), 183-187.

⁶ *Journals*, XI (1896), 22, 23; cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁷ "Development of Sociology at Michigan," p. 4.

⁸ Jandy, *op. cit.*, 42-43.

⁹ "Development of Sociology at Michigan," p. 5.

ideas in *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*. He also had great respect for Lester Ward but was little influenced by his ideas. In 1893-94 he attended a series of lectures on political philosophy given by John Dewey and was much influenced by him, more by his personality, though, it seems than by his lectures. In his early twenties Cooley became interested in Thomas à Kempis's *Imitation of Christ* and continued this interest throughout life. In his earlier years he was fond of the New Testament and the teachings of Christ though he was not interested in institutionalized religion; in his later years he inclined toward pantheistic mysticism. His Journals reveal his wide reading in literature, poetry, biography, history, travel, and philosophy.¹⁰

As social psychologist Cooley was interested in understanding the processes of mind linked with the social life of man. He felt there was a "gap between the ideas and the structure and function . . . and the actual motives and behavior of men."¹¹ Because of his interest in transportation and communication he felt he could not understand social processes until he could get at the psychological mechanisms behind them.¹² He was also interested in social biology, especially in Galton's idea of genius which he attempted to refute. He was one of the first at Michigan "to expound the theory of evolution to beginning classes and to assume its general truth."¹³

In 1902 Cooley published *Human Nature and the Social Order*.¹⁴ Jandy, one of Cooley's students, considers this in many ways "the objectification of Cooley's own inner self."¹⁵ He bases this opinion on Cooley's statement "It is delicious to feel that my self has gone out of me into this book."¹⁶ In this first book Cooley shows how human nature, personality, and the mind are products

¹⁰ Jandy, *op. cit.*, pp. 37; 49-50; 72.

¹¹ "Development of Sociology at Michigan," p. 8.

¹² Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

¹³ "Development of Sociology," p. 10.

¹⁴ In the revised edition, 1922, Cooley added an introductory chapter on Heredity and Instinct; enlarged the chapter on Society and the Individual; inserted material in other chapters; and appended a series of study questions for use of students. All references will be to the revised edition.

¹⁵ Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

¹⁶ Journals, XV (1902), 73; cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

of interaction and communication, and reflect their social milieu. *Social Organization* appeared in 1909 as a study of the individual and the social order in the larger setting of social organization. Some consider this to be the acme of Cooley's sociological thought. *The Social Process* was published in 1918 and completed his trilogy in social theory. The social-psychological approach is evident in all three. These were followed by *Life and the Student* (1927), a volume of notes and sayings gathered from his journals which is in a sense his autobiography. *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, containing selected papers, was published posthumously in 1930.

Sociology was considered by Cooley to be a means of interpreting life-situations. As source material he drew from literature, art, and travel as well as sociological treatises.¹⁷ He defined sociology as "the science of man in the group," and believed that the facts of social science were the attitudes, beliefs, and habits socially determined by the group as folkways, institutions, and primary and secondary forms of human association as aspects of personal intercourse. He did not use the term "group mind" but would not object if it referred to the objective aspect of the individual-group relationship.¹⁸

Jandy, a member of Cooley's seminars in Michigan, characterizes Cooley thus: "Cooley never had the scientific zeal of Lester Ward, nor the all-round cosmopolitan experience in firsthand observation of Ross; but he did have a Darwinian passion for truth and a Bergsonian faith in his own intuitive processes and powers."¹⁹ His artistic temperament and ideals were also expressed in his work because they were a necessary part of his self-realization and security. Cooley selected as his rôle in sociology that of systematizer and interpreter rather than fact-gatherer. He was primarily interested in human nature and its behavior, but not so much in discovering new truths as in interpreting the old.²⁰

¹⁷ A. E. Wood, "Charles Horton Cooley: An Appreciation," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXV (1930), 707.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, XXXV, 709.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

²⁰ *Journals*, XIII (1899), 51; cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

Just before publishing *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902) Cooley wrote:

A true sociology is systematic autobiography. The whole organization and process of society exists in my mind, and I and others like me can understand it only as we learn what it means to us.²¹

Thus Cooley declares his subjectivism and his intention to cull his own life and experience for sociological data. Although he recognized his inclination to be synthetic "at the expense of fullness of knowledge" and his limited personal investigation, yet he felt that his contribution was the knowledge gained by his introspective method or sympathetic insight attained by a trained imagination.²²

In speaking of his first two books, he says: "My two books have an air rather of philosophy than of science; and the second more so perhaps than the first."²³ This did not seem to disturb Cooley very much for in *Life and the Student* (1927) he states: "We hear it questioned whether sociology is a science or philosophy. It is both, and an art also."²⁴

In a paper, "Now and Then," Cooley remarked that the task of his generation of sociologists was to set up a framework of workable hypotheses, while the next generation, the present, is to test these in detailed empirical studies.²⁵

Since Cooley's idealistic view has been challenged both philosophically and scientifically, Jandy maintains that Cooley's may be the "last strong voice of the Neo-Hegelians in sociology."²⁶ Page maintains that Cooley's influence is not so much in his "system" of sociology as in his stimulation of students and readers.²⁷

²¹ *Ibid.*, XV (1902), 38; cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

²² *Ibid.*, XVIII B (1908), 23-25; cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

²³ *Ibid.*, XXI (1915), 54-55; cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 235; C. H. Cooley, *Social Process* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1918), pp. 395-396.

²⁴ *Life and the Student* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 160.

²⁵ "Now and Then," *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, pp. 283-85.

²⁶ Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Cooley, accepting the evolutionary view of his time, considered life in general, and life in society in particular, as an organic growth adapting itself to meet changing conditions. He insisted that "Our life is all one human whole" and must be studied as such.²⁸ An oft-quoted phrase is "self and society are twin-born."²⁹ In an eternal on-going process, human life is unified by many currents of interaction which are at the same time differentiated into two subprocesses, the social and the biological. Social life is transmitted through language, intercourse, and education, while biological life flows through the germ-plasm. Social forms interact and grow according to the "tentative process," a process of "experiment which is not necessarily conscious."³⁰ Within this forward moving process there seems to be "a vital impulse of unknown origin" working ahead in all directions adapting itself to all the other phases in the movement.³¹ Cooley studied society from the mental rather than the material side although he recognizes that the material side exists, but feels more competent in dealing with the mental, and also regards it as being more important.

The central conception of any real sociology is the idea of a "continuing social life, having an organization and history of its own, in which sentiments are developed, and from which they are derived by the individual."³² The process is social and not biological and individual as in Spencer. Distinctively social facts are mental and inward. His two most basic assumptions are: life as an organic process, and life as adaptation, survival, and evolution.³³ He used the term "organic" not in the biological sense of Spencer, but rather to imply the functional unity of the individual and society in the social process, and its historical continuity embracing the past, present, and the future. Facts are to be

²⁸ *Social Organisation* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1909), Preface.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁰ *Social Process*, p. 8.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³² "Reflections Upon the Sociology of Herbert Spencer," *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, p. 272.

³³ "Case Study of Small Institutions as a Method of Research," *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, p. 313.

studied in their complex relationship or in the total situation for the "organism" is a living whole made up of differentiated members, each with special function.³⁴ Thus he rejects geographic, economic, cultural, and biological determinisms as particularisms. Jandy classifies Cooley philosophically as an idealist, and scientifically as a social functionalist.³⁵

DEFINITION OF SOCIETY

After remarking that it makes little difference what terms we use if only there is a clear perception of the facts, Cooley proceeds to give a descriptive definition of society. He prefers to consider society as an "organism" rather than an "organization" because "the latter is usually understood to imply conscious purpose," and neglects the unconscious elements in society.³⁶

Society may be considered as including all of human life, and as organic in the sense that all its parts are interdependent and affect each other through mutual interaction.³⁷

We are all one life, and its various phases—Asia, Europe, and America; democracy, militarism, and socialism; state, church, and commerce; cities, villages, and families; and so on to the particular persons, Tom, Dick, and Harry—may all be regarded . . . as organs of this whole, growing and functioning under particular conditions, according to the adaptive process. . . . The total life being unified by interaction, each phase of it must be and is, in some degree, an expression of the whole system.³⁸

Or this great whole may be viewed as a complex of systems of interactions, "more or less distinct, more or less enduring, more or less conscious and intelligent." Examples of these are: "nations, institutions, doctrines, parties, and persons."³⁹ Exchanging glances with a person on the street sets up a process of interaction

³⁴ C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (rev. ed.; New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1922), p. 36.

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

³⁶ *Social Process*, p. 26.

³⁷ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 36.

³⁸ *Social Process*, p. 26.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

which may become more or less permanent in thought. Because of this overlapping and interpenetration, each part of the whole belongs to more than one organic system. For "one's own personality is one organic system; the persons he knows are others." From one point of view, "human life is made up of such personal systems," which "interpenetrate one another," for "each personality includes ideas and feelings reflected from others."⁴⁰ From another point of view, this complex breaks up into groups rather than persons—into families, communities, parties, races, and states. Each of these has its own history and growth and overlaps the others. Looking at it from a third viewpoint, the whole is "a complex of thought or thought-systems, whose *locus*, certainly, is the human mind, but which have a life and growth of their own. . . . All are equally real and all are aspects of the common whole."⁴¹

In summarizing the idea of society as an organism, Cooley states that:

. . . it is a complex of forms or processes each of which is living and growing by interaction with the others. . . . It is a vast tissue of reciprocal activity differentiated into innumerable systems, . . . and all interwoven to such a degree that you see different systems according to the point of view you take.⁴²

Cooley frequently reiterates the unity and differentiation of human life and society. In *Social Process* he treats society as a complex of reciprocally interacting systems. In *Human Nature and the Social Order* society is considered as a "phase of life" rather than "a thing by itself," i.e., it is "life regarded from the point of view of personal intercourse."⁴³ Cooley classifies human intercourse in its primary aspects as human nature and the social order, and its secondary aspects as groups, institutions or processes. In this sense society is defined as "simply the collective aspect of personal thought."⁴⁴

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Vance, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁴³ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 135.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

Society is an external structure and process of a living reality whose interrelationships make possible the social mind in the individual. Cooley's insistence that the facts of sociology are in the mind has been important for social psychology.⁴⁵ Perhaps his most fundamental propositions are: "Mind is social; society is mental."⁴⁶ Each man's imagination is "a special phase of society" because it is a mass of personal impressions worked up into a living, growing whole, while "Mind or Imagination as a whole, that is, human thought considered in the largest way as having a growth and organization extending throughout the ages, is the *locus* of society in the widest possible sense."⁴⁷ These are facts as we know them in experience.

Society, then, in its immediate aspect, is a relation among personal ideas. In order to have society it is evidently necessary that persons should get together somewhere; and they get together only as personal ideas in the mind. . . . What other possible *locus* can be assigned for the real contact of persons, or in what other form can they come in contact except as impressions or ideas formed in this common *locus*? Society exists in my mind as the contact and reciprocal influence of certain ideas named "I," Thomas, Henry, Susan, Bridget, and so on. It exists in your mind as a similar group, and so in every mind.⁴⁸

MATERIAL CAUSE OR MEMBERSHIP

Cooley insists on the "vital unity of every phase of personal life, from the simplest interchange of a friendly word to the polity of nations." He rejects "the crudely mechanical" idea that "a person, or some trait of personality or of intercourse" is "the element of society" and that society is "an aggregation of these elements," for he contends that this "mechanical conception" is "inapplicable to vital phenomena." Instead, he maintains that "living wholes have aspects but not elements."⁴⁹ From the aspect

⁴⁵ G. H. Mead, "Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXV (1930), 699.

⁴⁶ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 708.

⁴⁷ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 134.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

of personal intercourse, since society is "a relation among personal ideas," and the real person is the personal idea, the "*immediate social reality is the personal idea.*"⁵⁰ For as Cooley explains:

. . . the personal idea is the real person. That is to say, it is in this alone that one man exists for another, and acts directly upon his mind. My association with you evidently consists in the relation between my idea of you and the rest of my mind. If there is something in you wholly beyond this and makes no impression upon me it has no social reality in this relation.⁵¹

What is a "personal idea"? It is "the man in the imagination, . . . and he appears to be somewhat different from the rather conventional and material man of traditionary social philosophy."⁵² "The imaginations which people have of one another are the *solid facts* of society."⁵³ Or as Cooley states:

. . . the personal idea consists at first and in all later development, of a sensuous element or symbol with which is connected a more or less complex body of thought and sentiment; the whole is social in genesis, formed by a series of communications.⁵⁴

Cooley maintains that since the genesis of personal ideas is experience, that personal ideas are the key to the nature of and the method of studying the individual and society.

Cooley raises the question whether persons having "no corporeal reality, as for instance the dead, characters of fiction or the drama" are real persons and members of society. He concludes that "in so far as we imagine them they are." He also maintains that "a corporeally existent person is not socially real unless he is imagined." For example, if a nobleman regards his serf as an animal, the serf is "not real to him in the sense of acting personally upon his mind and conscience."⁵⁵ Cooley distinguishes

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 122; the influence of Baldwin and James may be noted here, cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-126.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

between the person and the personal idea or the various ideas about the person, and contends that the latter, the personal idea, is the "immediate social reality, the thing in which men exist for one another, and work directly upon one another's lives."⁵⁶ Hence, a reciprocal influence is an essential part of social reality. Society does not comprehend a man's entire personality but only the part "as it lives in my mind and forms there a part of the society in which I live" as "a group or system of thoughts associated with the symbols that stand for him."⁵⁷

Cooley thought that social reality must be approached genetically, that is, tracing the origin and growth of personal ideas and feelings. He had studied Baldwin, James, Perez, and G. Stanley Hall, and had kept as well careful records of the mental-social development of his two children.⁵⁸ To Cooley, society was a fact of consciousness that is necessarily social. One's consciousness is a reflection of what he thinks others think of him. Others exist in his imagination as he exists and influences others in their imagination. The imagination exists as an imagination in which both self and other have their origin and development. Cooley considers the "person" as metaphysically antecedent to self and others. The individual as a social fact consists of the ideas in his mind which he imagines that others think of him, and the others exist as members of society as the ideas which he imagines. Society is, then, a relation of these "personal ideas."

Although these "personal ideas" differ from each other according to the experience of different people, they have a basic core of identical content which acts uniformly in public consciousness. It is psychical and its *locus* is the experiences of the individuals.⁵⁹ There are then at least three aspects of consciousness which we may usefully distinguish: self-consciousness, or what I think of myself; social-consciousness in its individual aspect or what I think of other people; and public consciousness, or a collective view of the foregoing as organized in a communicative group, and all three are phases of a single whole.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁵⁸ Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁵⁹ Cf. Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 695-6.

⁶⁰ Cooley, *Social Organisation*, p. 10.

Both "self" and "other" or "self" and its "society" are carried along interdependently in the stream of consciousness. Both are different phases in the organization of social consciousness. The self is a "precipitate about a fundamental impulse or instinct of appropriation and power, while the primary content appears as a feeling or sentiment, the self-feeling, which defies further analysis."⁶¹ Here Cooley follows James very closely. Cooley is also indebted to Baldwin for the idea of the growth of self as a social process through mutual stimulation and response between the individual and society.⁶²

Society is an interweaving and inter-working of mental selves. I imagine your mind and especially what your mind thinks about my mind, and what your mind thinks about what my mind thinks about your mind. I dress up my mind before yours and expect that you will dress up yours before mine. Whoever cannot or will not perform these feats is not properly in the game.⁶³

An important phase of this social self is the "looking-glass self" which "seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification."⁶⁴

In contrast to those who think that society is a product of a gregarious instinct, Cooley maintains that the social tendencies of man are general rather than specific and that men are "social through and through."⁶⁵ His "psychical outfit is not divisible into social and non-social" but he is all a part of the common human life and his social progress consists in disciplining his faculties and instincts with reference to the progressive organization of life which we know in thought as conscience.⁶⁶

On the other hand, looking at men from the point of view of social organization or their functional relationship to each other,

⁶¹ Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 696.

⁶² Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 709.

⁶³ *Life and the Student*, pp. 201-202.

⁶⁴ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 183-184.

⁶⁵ *Life and the Student*, p. 205.

⁶⁶ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 47.

Cooley considers them as "a mass of rough material . . . more or less imperfect who must be adapted to social existence according to their capacity by a course of education and discipline."⁶⁷ The individual is born with rudimentary capacities and tendencies which are developed into a human personality by the "social environment which comes down from the past by an organic social process."⁶⁸ Reacting to one group of contemporary psychologists who treated man as an individual isolated from society, and another group including such men as Durkheim and Steinhal, who were more interested in society than in the individual, Cooley insisted on the dynamic interdependence of the individual and society.

A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social, that is to say a general, aspect; but is always, as a matter of fact, both individual and general.⁶⁹

In conclusion, since society is considered by Cooley to be a relation among personal ideas, rather than a relation among persons, the material cause of society is personal ideas.

FORMAL CAUSE OR ORGANIZATION

Cooley maintains that "society" and "individuals" are not separable phenomena, but are the "collective and distributive aspects of the same thing," such as the army and the soldiers, the class and the students.⁷⁰ The difference between the two is not in the objects themselves but rather in the point of view or the approach in looking at the two. Society or group is just a collective view of persons as ideas.⁷¹ Man has no existence apart

⁶⁷ "Personal Competition," *Sociological Theory and Social Research*, p. 182.

⁶⁸ "Reflections Upon the Sociology of Herbert Spencer," p. 273.

⁶⁹ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 36.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

from society or the group since he is bound to it by hereditary and social factors.

"Social" may be used, then, in any one of the three following ways, and is not properly regarded as antithetical to individual or personal. It may pertain to the "collective aspect of humanity, to society in its widest and vaguest meaning";⁷² or it may refer to "immediate intercourse, to the life of conversation and face-to-face sympathy—sociable, in short,"⁷³ for it is in these relations that individuality exists and expresses itself; or it may mean "conducive to the collective welfare . . . as when we say that crime or sensuality is unsocial or anti-social."⁷⁴

In discussing the problems of whether society is anything more than the sum of the individuals, Cooley maintains: "In a sense, yes. There is an organization, a self-process in any social whole that you cannot see in the individuals separately."⁷⁵

Organization involves "interdependence, the unity of parts";⁷⁶ or in other words, "interaction and mutual influence."⁷⁷ "That all minds are different is a condition, not an obstacle, to the unity that consists in a differentiated and cooperative life."⁷⁸ Just as an individual adjusts his thinking and acting to meet new conditions and new situations, so a social group like a church or state develops an organization in which each part is the product of adaptive growth.⁷⁹ Organization consists of the functional relations of the different members of society. Its unity is that of organization.⁸⁰

Social organization, then, is defined by Cooley as "differentiated unity of mental or social life, present in the simplest intercourse but capable of infinite growth and adaptation."⁸¹ The larger mind, or the collective aspect of mind, consciously or unconsciously

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 48.

⁷⁶ *Social Organization*, p. 243.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Social Process*, p. 19.

⁸⁰ Cf. Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 696.

⁸¹ *Social Organization*, p. 4.

develops into wholes such as "fashions, traditions, institutions, tendencies," according to man's interests.⁸² "Social organization is nothing less than this variegation of life, taken in the widest sense possible." It is the product of both "conscious and sub-conscious tendency," and may be classified and studied as social types, e.g., types of personality, classes, or family; or as processes like communication, cooperation, and competition; or as organization.⁸³

From one point of view, organization is "an assemblage of special functions, such as teaching, engineering, farming . . ." From another it appears as "a continuous and unified organism, with rich and varied traditions, intricate cooperation, and a wide interplay of thought and sentiment."⁸⁴ The organic view stresses both the unity of the whole and the peculiar value of each individual in his functional relationship to others.⁸⁵

In primitive society "membership is intimate and exclusive" so that the whole personality is comprehended by the group.⁸⁶ But in modern society as groups become more numerous and complex, personal activities tend to become "impersonal functions with special associates in each function."⁸⁷ Although a person is still dependent on the group system, his relations with different groups become selective, and no one group embraces his whole personality as in primitive society. Besides being a farmer, he may also be an investor in a stock company, a Republican, a poet, "a complex and unique personality."⁸⁸ Hence, Cooley concludes that the modern social order is based more on this selective association, and that the division of groups in modern life is not so much a division of persons as a division according to "interests, activities, opinions, or what not."⁸⁹ The whole system is more "intricately unified as well as more intricately specialized," than formerly.⁹⁰

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

⁸⁴ *Social Process*, p. 67.

⁸⁵ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 36.

⁸⁶ *Social Process*, p. 249.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, "Personal Competition," p. 185.

The chief example of the "inclusive, essentially personal group" still persisting is the family, although that also is becoming less inclusive than it used to be.⁹¹ Besides the family, other groups of intimate, face-to-face association and cooperation are the play-group of children and the neighborhood or community group of elders. These are called primary groups chiefly because they are "fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual."⁹² Since they are practically universal in all times and all stages of development they are a chief basis for what is universal in "human nature and human ideals."⁹³ The psychological result of intimate association within these groups is a "certain fusion of individualities in a common whole" that can be described as a "we" which involves sympathy and mutual identification.⁹⁴ The unity of the primary group is a "differentiated and usually a competitive unity."⁹⁵ Self-assertion and the "appropriative passions" tend to become socialized by sympathy and the discipline of a common spirit. It is in these primary groups that a person receives his "earliest and completest experience of social unity."⁹⁶ These groups serve as the basis for social institutions.

Besides these types of primary association there are others whose form depends upon the particular level of civilization. Their essential criteria are a "certain intimacy and fusion of personalities."⁹⁷ These may be clubs, fraternal organizations, school, occupational groups, or any group based on congeniality or common interest and activity.

Another aspect of social organization is the institution which Cooley defines as "a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion."⁹⁸ "Enduring sentiments, beliefs, customs, and symbols," become crystallized into definite forms as men throughout the ages center

⁹¹ *Social Process*, p. 251.

⁹² *Social Organisation*, p. 23.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

their attention on some deep and abiding interest. "Language, government, the church, law, and customs of property and of the family, systems of industry and education, are institutions because they are the working out of permanent needs of human nature."⁹⁹ These institutions are not separate entities but phases of a common body of thought, or are the "organized attitudes of the public mind." The institution exists in the individual as "a habit of mind and of action, largely unconscious because largely common to all the group," hence the individual is always "cause as well as effect of the institution."¹⁰⁰ Although he receives the impress of the institution, such as the state, which has influenced him from childhood by traditions, yet he also impresses his character on the state; hence, there is reciprocal interaction which produces change. Although an institution is made up of persons, it does not include the whole person, but only a specialized part, for instance, "the legal part of a lawyer," or "the business part of a merchant."¹⁰¹

The difference between an institution and a group is largely a matter of point of view. "A group is primarily an aggregation of persons, like a family or a regiment, with distinct purposes and organization."¹⁰² An "institution is more than a group; its vitality consists in an organic whole of transmitted ideas which has the power to enlist the activities of a group, but does not, for the most part, originate with the group, and cannot be explained as a mere product of their personalities. It must be seen as a distinct organic process."¹⁰³ A group may or may not participate in an institution, or may belong to it by certain habits and interests but not entirely. Examples of institutions are Tammany Hall, Salvation Army, juvenile gangs, and college football.

The "mechanism through which human relations exist and develop is communication."¹⁰⁴ Communication includes:

All the symbols of the mind, together with the means
of conveying them through space and preserving them

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 313-314.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

¹⁰² "Case Study," p. 318.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

in time. It includes the expression of the face, attitude and gesture, the tones of the voice, words, writing, printing, railways, telegraphs, telephones, and whatever else may be the latest achievement in the conquest of space and time. All these taken together, in the intricacy of their actual combination, make up an organic whole corresponding to the organic whole of human thought; and everything in the way of mental growth has an external existence therein.¹⁰⁵

The extension of intercommunication in groups is the means of expanding social relationships. As in an individual, so in a social group, development depends upon communication. For "communication, including its organization into literature, art, and institutions, is truly the outside or visible structure of thought, as much cause as effect of the inside or conscious life of men."¹⁰⁶ In this organic development symbols, traditions, and institutions are projected from the mind and also react upon it, and, in a certain sense, control it. By means of this, the individual is a member not only of a particular family, class, or state, but also of a larger whole reaching back to his prehistoric ancestors. In this whole he lives, gives, and receives his thoughts. The system of communication is a tool affecting the lives of every individual and institution. Studying communication gives a key to the understanding of mental and social changes.

Cooley considers solidarity in a social group to be "a fundamental harmony of forces resulting in effective cooperation."¹⁰⁷ However, he states that it is difficult to say in just what solidarity consists. It is a combination of likeness and difference. Likeness seems to be a similarity of essential ideas or sentiments appropriate to the activity in question. For example, the patriotic unity of Japan has been explained by devotion to the Mikado and the imperial family. The differentiating elements are the individuals who make up the harmonious whole. The test of lack of solidarity is "inefficiency in total action." Cooley remarks that in America, unity of spirit is "intense yet singularly headless and formless." It seems to be based on "common allegiance to vague

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁰⁷ *Social Organisation*, p. 330.

sentiments of freedom, kindness and hope.”¹⁰⁸ Again, this describes but does not explain social unity. Cooley’s explanation of social unity seems to be continuity of mind as expressed by tradition and convention in social groups for he states:

In a large view, then, tradition and convention are merely aspects of the transmission of thought, and of the unity of social groups that result from it. If our mind is fixed upon the historical phase of the matter we see tradition, if upon the contemporary phase, we see convention. But the process is really one, and the opposition only particular and apparent. All influences are contemporary in their immediate origin, all are rooted in the past.¹⁰⁹

In a comparatively small and stable group having little intercourse with the outside world, the traditional element is more apparent, while in modern society where groups are bound together “into a conscious unity by facile communication,” convention is more obvious, although tradition is still present.¹¹⁰

The unity of the social mind consists not in agreement but in organization, that is, in the reciprocal influence or causation among the parts of the whole since all are interdependent and an outcome of the whole, as in an orchestra.¹¹¹

The formal cause of society seems to be the relation among personal ideas or the unity of personal ideas existing in the minds of individuals as the result of the transmission of thought through tradition and convention. Because of the modern means of communication this unity of the social mind can be organized more on the level of intelligence and sympathy than on authority, caste and routine.¹¹²

Thus nations and eventually the whole world may be included in one mental whole. Unless there is a “means of working thought and sentiment into a whole by reciprocation,” the unity of the group will be ineffective.¹¹³ While Cooley recognized the

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹¹² *Social Organisation*, p. 81.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

possibility of a larger and freer society through modern improvements in communication, he also foresaw the possibility of disorder because of the confusion and injustice consequent on disordering settled relations and too much concentration on the mechanical phases of progress.

EFFICIENT CAUSE OR AGENTS

Cooley posits an over-all, continuous, and continuing process of human evolution correlative to the biological process in the subhuman order. Within this process there is a "vital impulse of unknown origin" proceeding from the past and moving onward toward the future, adapting itself to new conditions and situations as it progresses.

We see around us in the world of men an onward movement of life. There seems to be a vital impulse, of unknown origin, that tends to work ahead in innumerable directions and manners, each continuous with something of the same sort in the past. The whole thing appears to be a kind of growth, and we might add that it is an *adaptive* growth, meaning by this that the forms of life we see—men, associations of men, traditions, institutions, conventions, theories, ideals—are not separate or independent, but that the growth of each takes place in contact and interaction with that of others. Thus any one phase of the movement may be regarded as a series of adaptations to the other phases.¹¹⁴

In the total movement of organic life, there are two processes or two branches of the same process,—the biological working through the germ-plasm, and the social working through language as the medium of psychical communication. Language here means writing, printing, and every means of transmitting thought. In contrast to evolution on the plant and animal level, where adaptation to environment is primarily hereditary and fixed, the "distinctive thing in human evolution . . . is the development of a process which is not fixed but plastic," adapting itself "directly to each particular situation," and capable of a variety of modes of action."¹¹⁵ The "human intelligence" trained by the social

¹¹⁴ *Social Process*, p. 3.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 197-199.

environment is "the agent through which situations are understood and hereditary tendencies are organized to meet them."¹¹⁶ A system of communication, education, and tradition enables the intelligence to develop and organize its control. The "human process, then, involves a plastic heredity prepared to submit itself to the guidance of environment as interpreted by intelligence."¹¹⁷ In human beings heredity is not an inborn tendency to do whatever is necessary in each situation. A child is born with certain capacities and these are stimulated or repressed by the environment. In the two parallel and interdependent subprocesses, the hereditary and the social, each has its own sphere, "that of heredity being, in general, the production of physical and mental aptitude, and that of society the creation, by the aid of this aptitude, of a progressing order."¹¹⁸ From this it would seem that the individual person is the agent in the sense that he interprets the processes and organizes his tendencies to meet situations. He does not create the process that results in social organization but adjusts to it in the manner that seems most feasible at the time. As Cooley remarks, "this organization, of which we are a part, like the process that creates it, is more largely unconscious than we are apt to perceive."¹¹⁹ Just as in animal and vegetable life Darwin showed the working of subtle adaptation, so the "principle of unintentional adaptation is a work in human life."¹²⁰ Although this does not explain all of man's activity, it is an important factor. Cooley states that "although conscious purpose may play a central part," yet "there is a whole organism of tendencies that feel their way about in the situation, reacting in a complex and mainly unconscious way . . . it is a man's character that works, and of this definite purpose may or may not be a part."¹²¹

At any given moment life is made up of a complex of personal and impersonal wholes charged with energy and tendency derived from past heredity and habit. If any of these particular wholes is studied,—“a person, a party, a state, or a doctrine,” it can

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

be discerned that each whole is pushing forward "in the direction of its tendencies."¹²² Its activities are tried upon the situation, directed by intelligence or acting blindly. The more effectively it works, the more energy it acquires in the working. In this process of adaptation a "selective" development takes place, since the activities of the structure that are stimulated increase while the others are repressed. Intelligence may or may not be active in the situation. The two essential factors are "active tendencies and conditions which guide their operation."¹²³ Just as the growth of individual persons is adaptive, so is the life of a social group or the development of ideas. "Human life is thus all one growing whole, unified by ceaseless currents of interaction, but at the same time differentiated into those diverse forms of energy which we see as men, factions, tendencies, doctrines, and institutions."¹²⁴ Though the structure that results from the social process may seem rational, generally the "social organisms feel their way without explicit consciousness of where they want to go or how they are to get there."¹²⁵ This may be seen in the case of the growth of cities, nations, or large social movements, such as commercialism. Each "form of human life, a group, institution, or an idea, has a character, a correlation of complex tendencies, a *Motiv*, genius, soul, or whatever you may choose to call it," which is the outgrowth of the past and forges ahead to meet the new situation,¹²⁶ since the primary need of individuals and social organisms is "to live and to grow."¹²⁷ The "immediate motor and guide of this growth is interest, and wherever that points social structure comes into being."¹²⁸ In this process of reciprocal activity persons make society and society makes persons since "both self and society are twin-born."¹²⁹ For example, the political state and the church with their power, literature, buildings and offices, are products of human invention.¹³⁰

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹²⁸ *Social Organization*, p. 21.

¹²⁹ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 42; *Social Organization*, p. 5.

¹³⁰ *Social Organization*, p. 313.

In reaction to a particularistic and atomistic interpretation of cultural development, Cooley presents his organic or synthetic view of social causation in which all factors must be studied in view of each given situation. "In the organic world, that is to say in real life . . . there is no logical primacy, no place where the thread begins. You must see the whole or you do not truly see anything."¹⁸¹ Even the most complex and rigid situations are the result of personal influences or acts of sympathy organized into a definite whole by some "system of permanent symbols, such as laws, constitutions, sacred writings, and the like in which personal influences are preserved."¹⁸²

In conclusion these ideas may be summarized in this passage:

Life is constantly developing and carrying us on in its growth. We do not need to impel it so much as we sometimes think. A main thing for us is to hang on to our higher hopes and standards and have faith that the larger life will supply our deficiencies. God is a builder; to be something we must build with him; understanding the plan if we can, but building in any case.¹⁸³

The efficient cause of social organization seems to be the interaction between internal tendencies and external conditions. This resembles Spencer's internal and external factors and Ward's social forces, though it differs from Ward in that for Cooley heredity and social environment are normally complementary rather than antagonistic.¹⁸⁴ This interaction may be interpreted and guided by intelligence or be the result of blind groping. In any case it is a process of adaptation. It is not clear whether Cooley intends to imply that God is the primary efficient cause. He states that there may exist an all-foreseeing consciousness but life does not seem to be the work of such a consciousness. It appears rather to be "a mighty and impulsive growth of a power that *feels its way* into incarnation. God is apparently a process, an onward-striving life, and we are members of him, real agents

¹⁸¹ *Publication of the American Economic Association*, V, 182-187.

¹⁸² *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 166.

¹⁸³ *Social Process*, p. 94.

¹⁸⁴ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 16.

in his work, our conscience is his command.”¹³⁵ God is conceived of as a composite, shifting thing, characterized by kindness, with courage, patience,—a common current in all men flowing mainly in the involuntary processes.¹³⁶ This is a naturalistic rather than a theological conception of God. The ultimate efficient cause seems to be “a vital impulse of unknown origin.” The proximate efficient cause is the interaction between internal tendencies and external conditions in which man is the medium of the interaction.

Cooley maintains that the organic view about the nature of life and society does not attempt to explain how things began but claims that their actual working now and in the past is organic.¹³⁷ Reacting against particularistic explanations, Cooley emphatically states that “there is no beginning; we know nothing about beginnings; there is always continuity with the past, and not only with any one element in the past, but with the whole interacting organism of man.”¹³⁸

FINAL CAUSE OR PURPOSE

According to Cooley, “the aim of all organization is to express human nature, and it does this through a system of symbols, which are the embodiment and the vehicle of the idea.”¹³⁹ “Human nature,” as a social nature, refers to the sentiments, attitudes, and impulses characteristic of human beings at all times and all places.¹⁴⁰ It means particularly “sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling of social right and wrong.”¹⁴¹ Cooley believes that human nature thus defined is a comparatively permanent element in society, since all men “seek honor and dread ridicule, defer to public opinion, cherish their

¹³⁵ *Life and the Student*, p. 250.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

¹³⁷ *Social Process*, p. 45.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹³⁹ *Social Organization*, pp. 342-3.

¹⁴⁰ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 32.

¹⁴¹ *Social Organisation*, p. 28.

goods and their children, and admire courage, generosity and success." ¹⁴³

Human nature as thus described is not something existing separately in each individual, but is a "*group-nature or primary phase of society*, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind." ¹⁴³ It is midway between and includes the instincts born in us, and the ideas and sentiments making up institutions. It is that nature developed and expressed in the simple face-to-face primary groups,—the family, playground, and neighborhood. The essential similarity in these groups explains the similarity of ideas and sentiments in the human mind. These primary ideals "as the carriers of social tradition and social custom" are the chief "moulders of personality and the carriers of the human element in social life." ¹⁴⁴ "In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation." ¹⁴⁵ Since these human characteristics belong to man in association, Cooley asks, "What kind or degree of association is required to develop them?" ¹⁴⁶ He decides that family and neighborhood life are essential for the genesis of human nature. It is in these primary groups that individuals satisfy their primary needs, become socialized, and form concepts of primary ideals or social ideals, such as loyalty, kindness, service, love, freedom and justice. ¹⁴⁷ The sacrifice of self-interest to the interests of a congenial group makes a person more human. In so far as one identifies himself with the whole, loyalty to the group is loyalty to oneself, or self-realization. These ideals of the primary groups are the basis for the systems of larger idealism—democracy and Christianity. The tool for the extension of ideals and the development of a true human nature is communication. An illustration of this may be seen in the case of Helen Keller. ¹⁴⁸ The individual is born with "decisive but rudi-

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁴⁴ C. A. Ellwood, "Charles Horton Cooley, Sociologist 1864–1929," *Sociology and Social Research*, XIV (Sept., Oct., 1929), 6.

¹⁴⁵ *Social Organisation*, p. 30.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

mentary capacities and tendencies" wholly dependent for their development into a human personality upon a "social environment which comes down from the past through an organic social process."¹⁴⁹ The primary trait of such a nature is its teachability.¹⁵⁰

Considering human nature as the hereditary equipment of a child, Cooley regards it as consisting of vague tendencies or aptitudes needing actualization through society. For instance, babbling is instinctive while speech becomes defined in society; curiosity comes by nature, and knowledge by life; and instinctive sensibility develops into sympathy and love.¹⁵¹ The function of the school is to supplement the primary groups in meeting the primary conditions which a child needs for the growth of his human nature. He needs intimate relations with a teacher who can arouse and guide his mental life, and equal membership in a group to develop the "democratic spirit of loyalty, service, emulation and discussion."¹⁵² The merging of self in the willing service of a greater whole raises man to a higher level of human nature.¹⁵³ "The great thing, then, is to make life as a whole a cooperative and intelligible struggle in which we may merge our individualities and find an enduring hope."¹⁵⁴ The function of the social system as a whole is "to achieve effectual team work,"¹⁵⁵ for "team work is the principle of society."¹⁵⁶ It depends upon the vision of a common purpose, and grows by sympathy, intelligence, faith in others, and practice.¹⁵⁷ The secret of a stable society is to give all forms of energy a chance to express themselves within the system. This is done by "inculcating discipline, loyalty, and industrial and social intelligence in the members,"¹⁵⁸ and by embracing an adequate system of communication so as to organize and develop

¹⁴⁹ Cooley, "Reflections Upon the Sociology of Herbert Spencer," p. 273.

¹⁵⁰ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 34.

¹⁵¹ *Social Organization*, p. 316.

¹⁵² *Social Process*, p. 62.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁵⁴ *Life and the Student*, p. 256.

¹⁵⁵ *Social Process*, p. 244.

¹⁵⁶ *Life and the Student*, p. 34.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

the social mind. A body of special traditions and customs to meet the exigencies of the group is also necessary. Stability is a basic requirement. This must be strengthened by respect for the traditions of the past, but not be so inflexible as not to be able to adjust to new conditions. The ideas which make up the social order are impressed on the members of society by suggestion but may have to be reinforced by public opinion, emulation, fear and blame.¹⁵⁹ In order to have progress, it is necessary to bring conflict under rational control. This requires a social constitution, formal or informal, that is larger than the sphere of struggle and capable of imposing regulation on the conflicting elements. The regulatory principles must be broad enough to allow for peaceful change and adaptation in meeting new conditions.¹⁶⁰

Cooley compares a well-ordered community to a ship in which each officer and seaman work together, and fulfills his duties conscientiously. "All hangs together, and is subject to reason in the form of long-tried rules of navigation and discipline."¹⁶¹ Each one feels that the good of the individual is found only in the subordination of himself to the rational whole.¹⁶²

In order that human nature may express itself in an orderly and effective way, there must be "forms and customs of rational organization." These must be incorporated into a body of law and custom to effect stable nations. They are a "product of progressive intervention, trial, and survival," and serve the purpose of "the fuller expression of human nature in a social system."¹⁶³

In recapitulation, Cooley's concept of society may be summarized thus :

1. Society is a relation among personal ideas.
2. The material cause of society is personal ideas.
3. The formal cause or organization is the unity of personal ideas resulting from tradition and convention through communication.
4. The proximate efficient cause is the interaction between

¹⁵⁹ *Social Process*, pp. 244-245.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

¹⁶¹ *Social Organisation*, p. 351.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 354.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

the internal tendencies and the external conditions. The ultimate efficient cause seems to be "a vital impulse of unknown origin."

5. The final cause or purpose is the fuller expression of human nature or the socialization of the individual.

SOCIAL CHANGE

Cooley does not give a specific definition of social change, but mentions that in social life, change is obvious and urgent, and that any real study of society is a study of process.¹⁶⁴ Social change, then, is equivalent to the social process that is an aspect of the onward-going process of human life which is known by sympathetic participation. It is a part of life as a whole which is "an eternal growth, an onward and upward development . . . involving the continual transformation or elimination of details. Just as humanity lives on while individuals perish, so the social organization endures while particular forms of it pass away."¹⁶⁵

Whether it is a political party, business enterprise, or a nation, the development is characterized by a "mixture of foresight and unforeseen experience. It feels its way, more or less intelligently, until it finds an opening, in the form of policies that prove popular, . . . and then, through increased activity at the point of success, develops in the propitious direction."¹⁶⁶ All movements of history are cyclical in character. Each form of organization, mob, fashions, the Roman Empire, grows, declines, and falls and may disappear "for this is a trait of life in general . . . if we assume that social process is made up of functional forms or organisms working onward by a tentative method, we can see that their history is naturally cyclical."¹⁶⁷ Each form experiments, consciously or unconsciously, to meet the conditions under which it functions. It does not follow, however, that a social cycle is in any way mechanical or predetermined as Herbert Spencer maintained, or that social organisms are "subject to a *definite* law of growth and decay, which enables us to predict their fate in

¹⁶⁴ *Social Process*, p. 396.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

advance.”¹⁶⁸ The process is complex and partly determined by the will, so there is no exact way of prediction. Forms of social organization that are plastic and capable of rational adaptation persist while others decay. The person is the medium through which the change takes place.

FACTORS IN SOCIAL CHANGE

Social change may be due to change of personnel in society, or changes in the social system such as new industrial methods, migrations, transformation of ideas and practices in every sphere of life.¹⁶⁹

Life, as a whole, considered as an onward struggle, has two phases, conflict and cooperation.¹⁷⁰ The social order may be resolved into a number of cooperative wholes, each of which includes conflicting elements. Both conflict and cooperation “have their places in our process of organic growth.”¹⁷¹ As the forces become organized, they cooperate as a result of a selective method which involves conflict. The forces most fitted to the situation survive. Cooperation is never static but a “*modus vivendi* under which we go on to a new sort of opposition and growth.”¹⁷² This idea is reminiscent of Novicow and Ward, although Cooley stresses cooperation more than conflict. “Conflict, of some sort, is the life of society, and progress emerges from a struggle in which each individual, class, or institution seeks to realize its own idea of good.”¹⁷³ The function of the struggle is to work out new forms of cooperation.¹⁷⁴ The contest is mainly unconscious and leads to the survival of the fittest. Energy and suggestion are also important factors in human achievement. Innovation is the result of fresh personality reacting against mechanism; for example, the young or bold and restless temperaments full of vigor and constructive power are likely to be dissatisfied with the existing order and initiate change. What is true of individuals is

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Social Organization*, p. 199.

¹⁷⁴ *Social Process*, p. 41.

true also of whole peoples. The amount of mental energy used depends mainly on the urgency of the suggestion.¹⁷⁵ Cooley stresses suggestion in contrast to the principle of imitation of Tarde and Baldwin. The will also plays a part in the process of change.¹⁷⁶ Apparently in all variation there is always "an antecedent system of tendencies, some of which expand and fructify under fresh suggestions."¹⁷⁷

DIRECTED SOCIAL CHANGE

Since the present adaptive organization of society is inefficient both from the personal and the social point of view, it needs to be made more rational through an experimental method including comparison, selection, and cooperation. "For us the way plainly lies through the acceptance of the selective method, and its scientific study and reconstruction."¹⁷⁸ This requires intelligent and responsible members of society, well-trained and equipped to perform their functions in a complex society. The principal institution to meet this need is education.¹⁷⁹ Rational adaptation should be applied not only in the schools, but also in employment bureaus, vocational guidance bureaus, and in private industries.¹⁸⁰

Great social changes, such as the Industrial Revolution and the Civil War in the United States, cause much confusion and demoralization. Such sudden and disorderly changes can be provided against only in the measure in which "we foresee and control the process in which we live."¹⁸¹

Progress like human life is "a tentative process" worked out "as we go along," rather than an attainment. It is indefinable and consists of "growth, renewal, onwardness, hope." The higher life is a struggle onward toward a richer life that is never really attained. The reality of progress is an act of faith rather than a matter of demonstration. We are all parts of an onward movement, parts of a larger life moving forward, believing that

¹⁷⁵ *Social Organization*, pp. 327-328.

¹⁷⁶ *Social Process*, p. 33.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-61.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

"I may perish, but *We* are immortal." "In childhood, music, poetry, in transient hours of vision, we know a fuller, richer life of which we are a part, but which we can grasp only in this dim and flitting way."¹⁸²

Progress results from the interaction of personality and institutions. The person represents human nature which institutions serve, and institutions represent the total development transcending single persons.¹⁸³ "Progress . . . is development of knowledge, arts, and institutions that takes place in the social process with little or no alteration in the germ-plasm."¹⁸⁴

The criteria of progress are the ideals formed by man and toward which he works. These ideals are a "working test of progress, but there can be nothing certain or final about them."¹⁸⁵ The growth of "rational social guidance is a part of progress."¹⁸⁶

In summary, Cooley seems to equate social change with the eternal onward-going process of human life since society is only one aspect of human life in the evolutionary, organic process of change. Its source is a vital impulse working through each individual, group, or institution seeking to realize its development. Hence the change may be due to change in personnel or the social system. Its law is experimental adaptation, and its objective is a fuller expression of human nature in a social system. The factors are persons, conflict, cooperation, energy, suggestion, ideas and human will. Cooley considers the present adaptive organization of society as inefficient, but hopes for a more rational adaptation through intelligent leaders, education, and improved methods in employment bureaus, vocational guidance bureaus, and private industries. In this he is more in agreement with St. Thomas and Ward than with Sumner.

CONTRIBUTIONS

In his trilogy, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, *Social Organization*, and *Social Process*, Cooley revolutionized the

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 408.

¹⁸³ *Social Organization*, p. 324.

¹⁸⁴ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 14.

¹⁸⁵ *Social Organisation*, p. 406.

¹⁸⁶ "Reflections Upon the Sociology of Herbert Spencer," p. 276.

method of sociology by turning attention from the larger aspects of human relations to small groups and to individual interactions.¹⁸⁷ His most original contribution and one now fundamental to sociological analysis is his theory of "primary groups" characterized by "intimate, face-to-face association" in the home, on the playground, and in the neighborhood. Within these groups arise basic ideals for society as a whole, such as truth, service, kindness, and loyalty. Cooley together with Sumner, Giddings, Small, and Ross, was one of the leaders in giving the concept of the "group" an important place in sociological thinking. Some sociologists have criticized Cooley's classification of primary groups as well as his criteria of primary groups. Faris maintains that some primary groups are not face-to-face and some face-to-face groups are not primary. He also questions the factor of temporal priority as an essential requirement of a primary group.¹⁸⁸ However, the concept of primary groups is important in studying the genesis and early development of personality and human nature, and also in contrasting this with the effects of secondary groups on the individual.

The literature of educational sociology is still very much influenced by Cooley's idea of the socialization of the personality through primary groups, and the school, in preparing one to participate in group life and realize individual happiness. His influence is also seen in the educational ideology that the school environment as part of the social environment can be so controlled that social life can be redirected toward social progress.¹⁸⁹

Cooley, James, Baldwin and Mead started a trend in social psychology which still persists. This school is interested in analyzing the influence of environment and the processes of social interaction accounting for the genesis and development of human nature and personality.¹⁹⁰ This dynamic viewpoint is basic to

¹⁸⁷ Ellwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁸⁸ Ellsworth Faris, "The Primary Group: Essence and Accident," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVIII (July, 1932, May, 1933), pp. 41-50. Harry C. Harmsworth, "Primary Group Relationship in Modern Society," *Sociology and Social Research*, XXXI (March-April, 1947), 291.

¹⁸⁹ Barnes, Becker, and Becker (eds.), *Contemporary Social Theory*, pp. 805-806.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 799; Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

the social psychologists and the sociologists of the "Chicago School" called by Blumer the "symbolic interactionists," who are reacting to static, traditional, individual psychologies.¹⁹¹ Cooley's trilogy is considered by some sociologists to be the clearest, general statement of psycho-sociology yet produced in English.¹⁹² According to him, society is an organic unity *mentally* constituted. Bogardus compliments Cooley on making vital contributions to social psychology without coining an elaborate terminology.¹⁹³

Cooley contributed to social psychology the idea that social consciousness is a social process going on within which the "self" and the "others" arise. It is a bi-polar process in which social individuals develop. In this concept Cooley was ahead of Baldwin, Tarde, and James. He successfully established the idea of "self and others upon the same plane of reality in experience" and the concept of "society" as the outgrowth of association and cooperation of the primary group in its face-to-face organization.¹⁹⁴ Although the interdependence of the individual and society is generally accepted today, Cooley is usually credited with giving the most lucid and consistent application of the organic theory to the study of human nature, personality, and social organization.¹⁹⁵ His attention to the social process emphasizes the dynamic and functional aspects of social phenomena. The object of sociological study is "primarily an imaginative idea or group of ideas in the mind, that we have to imagine imaginations." This was, in effect, stressing the importance of the mental side of social life and the close interdependence of psychology and sociology.¹⁹⁶

Cooley's concept of institution has served a useful purpose in analysis as can be seen from the recent literature. Floyd Allport and Stuart Chapin are among those who have advanced a theory of institutions since Sumner and Cooley. Chapin's is an extension of Cooley's rather than a deviation.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹¹ H. Blumer, "Social Psychology," *Man and Society*, ed. E. P. Schmidt (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1937), pp. 144-98.

¹⁹² Cf. Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 985.

¹⁹³ Cf. E. S. Bogardus, *The Development of Social Thought* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1940), p. 492.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Mead, *op. cit.*, pp. 700-706.

¹⁹⁵ Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹⁹⁶ Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 6, Barnes, Becker, and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*

Cooley's contribution to sociological methodology is presented in "The Roots of Social Knowledge" in which he distinguished between the social and physical sciences and the necessity of different methods in studying them. He states that "the first step in thinking about social or human knowledge is to recognize that the former rests eventually upon sympathetic understanding of the acts of men, and can never be exact or mensurative in the sense that material knowledge can be."¹⁹⁸ Social scientists who disregard the mental and emotional processes in which society consists arrive only at pseudo-science.¹⁹⁹ His method of "sympathetic insight" was that of a comprehensive grasp of the total situation by considering the factors involved. In stressing this he seems to have laid the foundation for the case history analyses used today in Child Guidance Clinics.²⁰⁰ Cooley does not object to behavioristic methods if their limitations are recognized, that they leave out distinctively human elements—creative mental synthesis. But he maintains that the final interpretation must include sympathetic introspection since it is "a normal and common process, without which we could know very little about life."²⁰¹ To him true social knowledge comes through insight and understanding obtained through the sympathetic contact of a sensitive nature with society.²⁰² By emphasizing the importance of communication Cooley indicated a method of studying group behavior which was even more accurate than studying the individual mind through introspection. He showed the mechanism of communication to be the essential structure for understanding the human development of social life and the psycho-sociological phenomena of suggestion and imitation as well as the means for developing a true human nature.²⁰³ Communication was considered by Cooley to be a sociological key of great importance and fundamental to the in-

¹⁹⁸ Cooley, *Life and the Student*, p. 150.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

²⁰⁰ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 710.

²⁰¹ "The Roots of Social Knowledge," *American Journal of Sociology* XXXII (July, 1926, May, 1927), 69.

²⁰² R. H. Holmes, "Charles Horton Cooley: Scholar," *Sociology and Social Research*, XIV (Sept.-Oct., 1929), 106.

²⁰³ Ellwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

terpretation of association. It is essential to the social process and to the adjustment of individuals in social groups.²⁰⁴

Since Cooley interprets consciousness as an inner experience of the life of the external organism, he sets up a parallelism between sensations, percepts, emotions, volitions, and physiological processes. According to Mead this seems to imply a scientific account of the physiological process without bringing in the state of consciousness. Cooley maintains that "self" and "others" lie in the consciousness of "ordinary psychology" and yet they are the "solid facts" of sociology, the field of the external organism. Cooley contends that his parallelism refers to an outside and inside view of the same reality rather than a parallelism between states and processes on two different levels of metaphysical being. Mead raises the question whether within this apparatus of social psychology Cooley succeeds in presenting adequately the "solid facts" of society. Cooley does not identify self with the physical organism but merges the life-process and social process of a universal onward evolution, thereby not segregating the biological person from the social person. He actually took the mental organization of society according to his own view as the standard by which to test primitive impulses. Hence *Human Nature and the Social Order* becomes an "ethical treatise rather than a scientific analysis of the situation in which lie moral judgments and the whole apparatus of impulses."²⁰⁵

In regard to method, Mead contends that Cooley was not interested in the form in which social experience could be stated so as to be amenable to exact definition. Therefore, he is considered "unscientific" by some social scientists. However, Cooley was interested in understanding "human nature and the social order," consequently, he preferred "sympathetic insight" to statistics or any natural science methods.²⁰⁶

In presenting his organic view of history in which all factors are considered as phases of a unitary life process whose main characteristic was growth, Cooley maintained that evolution brought society into the realm of science, but actually evolution for

²⁰⁴ Cf. Barnes, Becker, and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 797.

²⁰⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 702.

²⁰⁶ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 711.

Cooley was a philosophy rather than a method. He was not interested in analyzing the primitive mind nor in tracing the development of society from its earlier forms. His method was introspection, but the methodological problem of objectifying the mind as the *locus* of the selves acting upon each other did not interest him. His method was psychological since society was a psychical whole. Does this adequately describe the social individual in the objective life of society? Is the idea of "self" and "others" entirely imaginative or are the selves and others objective facts of reality which need inner experiences for their interpretation? Is the *locus* of society in the mind as Cooley maintains and the approach to it by introspection or is it an objective reality which can be approached by other methods also? From the point of view of social behaviorism, Mead criticized Cooley's idea that society exists only in the mind and that the social self is a product of the imagination. This commits Cooley to a "subjectivistic and idealistic, rather than an objective and naturalistic, metaphysical position."²⁰⁷ In reducing social reality to an internal relation between ideas, the result is solipsism or the position that one can know only his ideas and is confined to his own consciousness. Another limitation to this theory is that although our ideas have a special origin and a common element yet there is an individual or private element also that Cooley neglects. There is an individual as well as a social aspect to the mind.²⁰⁸ Cooley also tends to overstress the affective element and under-emphasize the cognitive and conative elements in social life.

Cooley's organic view of life as a whole and society as a whole in which everything is interrelated and interdependent does not present definitively what the whole is, or the degree of interrelationship or interacting elements which may be tested empirically. In insisting that "sympathetic insight" makes for "a life-like or dramatic picture of typical functional behavior" Cooley may be stressing more the dramatic element than the typical. His generalizations are verbalizations of impressions which can not be expressed in quantitative form. So far this method lacks com-

²⁰⁷ George Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, ed. Chas. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 224n; cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

municative techniques that can be used to test and check empirically conclusions drawn by others. Yet, it is valuable in furnishing insights not yet attainable by other methods. Studying social phenomena functionally and dynamically has also contributed much to the former static studies.

Cooley seems to assume a social order and process as given which introspection reveals, rather than finding "selves" and "society" arising in the primitive process of communication. According to Mead, Cooley's sociology was "in a sense an account of the American community to which he belonged and presupposed its normal healthful process."²⁰⁹ This process was that of the primary group with its intimate organization and cooperation. Given the process, its growth and degeneration could be identified and described. Institutions and values were implicit in it. Cooley was not interested in the origin of this process or the social patterns responsible for the structure and the evolution of society. He did not show at what stage in the development of personality, self-consciousness and the "social self" arose or by what mechanism they came into existence as Mead in his "generalized other."²¹⁰ Mead questions whether society is psychical or whether the psychical is something in the nature of communication originating in primitive behavior.²¹¹ By assuming that society is psychical by nature, Cooley closes the door to other types of analyses of selves and their origin.²¹² According to Wood, Cooley contended that social knowledge consisted in observing and recording the facts of social interaction as a socio-psychological process including both the data of consciousness and overt behavior.²¹³ However, his emphasis on ideas as being the "social fact" limited Cooley's method to "sympathetic introspection," "imagination" and artistic insight although this does not necessarily follow.

Since the more recent text-books on sociology and social psychology tend to be eclectic, Cooley's philosophical approach will

²⁰⁹ Mead, "Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought," p. 705.

²¹⁰ Cf. Jandy, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

²¹² Mead, "Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought," p. 706.

²¹³ Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 709.

hardly be incorporated *in toto* yet many of his important contributions probably will. Some of these are: his clear-cut analysis of the nature of human nature and personality—a trend still persisting in social psychology; his views on the “self,” “social self,” and “looking-glass self” which Mead later developed into the “rôle”; the influence of social organization or disorganization on individuals; the social genesis and nature of the human mind; the functional interdependence of the individual and society; the concept of primary groups and their effect on human nature, primary ideals, and sentiments; the rôle of communication in the social process; the analysis of social institutions and their tendency toward formalism; the tentative character of all social processes; the method of introspection as a means of interpreting social phenomena; the lucid distinction between self-consciousness, social consciousness, and public consciousness,—distinct yet all parts of an organic whole; the emphasis on rational control; the descriptions of the social process from which arise social persons and social organizations; his almost limitless faith in democracy; the psychological factors of men’s thoughts, beliefs and ideas as the “social fact”; the conception of historical change and progress as inseparable; the analysis of social change in terms of the “social” rather than the biological or economic factors; society as a process—a functional unity of interacting individuals; and the concept of the organic unity of society as opposed to the nominalistic or atomistic approach.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

IN THIS chapter the concept of society according to St. Thomas, Ward, Sumner, and Cooley will be compared as to: definition, material, formal, efficient and final causes, and the implications of such concepts for social change and social control.

In making these comparisons it will be helpful to keep in mind the framework in which each of these men wrote: St. Thomas as a realistic dualist, and Ward, Sumner, and Cooley as monists. Ward at first seems to be a materialistic monist and later emphasizes more the psychic factor, hence might be regarded more in his later years as a spiritualistic monist; yet the psychic factor was conceived always as originating in matter. Sumner was a materialistic monist primarily, and Cooley a spiritualistic monist because of his transcendental idealism. St. Thomas, as a realistic dualist, considers man as both material and spiritual, since man is composed of a two-fold principle, rationality and animality. Materialistic monists like Ward and Sumner always consider man in terms of matter, hence he is essentially only an animal. This leads easily into behavioristic psychology. Spiritualistic monists like Cooley explain human nature in terms of the spirit alone. The last three believed in a process of evolution; yet for Ward and Sumner it was an organic evolution rooted in matter, while for Cooley it was in the realm of ideas.

St. Thomas defines society as "a union of men acting together for a common purpose." This definition may be applied to society in general as a macrocosm of groups in a hierarchical order or to a specific group such as the family or the state, a microcosm of social relations. In either case the essential elements are two or more people, common action, and common purpose. Since society is rooted in man and can not exist apart from man, St. Thomas does not hypostasize society as a substantial reality existing by itself. Society is an accidental being or set of relationships exist-

ing between or among concrete persons in so far as they are functionally related in working together to achieve a common end. Taking this as a practicable definition, it may be applied to the study of any type of group or groups.

Ward, on the other hand, includes only two of these elements in his definition "association" and "individuals." He leaves out the idea of "common purpose" because he seems to be more interested in the individual than groups,¹ and he also lacks an objective teleological order arranged according to God's plan although he emphasizes the necessity of a teleological order according to human invention. Populousness is the necessary condition for association but this does not explain the integration of a group as "common purpose" does in St. Thomas. It is not clear whether Ward considers society to be an accidental or substantial reality, a difficult distinction for a monist believing that all reality is matter, yet he does treat of society as an "abstract" relation rooted in "concrete" individuals. At least he does not hypostasize society for society can not exist apart from the individuals composing it. Interaction is implied in Ward's definition, but he does not suggest that relations be made the object of empirical research, since he was more interested in a synthetic than an analytic sociological approach.

In the Sumner-Keller tradition society is defined as "a group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species." The indispensable elements noted here are: "group of human beings," "cooperative effort," and two specific purposes only, "self-maintenance and self- or race-perpetuation." The existence of other specific groups such as political parties and clubs are recognized but are not labeled "society" since they do not fulfill the two designated societal functions. This definition limits the term "society" to "family, nation, or the whole race of mankind" as it fulfills the purposes of subsistence and reproduction. The conditioning factors of the size of the group and its territorial dimensions are: food-supply, means of transportation and communication, technology, and the

¹ Cf. W. B. Bodenhafer, "The Comparative Rôle of the Group Concept in Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* and Contemporary American Sociology," p. 294.

conditions for the struggle for existence. Proximity is a necessary condition for association but the conditions of the struggle for existence or the man-land ratio determine the size and organization of the group. Sumner also considers society as an accidental being, in the Thomistic sense, yet he differs from St. Thomas in limiting the term to groups fulfilling the specified societal functions. Sumner is much more specific in his definition and thereby furnishes a guide to empirical studies, yet his specificity as to types of groups and his basic assumptions of "struggle for existence" are too limited to give a complete picture of social reality.

According to Cooley, society "is a relation among personal ideas." Since it is a "phase of life" rather than a "thing in itself" Cooley restricts it to the phase of life—personal intercourse. Generically, it is human thought in its eternal on-going process of growth and organization throughout the ages. Specifically, it is located in the mind of each individual where the contact of persons as impressions or ideas takes place. It is "simply the collective aspect of personal thought." Reciprocal activity and mutual interdependence are necessary conditions for the growth and organization of thought or thought-systems or systems of interactions such as "nations, institutions, doctrines, parties, and persons." These thought-systems may be considered from the point of view of the individual person with his ideas and feelings, or the group as families, communities, states. Society is a mental fact since it is personal thought considered collectively, for person and society are two aspects of the same reality—human thought.

Cooley agrees with St. Thomas, Ward, and Sumner in that interaction and mutual interdependence are necessary in society, yet he differs from them in placing society in the realm of ideas rather than relations between persons. He recognizes the person as a *locus* for society, but it is the imagination of the person that is indispensable in his concept of society, rather than the objective relations set up between or among persons in interaction. By making society a relation among ideas rather than among persons, Cooley reduces society to a subjective reality known only by introspection. It seems to be an accidental being in that persons are necessary for its *locus*. Just as Ward is not specific enough, and Sumner is too specific, Cooley is also too limited in restricting

society to the realm of ideas and thus neglecting the objective factors of social reality.

MATERIAL CAUSE OR MEMBERSHIP

Since society is a "union of men," according to St. Thomas, the material cause of society is man.

St. Thomas demonstrates his thesis that man is naturally social by discussing man's needs, his natural equipment to meet these needs, and his inability alone to provide for all of his needs. Since his needs are both spiritual and physical, altruistic and egoistic, man needs God, other men, and things. In order, then, to meet his needs and develop his complete personality, man naturally seeks to satisfy his desires and meet his needs in cooperation with others; hence, man is social by nature.

St. Thomas also makes an important distinction between "sociality" (*socialis*) and "sociability" (*sociabilis*). The former refers to the tendency within man's nature to meet his needs and desires in association with others. The latter refers to the manner of cooperating with others, that is, his pleasantness and agreeableness. The first, man has by nature; the second is acquired.

Ward also considers man to be the material cause of society. However, Ward differs from St. Thomas in regard to the nature of man. Since man evolved from the animal, his original nature was limited to the physical appetites of food and sex. Only through the process of civilization, in its evolution from lower to higher stages of culture, did man acquire his "humanity" and moral nature.

Ward admits that "civilized man" is social, yet before he was subject to the civilizing process and his brain capacity had evolved to such an extent that he became a rational being, man was a very quarrelsome and belligerent individual. It seems that here Ward is equating "social" with "sociable" as defined by St. Thomas. In tracing the development of society from small groups in isolation to their incorporation into nations, Ward seems to be tracing the process of socialization of individuals or the widening of their base of association. This also is attributed to the evolution of the intellect which is a concomitant of man's brain development for it is the intellect that perceives the advantages of wider associa-

tion. Because of the perceived advantages, man is supposed to have changed from an antisocial to a social being. Ward admits that the evidence for this hypothesis is not too conclusive, yet he posits its plausibility.

Although Sumner is much more interested in group adjustment than in the individuals making up the group he admits that it is men that make up society. Sumner, like Ward, attributes man's origin to the process of evolution from the animal. Like Ward, Sumner also agrees that man as we know him today is a social being but he has become social out of necessity and expediency. If he wished to survive in the struggle for existence, man had to associate with others. Consequently society became a form of insurance necessary for survival. However, Sumner regards man's social nature as acquired through societal evolution rather than organic evolution as Ward maintains. To illustrate rather than demonstrate his thesis of man's progression from the non-social or anti-social to social, Sumner, also like Ward, presents evidence from the primitives. However, recent social anthropologists such as Marcel Mauss, René Maunier, Lowie, Malinowski and others in their field studies have tended to discredit the "atomism" of primitives.² In correlating man's sociability or lack of it with means of subsistence, Sumner refers to man's anti-social attitude toward his competitors in the "out-group," yet he neglects to stress the dependence of each individual within the group on the other members for subsistence and survival. It is this very dependence with its elements of give and take which is the basis for man's social nature. In keeping with Sumner's basic assumptions of "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest" he stresses conflict more than cooperation. However, the element of cooperation is present as the result of conflict even though it is minimized.

The main differences between St. Thomas, Ward, and Sumner are in their concept of the nature of man, and the confusion in the definition of "social" and "sociable."

In reaction to Ward's and Sumner's concept of society as a mechanical organism, in which the person is considered the

² Logan Wilson, "Sociography of Groups," *Twentieth Century Sociology*, p. 142.

element, Cooley considers human life as an organic process in which the personal idea is an aspect of the whole. He clearly distinguishes between person as a concrete individual and the personal idea which is the material cause of society for him. For the sociologist, the real person, according to Cooley, is the personal idea, that is, the idea which one person has in his mind or imagination about another. It consists of a symbol and the complex of thoughts and feelings connected with the symbol which relate to the person in question. Since it is the imagination that gives reality to the person, the person need not exist corporeally, but may be deceased, a person of fiction, or of the drama. Society, then, does not include all of man's personality but only that aspect which is imagined in the mind of another as part of his system of thought. The social person becomes a psychical or mental rather than material or concrete reality. Cooley posits the "person" as metaphysically antecedent to the "self" and "other" which originate in the consciousness of the "person." Thus, the "self" and "other" as "social persons" originating and developing in the imagination are the social reality for sociologists.

In contrast to Ward and Sumner, Cooley considers man to be social, but his concept of social differs from St. Thomas' in that for Cooley the "social" is referred to the realm of ideas, while for St. Thomas, it refers to the relations resulting from common action and common purpose.

Looking at man from the point of view of social organization, Cooley considers him to be an individual born with rudimentary capacities and tendencies that are developed into a human personality through the organic social process. Hence, Cooley recognizes human beings as concrete individuals in the practical order, but the social facts in his system of sociology are personal ideas rather than persons.

FORMAL CAUSE OR ORGANIZATION

According to Thomism the formal cause of society is social unity or unity of order which distinguishes society from mere aggregation. Because it is a unity of order among persons, it is a moral unity. It is also an accidental unity since the individuals or

persons are separate substances and united in only one aspect—membership in society. In this St. Thomas differs from those sociologists who hypostasize society, making it a substantial rather than accidental unity. However, it is a real unity since the relations between the members are real for they are rooted in human beings that are real. Society, then, is a system of relationships of subordination and coordination arising out of common action for a common purpose. The purpose determines the form of each society and the hierarchy of relationships within the form or structure. Society is dynamic for it depends upon active agents to initiate and maintain it. As there is a variety of types of groups corresponding to a variety of types of purposes, man may choose implicitly or explicitly to belong to many groups which tend to satisfy his needs and desires. Only that part of his personality is included in the group which pertains to the purpose of that particular group. Hence he has a dual rôle as an individual and as a member of society. Social relations may be considered in the group or in institutions.

Since an institution consists of stable human relations, it may be an association, custom, or relationship consciously approved by society and maintained by certain rules and agencies. It is a mechanism facilitating social activities by furnishing a definite pattern within a certain range of accepted behavior. Natural institutions, such as marriage, the family, state, and property derive their origin, purpose, and sanction from the natural moral law, since they safeguard basic human needs and desires. Cultural institutions, such as etiquette, derive their origin and sanction from human convention or human law, and are related to human needs and desires that do not require universal or permanent institutions to safeguard them.

The necessary virtues for unity, since it is a moral unity, are social justice and social charity. Auxiliary virtues are honesty, truthfulness, and cheerfulness. Physical proximity may facilitate group action but is not essential for membership.

Society, then, is an accidental though real being resulting from unity of order. It is a moral rather than a physical unity, since it is directed by man's free will and intelligence.

Ward also implies unity among the members of society, since

he considers the essence of society to be association in which the individual members are united by a certain psychic force. Society is the result of interaction; consequently, there must be some kind of unity. Since Ward deals with the individual as a datum, and is not concerned so much with the concept of group as a tool of analysis, he is not very explicit about what constitutes the principle of integration. The unity is more of an artificial, than a moral, unity because the interacting individuals do not originate the group though they may direct its activity as their intelligence evolves. This unity also seems to be mechanical since it is the result of "synergy" equilibrating the social forces. Ward speaks of aggregates rather than groups as units of society. These are classified as impartial if they do not include all the members of a definite territory, and universal, if all members are included. Hence it is not an integrating factor but inclusiveness of membership that is the criterion of aggregates. Physical proximity seems to be a necessary condition since association or society is the product of associating. Unity and common action are implied but the integrating factor is very vague in Ward's system.

Ward considers institutions to be social structures, either material or psychic, that control and utilize social energy. The term "social energy" has a mechanical connotation of social physics in contrast to the activity of human beings working through institutions in the Thomistic sense. Institutions are the product of the conflicting social forces and serve as mechanisms for carrying on the work of society. The primary institutions are related to man's fundamental wants and demands while the secondary or artificial are derived genetically from the primary. For example, the institution of the family grew out of the institution of marriage; the moral code is derived from the blood bond.

Ward agrees with St. Thomas in that natural or primary institutions are related to man's fundamental needs and desires although his classification of needs and desires differs from the Thomistic in that his is a genetic classification while the Thomistic is hierarchical based on the natural moral law. Ward also differs from St. Thomas in his conception of intellectual and moral needs, and in the origin of institutions. For Ward, society and institutions are the product of conflicting social forces, while for St.

Thomas they are the product of the creative activity of man's intelligence in accordance with God's plan.

In the Sumner-Keller system, social unity or unity of order arises out of the common action necessitated by the struggle for existence. Out of this competing interaction, relationships of superordination and subordination automatically arise in the process of adjustment. Since the adjustment is spontaneous, unconscious, and automatic, the unity is mechanical rather than consciously planned, accidental rather than substantial. Sumner is more specific than Ward in designating struggle for existence as the integrating factor. Yet he differs from St. Thomas in limiting the integrating factor to material existence.

This struggle also limits Sumner's types of groups to in-groups and out-groups that are necessarily opposed to each other. The group to which a person belongs is the in-group and embraces his whole activity in contrast to the Thomistic and Cooley idea in which a person may be a member of many types of groups.

Sumner regards an institution as consisting of a concept and a structure for implementing the concept; therefore, it is both ideological and social. His "crescive" or primary institutions, such as property, marriage, and religion, grew out of the folkways and mores, while the "enacted" institutions such as banks and laws are the result of rational invention although they are "crescive" in character. The nuclei are the four basic interests of hunger, love, fear, and vanity for these are the four fundamental needs of man.

Sumner, like Ward and St. Thomas, relates his primary institutions to basic needs but differs in his classification of needs because of his concept of the nature of man, which is similar to Ward's. His concept of institution may be useful in explaining the instinctive and traditional elements in the development of institutions providing the evolutionary basis is discarded. However, by ascribing the development entirely to the folkways and mores, Sumner, like Ward, leaves out the rational element characteristic of the Thomistic conception of an institution.

To Cooley, society is simply the collective view of persons as ideas, since society and individuals are not separable phenomena but the "collective and distributive aspect of the same thing."³

³ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 1-2.

Unity is organization which consists of the functional relations of the different members of society or it is "a system of co-ordinated activities fitted to the conditions."⁴ Interaction and mutual influence are essential.

Solidarity in a social group is "a fundamental harmony of forces resulting in effective coöperation."⁵ However, Cooley finds it difficult to analyze the elements of this solidarity. It is a combination of likeness and difference. Likeness consists in common ideas or sentiments pertaining to the activity in question. Differences reside in the individuals making up the harmonious whole. The test of solidarity is efficiency in total action. Social unity seems to consist in a common body of ideas and sentiments expressed by tradition and convention and resulting from reciprocal interaction among persons and institutions. Unity consists not in agreement but in organization which is reciprocal activity among the parts of the whole.

Both groups and institutions are phases of the public mind or common body of thought and differ largely in point of view. A family may be considered a group if it is conceived of as an aggregation of persons with distinct purposes and organization. Or it may be designated as an institution in which the sentiments, beliefs, customs and symbols are crystallized into definite forms centering upon the familial interest. An institution is a habit of mind and of action largely unconscious, which may enlist the activities of a group but is not co-extensive with any one group. Again Cooley differs from St. Thomas in stressing only the subjective or ideological aspect, and from Ward and Sumner who tend to emphasize the objective or material aspect. However, Cooley agrees with St. Thomas that a person may be a member of many groups in contrast to Sumner who confines membership to one group only.

EFFICIENT CAUSE OR AGENT

According to the Thomistic position, the proximate efficient cause of society is man's intellect and will, while the ultimate cause is God, the creator of man and his human nature. Man is natu-

⁴ *Social Process*, p. 19.

⁵ *Social Organization*, p. 330.

rally inclined toward society because of his social nature. He also wills whatever is necessary for his conservation and development. Since society is a necessary means, man, explicitly or implicitly, helps to form and maintain the types of societies or groups which will help him in the attainment of his end. For example, in marriage the man and woman freely and consciously make a contract with each other which establishes the husband-wife relationship, the basis of marriage. The state is an outgrowth of several families within a territory in which mutual rights and duties arise. At first the organization is practically instinctive and is controlled by custom. As the number increases and more formal organization is necessary, some of the members, at least, consciously develop a political organization to meet the needs of the members. This is accepted explicitly or implicitly by the willing of the others to remain in the territory and cooperate for the common good.

Factors conditioning the operation of the intellect and will are the lower appetites such as fear, anger, sex habits; and other forces of heredity, and the physical and social environment.

Correlative to the intellect and will as efficient cause is authority with its laws and sanctions. The ultimate efficient cause is God, as the author of man's nature, and the natural moral law according to which man, the proximate cause, conforms his actions in carrying out God's plan.

Ward, on the other hand, maintains that society is the product of materialistic evolution. Yet to Ward evolution is a law of sympodial development rather than unilinear as Sumner contends. Just as in organic evolution the inner process is conflict so in society it is the conflict of desires in the individual. These become social forces by interaction and furnish the dynamism for the activity to satisfy physical and psychical or spiritual desires. These social forces are "equilibrated" by the principle of "synergy" and result in the organization of society and social structures. In his later writings, Ward follows Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer in contending that race struggle is the social "synergy" which operates in the social world and creates society. He states that the two great agents or agencies of society are the dynamic and directive. The dynamic are the social forces initiated

by the conative aspect of man's nature, feelings or desires, which are blind and mechanical. The directive is the intellect which perceives the advantages of association and directs the social forces accordingly. However, the intellect is not a spiritual faculty in the Thomistic sense but a higher evolution of matter.

The ultimate efficient cause of society is matter in motion which is characteristic of all types of evolution, physical, psychical, and social. The proximate efficient cause is the social forces generating activities which are equilibrated and organized by social "synergy," specifically, race struggle. It is not too clear whether Ward means race struggle to be the origin of society as such, or society as politically organized.

Ward considers intellect and will as highly organized forms of matter, while St. Thomas regards them as spiritual faculties of the soul. For St. Thomas, human action is, to a certain extent, determined by matter since man is partly material and his sentient appetites are related to matter, yet the intellect and will, as spiritual faculties, transcend matter, and are free to direct human activities according to God's moral law, aided by divine grace. In Ward, all desire is physical, while St. Thomas recognizes the conative aspect of man on both the sensile or animal level and the rational or human level.

Ward classified desires into essential and non-essential as they are related to race continuation and progress. St. Thomas, on the other hand, classifies desires according to the three levels of life in man—vegetative, sensile, and rational. These are ordered to man's moral spiritual purpose—temporal felicity here and eternal beatitude hereafter. Hence St. Thomas' classification is "spiritually individualistic and not racial" as Ward's.⁶

As to the ultimate cause of society, there is the eternal distance between God as the First Cause in the Thomistic tradition and matter in motion as the primary cause in Ward's system. Both disagree fundamentally in their philosophy and moral interpretation of life.

Ward lacks the clear-cut analytical view of desires or appetency presented by St. Thomas, while St. Thomas lacks the recognition

⁶ Smith, *Classification of Desires in St. Thomas and in Modern Sociology*, p. 36.

of the esthetic forces presented so thoroughly by Ward. Both agree on the function of pleasure as related to appetency yet St. Thomas views it from an ultimate spiritual interpretation.⁷

With Sumner, as with Ward, social forces arise as the result of interaction among men in their struggle for self and race preservation. However, Sumner limits these forces to four—hunger, love, vanity, and fear. The first two are primary as with Ward since they are possessed in common with animals. Vanity and fear are secondary or derivative. Perhaps it would be more accurate to call them socializing rather than social forces for they drive men into association and keep them there.

Similarly to Ward also, Sumner maintains that in association men compete with each other, but according to Sumner, harmony is obtained through "antagonistic cooperation" instead of "synergy" as in Ward. The process out of which society evolves is "competition of life," that is, the struggle between men and with the flora and fauna.

Among the conditional factors in the process are the variable elements of the environment, supply of materials, means of exploiting the materials, the stage of technology, climate, and mode of transportation and communication.

The ultimate efficient cause is evolution, as in Ward, although in the form of competition of life. The proximate efficient cause is the social forces driving men into association to meet their needs.

In comparing St. Thomas and Sumner, the same evaluation holds as with Ward, with the exception that Ward emphasizes more the direction of the desires by the intellect, and Sumner stresses more the struggle for existence.

Since Cooley conceives human life to be an eternal onward-going process, and men, groups, and institutions to be aspects of that life resulting from interaction with all other aspects, the ultimate efficient cause seems to be a "vital impulse of unknown origin" operating within the process, adapting itself to new conditions and situations. It is an interaction between internal active tendencies within persons, groups, or ideas, and the external conditions to which it must adapt in its growth. The process of adaptation may be conscious or unconscious, directed by the reason

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

or not. Cooley considers reason to be a principle of higher organization which controls and transforms the instinctive energies. It is an instinctive disposition itself which "compares, combines, and organizes the activities of the mind."⁸ It differs from animals in degree, not in kind. In this sense Cooley's concept of reason differs from the Thomistic in which reason is a spiritual faculty of the soul. The "immediate motor and guide of social growth is interest." Both elements—competition and cooperation—are present because of common and conflicting interest. Competition seems to be the most effective means of adaptation until individuals have sufficient intelligence and self-control to unite in following common interests. The maintenance of institutions is made possible by permanent symbols such as laws, constitutions, and sacred writings by which personal influences or acts of sympathy are organized as cohesive forces.

Cooley speaks of God as a builder and men as co-builders. God is apparently an onward-striving process in which we are members of him and the real agents of his work. He is a common current in all men flowing mainly in the involuntary processes. Hence, it is not clear whether Cooley means that God is the ultimate efficient cause or not. In fact, Cooley contends that his organic view of nature and society does not furnish ultimate explanations. The immediate explanation is the organic process of adaptation in which men and society are twin-born as the result of mutual interaction between internal tendencies and external conditions. The elements of conflict and cooperation in an evolutionary process are present as in Ward and Sumner but again the process is in human thought. Cooley differs from St. Thomas in emphasizing only the spiritual aspect of man relating to thought and ideas and neglecting the physical aspect of men which also affects the interaction with others.

FINAL CAUSE OR PURPOSE

In the Thomistic synthesis the final cause of society is the common good. There are two kinds of common good: first, the particular goods common to all the members of society that each

⁸ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 30.

individual seeks such as food, clothing, housing, recreation, education, and religion, or the goods of body, soul, and external goods, and the good of society as such, peace and general prosperity. Society, then, is the means of helping man to attain temporal happiness or felicity here and eternal happiness in the next life. Since the common good of society is the welfare of the group each person contributes according to his abilities and shares according to his needs. Thus arises a "mutuality of responsibility." Each group in society has its own "common good" and these are graded according to a hierarchy of purposes from lower to higher on the basis of the "principle of subsidiarity" as directed by the natural moral law. As in nature, so in society the imperfect progresses toward the perfect. Each person may contribute to the common good by cooperating with others in fulfilling the purpose or purposes of each group to which he belongs. Since man is composed of soul and body, he has both spiritual and material needs which society must take into account. The state, as society politically organized, has the duty to promote the common good of all legitimate groups by helping each group fulfill its purpose constructively by assistance and negatively by removing obstacles hindering the attainment of the common good of that particular group. The common good in any group or society at large takes precedence over the individual good in the temporal order while the individual good supersedes the common good in the spiritual or supernatural order. Society exists to help its members attain temporal well-being here and eternal happiness hereafter by promoting the common good which is perfection of human living in the natural and supernatural order.

According to Ward, the ultimate end of every individual man and society collectively is to increase happiness, that is, the satisfaction of man's desire—physical, such as eating, drinking, and reproducing; and psychical, such as esthetic, moral, and intellectual. He recognizes that specific groups are formed for specific purposes, but it is the duty of the universal organization to care for the general good of its members. The universal organization seems to be synonymous with government or society politically organized. Therefore he suggests two means to attain the end which is increase in happiness. The first is the establishment of

"sociocracy," a term borrowed from Comte, that is, the rule of society, by society, for society, or the scientific control of social forces by the collective mind of society for the advantage of all. By attractive rather than repressive legislation, and by placing the government in the hands of social scientists, society could be directed toward desired ends. Attractive legislation would tend to harmonize purposeful social activity or "collective telesis" with individual self-interest. Tracing most of the evils of society to lack of wisdom, Ward suggests as the second means of increasing happiness the wider diffusion of knowledge. It is not clear whether this popular education is to be directed by the élite or the government.

Since the progress of the race is ultimate in Ward, individual and race preservation are primary in his system. Increasing happiness or social progress are to be achieved by man's greater mastery over nature and the social forces, greater individual opportunity by education, and the ascent of the non-essential or ameliorative over the essential or physical powers. Both St. Thomas and Ward regard individual and race preservation as important but St. Thomas considers them in their relationship to God and His plan for creatures, rather than ends in themselves. Both agree that happiness is the end of the individual but disagree in what happiness consists. For Ward, happiness is the excess of pleasure or enjoyment over pain. For St. Thomas, happiness is the satisfaction of desires through action, and pleasure accompanies the attainment of the object but is not limited to physical pleasure alone. Ward considers pleasure as unrelated to God, whereas St. Thomas conceives it as related to God and human life.

Sumner limits the purpose of society to two functions: self-maintenance and preservation of the species. Society is a kind of insurance which meets these two needs as a matter of expediency and utility. For him the common good is apparently limited to the physical needs and all others are derived from these. At least these are the basic needs. Sumner, like Ward, is also more concerned about race progress than the temporal and eternal happiness of the individual as the ultimate goal of society, therefore, he differs from St. Thomas in this aspect just as Ward does. Sumner considers pleasure and pain as principles operating for

expediency and survival rather than for happiness. Since he is so intent on the struggle involved in the man-land ratio, his main emphasis is conflict and survival rather than cooperation and happiness. The ultimate goal in both Ward and Sumner is life on this earth, in terms of happiness for Ward, and survival for Sumner; while in St. Thomas, it is both happiness in this life and the next for each individual.

According to Cooley, the purpose of society is to express human nature through a system of symbols embodying ideas. Human nature is defined as sentiments and impulses characteristic of human beings at all times and places such as sympathy, love, ambition, and feelings of right and wrong. Since these common sentiments and ideals are acquired only in interaction with others, society is necessary to develop and express human nature or to socialize the individual. The essential means of this socialization are the primary groups—the family and neighborhood, supplemented by the school, and the instrument of communication, which includes words, writing, telephones, railways, and every means of spanning space and time.

Cooley agrees with St. Thomas that society is the means of socializing the individual, but St. Thomas would not agree that society is the principle from which man derives his social nature. Cooley limits human nature to sentiments and impulses, while St. Thomas, considering human nature as it exists in the individual person, includes all of man's potentialities on both the physical and spiritual level. Cooley does not make the distinction as St. Thomas does between the metaphysical essence of man—his rationality and animality that never changes—and the physical man who is constantly changing through his activity. Cooley is interested also only in the development of "human nature" as such without reference to any goal outside of the individual such as union with God in the Thomistic system. St. Thomas would agree with Cooley's emphasis on the importance of the primary groups but would also add the Church and the state as being very necessary. "The Church is necessary to meet man's spiritual needs, and the state, to safeguard his temporal welfare.

Cooley differs from Ward and Sumner in emphasizing the socialization of the individual through groups by means of symbols

and ideas, yet he agrees with them in confining the development of the individual to this life without much reference to the next. His idea of God is vague as it is embodied in the great on-going process. Cooley agrees with St. Thomas that change is always taking place, but St. Thomas would not agree that everything changes, and that human life consists wholly of a process of thought.

SOCIAL CHANGE

With such varied concepts of society arising from different basic assumptions, it is easy to see that the concepts of social change and the implications will also differ.

Although St. Thomas does not discuss social change as such, he does present the fundamental principles which may be applied to social change. He considers change or movement as a passage or development from an antecedent to a consequent state, or the reduction of potentiality to actuality.⁹ Applying this to man, his social nature has been given to him by God so that he may, in cooperation with others, develop his own personality and help others to perfect theirs. In doing this he enters into relations with others, either temporary or permanent. Social change takes place, then, in the field of these relations as they are adjusted to meet man's needs and the conditions of the times. These relations are dynamic and therefore always changing as men seek through common action and common purposes to meet their needs and desires. This is readily deduced from the definition of society as a union of men working together to attain a common end. The social process consists in the interaction of persons and institutions since these embody the dynamism of human activity, or it may be conceived of as the movement of human beings in a social group or groups toward objectives determined by the potencies of human nature as given to man by God.

According to Ward the production of an effect by a cause involves the notion of change or movement.¹⁰ Applying this to society, any disturbance of the balance of opposing social forces results in change, since social change is one aspect of the universal cosmic change. "Genetic" changes are the result of blind evolu-

⁹ *Physics*, III, 1; cf. Duzy, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

¹⁰ *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 458.

tionary forces while "telic" changes are the product of conscious social improvement.

Sumner regards social change as group-adjustments to life-conditions, or the man-land ratio, since he considers evolution to be a process of adjustment.

For Cooley, social change is synonymous with social process which is an aspect of the eternal onward-moving process of human life embodied in human thought.

Some of the implications of these concepts will be treated. For instance, according to St. Thomas, the proximate source of social change is the persons who make up society and initiate and maintain social relations to meet their needs and desires. Since creatures are dependent on God for their being and also the power to act, God is the ultimate source of social change, since God is the beginning and end of all change. Ward and Sumner maintain that impersonal automatic forces acting within conditions that are part of the universal order are the origin of change. Cooley also posits a vital impulse within the process that is always pushing forward, but Cooley's impulse or force is in the realm of ideas rather than the material as in Ward and Sumner.

The medium of social change for St. Thomas is man in his social relations, either temporary or permanent. Ward, Sumner, and Cooley also consider man as the medium through which social change takes place, but man is more the passive recipient or instrument through which change is effected than the initiator and director in the Thomistic sense.

In the Thomistic system the fundamental law of social change is the natural moral law, in which the directives of social change are found. It is also the yardstick of progress since it safeguards human rights and duties. For both Ward and Sumner, it is the law of materialistic evolution, while for Cooley, it is spiritualistic evolution in terms of ideas. Ward conceives of change as sympodial, Sumner as unilinear, and Cooley as cyclical.

The objectives or goal of social change for St. Thomas is the same as the final cause of society, that is, proximately, man's felicity or temporal well-being on this earth, and ultimately, beatitude or eternal happiness in union with God in Heaven. Ward also considers the increase of human happiness or social progress

as the goal of social change; however, his idea of happiness is limited to happiness on this earth. Sumner is concerned with social changes to meet needs, but his list of needs is primarily self and race-preservation. As man advances to a higher stage of civilization, he strives for a higher standard of living but this seems to be in terms of material advancement. Cooley considers a richer life to be the objective of the social process but does not explain specifically what the richer life includes. It implies a more fully developed human nature in the sense of more socialization and higher ideals.

In regard to directed social change or social control, basic in the Thomistic tradition is the principle of the subjection of the lower to the higher, consequently, any plan or change contemplated by man in his social relations with others must be in accordance with man's highest faculty, reason, which is guided by the natural moral law, God's plan for man. According to God's plan, certain institutions such as marriage, the Church, and state protect man's basic needs, and therefore can not be changed in essence but can be changed accidentally. While other institutions derived from the culture or convention, such as choral clubs, sports groups, may be changed both essentially and accidentally. In forming relations with others or introducing changes in these relations to meet his needs and desires, man is guided by reason enlightened by revelation and the objective order in which each being has a proper place and function. Men acting according to their rational nature, and guided by the above principles, can direct social change so as to better their temporal welfare and enable them to attain eternal happiness, which is true progress since it is in accordance with human nature and God's plan; or they may neglect the directives of God and their human nature, so that their lower appetites, such as sex, greed, or power, rule instead of the higher which is reason, and the result is retrogression. Man decides wisely or unwisely according to his ability, information, and pressure from within and without. All social change should be directed in view of the dignity of the human person. It is in man's power to balance the tension between the individual and his environment.

Ward in distinguishing between "telic" and "genetic" change

emphasizes the necessity of "telic" or conscious social improvement replacing the "genetic" which results from blind evolutionary forces. Man in his social capacity is to try to improve society by intelligently directing the social forces so that they will best serve society. In that sense man is the teleological agent. However, man as the product of nature awaits the development of his intellectual capacity which is concomitant with the development of his brain capacity so that he can direct the social forces. The means to be used are popular education of the masses and attractive legislation initiated by the "sociocracy." Progress or retrogression may result depending upon whether change becomes more "telic" or not.

Sumner, in contrast to Ward, places little hope in man's effort to direct social change, since changes are due to natural forces practically beyond man's control. No major changes are possible. Whatever change is attempted must be confined to immediate efforts in adapting means to ends in minor problems. Sumner recognizes that social change has taken place and that man has advanced to a higher plane of civilization, but this change seems to be due primarily to changes in the maintenance-mores on each level.

Cooley maintains that the inefficient adaptive organization of society should be replaced by a more rational control through scientific study and reconstruction. Agreeing with Ward, Cooley contends that education is the principal means of equipping the members of society to fulfill their functions intelligently and responsibly. Recognizing the fact that change may be retrogressive as well as progressive, Cooley emphasizes the need of providing against disorderly changes by foreseeing and controlling the social process in which we live. An extension of the means of communication can facilitate or hinder social change depending upon the use of these instruments.

Fundamentally, the concepts of society and social change or social control are based on the concepts of man's nature, origin, and destiny.

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